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ًعا َوُخْفيَةً إِنَّهُ الَ يُِحبُّ اْلُمْعتَِديَن * َوالَ تُْفِسُدواْ فِي األَْرِض بَْعَد  إِْصالَِحَها َواْدُعوهُ َخْوفًا ﴿ اْدُعواْ َربَُّكْم تََضرُّ
َن اْلُمْحِسنِيَن ﴾ ِ قَِريٌب ِمه  َوَطَمعًا إِنَّ َرْحَمَت ّللاه




ALLAH The Highest Says: 
”  (55)  Call upon your Lord in humility and privately; indeed, He does not like 
transgressors.  (56 ) And cause not corruption upon the earth after its reformation. 
And invoke Him in fear and aspiration. Indeed, the mercy of Allah is near to the 
doers of good” 
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Although the connection between innovation and corruption has been ubiquitous 
since the middle of the twentieth century, scholars have yet to establish an exact 
nature of this relationship: some researchers have found that corruption can boost 
the innovation level via removing the rigid obstacles to investment and foster 
innovation which eventually greases economic growth. Conversely, others 
demonstrated that corruption could deter innovation levels and the adverse 
relationship between corruption and innovation can slow down economic growth. 
This complex and controversial relationship encouraged us to further investigate 
the interaction between the two across many countries and over several years. To 
this aim, our first empirical chapter addresses the relationship between corruption 
and innovation. Unlike usual approaches, we apply two proxies to represent 
innovation and they are divided into: 1) innovation inputs, where a fixed effects 
method has been used, and 2) innovation outputs, where a random effects method 
has been used. The results show that corruption could sand the wheel of innovation 
inputs, yet, it shows no impact on innovation outputs. In conclusion, innovation 
inputs are adversely affected by corruption. Therefore, governments should 
establish anti-corruption campaigns as well as focus on minimizing corruption by 
implementing laws and regulations that discourage any attempts to corruption. 
The second empirical paper studies the effect of neighbouring corruption on home 
country innovation and, furthermore, examines neighbouring innovation impact on 
the home country corruption. Two Stages Least Squares method and random effects 
method have been used respectively to address these issues. The empirical evidence 
demonstrates that neighbouring corruption harms home innovation, as well as being 
adversely affected by neighbouring innovation. Additionally, geographical 
closeness between capital cities can increase corruption in both countries 
(neighbour and home country). Also, neighbouring openness acts as a hindrance to 
home country corruption, and it can help reduce corruption. Thus, we can conclude 
that countries can be affected by their neighbours’ levels of corruption, and that it 
is challenging to remain uncorrupted while surrounded by corrupted countries. To 
minimize the harmful effect of contagious corruption on home innovation therefore, 
governments should set strict laws and regulations at the borders.  
The third paper empirically investigates the influences of English Language, trade 
openness and corruption on innovation outputs, namely on research productivity, 
by using mixed models. Our empirical results show that both trade openness and 
corruption are adversely related to research productivity. However, the results also 
demonstrate that countries which have English as an official language are more 
active in the research field in terms of citations than those countries in which 
English is not an official language. On the other hand, in terms of publications the 
results showed that countries with English as an official language are not 
necessarily publishing more than those where English is not an official language. 
Therefore, governments should firstly support international and national grants by 
increasing the amount dedicated to the R&D sector, and secondly should also 
encourage international collaboration.  
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1. Chapter One:  Introduction 
 
1.1 Purpose of the Study 
This research project explores the corruption-innovation relationship over time. 
Specifically, the thesis aims to contribute to the corruption and innovation literature 
by providing a more comprehensive view of how this complicated relationship is 
manifested across countries and over time. Thus, the following aims and objectives 
have been developed for the present project: 
1. Examine the relationship between innovation and corruption. The first 
objective of this study is to address the overall relationship between 
corruption and innovation through the two main categories of input and 
output. Innovation input is represented by the research & development 
expenditures and the number of researchers working in the research & 
development sector while the innovation output is signified by the number 
of residential patents and the number of articles published. 
2. Quantify the impact of contagious corruption on the home country 
innovation. The second objective of this study is to explore if the corruption 
of neighbouring countries has an impact on the innovation level in the home 
country. Also, this part discusses if the innovation of the neighbouring 
countries can affect the level of corruption in the home country.  
3. Address the relationship between innovation (research productivity) and 
the use of English as an official language. The final objective of this study 
is to investigate if English “being an official language” has an impact on a 
country’s innovation level represented by research productivity. The 
variables used to characterize the research productivity are the number of 
citations, of publications and citations per publication. Other variables, 
including corruption are also being controlled.  
Chapter One: Introduction 
15 
 
1.2 Thesis Outline 
This PhD research is structured as an article-based thesis comprised of a context 
chapter that sets the scene for the study, and three separate articles written for 
publication in three different journals. Each of these articles raises distinct research 
questions and presents independent contributions to the literature. They are closely 
interlinked and complementary as each one addresses a specific aspect of the 
primary objective of the thesis to explore and understand the dynamic relationship 
between corruption and innovation. The thesis ends with general conclusions, 
research limitation and suggested future work. The structure flowchart of the thesis 








Chapter 2: Research Background- This chapter delivers an overview of the 
economic growth theory. It also provides definitions of the two main eras of this 
project, which are innovation and corruption and their relationship to the economic 
growth of nations.   
Chapter 3: Paper 1- Chapter 3 presents the first article, entitled “Is Corruption 
Detrimental to Innovation?” The purpose of this paper is to map the corruption-
innovation conflict relationship, and to identify the research gaps that require 
further attention. Therefore, this paper proposes to investigate the relationship 
between corruption and both innovation inputs and outputs for selected countries 
over several years while controlling other variables. Overall, the results showed that 
















Figure 1-1. Thesis Structure Flowchart 
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Chapter 4: Paper 2- This presents the second article, entitled “Does Contagious 
Corruption affects Home innovation?” This paper is an extension of the previous 
paper and to the best of the researchers’ knowledge it is the first to investigate the 
question of whether neighbouring corruption can disturb home country innovation 
level .Goel and Nelson (2007) and many others studied if corruption can move from 
one place to another and they concluded that corruption could be contagious. Thus 
far, this chapter is based on the country level, and it aims to quantify the influence 
level on the home country’s innovation of the neighbouring countries’ corruption. 
Geographical proximity was the main factor used to quantify the impact of 
corruption and, interestingly, the results showed that corruption could move from a 
country to another and it can harm the innovation level in the home country. 
Chapter 5: Paper 3- Chapter 5 presents the last article, entitled “Can Corruption 
Distress Research Productivity?” This study attempts mainly to empirically 
investigate if countries with English as an official language are more innovative 
than countries in which English is not an official language. Furthermore, this article 
meant to quantify the impact of corruption level on the research productivity of 
nations. However, to the best of the researcher’s knowledge, this is the first attempt 
to quantify these impacts using 170 countries for 23 years. The results support that 
countries in which English is an official language neither have the advantage nor 
the disadvantage to be more innovative in terms of research productivity.  
Chapter 6: Conclusion- Chapter 6 provides an overall conclusion to the three 
papers and mentions the implications of this research, its limitations and future 
directions.
Chapter Two: Research Context 
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2. Chapter Two: Research Context 
This chapter is divided into two sections that provide an overview of the research 
context. Section 2.1 highlights the research background, defining the thesis’ two 
main focuses of innovation and corruption. This will be followed by a brief 
summary of the literature on the relationship between innovation and corruption.  
2.1 Research Background  
The economic growth of a nation can be influenced either by endogenous or 
exogenous factors such as human capital, natural resources, and technological 
change. The scholars of economic growth theories have branched into two different 
schools of theories along the line of this division. Firstly, traditional economic 
growth theories such as Neo-classical economic growth models represented by the 
Neoclassicist school such as Ramsey (1928), Solow (1956) and Swan (1956) who 
theorised that exogenous factors drive economic growth. The second school of the 
recent economic growth theories built around Schumpeterian economic growth 
theory whose core principle is that economic growth or development is driven 
endogenously through technological change. In this context, innovation is 
considered to be an endogenous factor which affects economic growth within in a 
system (Schumpeter, 1939:38). The following section provides more details about 
innovation and its relation with economic growth.  
2.1.1 Innovation  
The common definition of innovation involves developing new ideas in order to 
yield new programs, new processes or ways, new products, or new services. 
Generally, all innovations commence with generating original ideas. Amabile et al. 
(1996) defined innovation as successfully implementing creative ideas. According 
to West and Altink (1996), “innovation is any idea, practice or material artefact 
perceived to be new by the relevant unit of adoption”. Furthermore, Kanter (1983) 
defines innovation as “the process of bringing any new problem-solving idea into 
use”.  
Chapter Two: Research Context 
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However, the theory of economic growth has evolved over years to appear in its 
current shape. Since the recognition of the relationship between technological 
progress, innovation and economic performance in the 1990s, investment in 
research and development has snowballed along with the widening of innovation 
activities across many sectors of the economy (OCDE, 2000). Furthermore, 
innovation is a crucial factor in development both because it is one of the economic 
growth’s main drivers (OECD, 2012), and because it helps address socio-economic 
challenges. Much of the literature has established that innovation has a vital role in 
stimulating either the growth of a country’s economy — not only in developed 
countries, but also in emerging ones — or a firm’s profitability (Cameron, 1996; 
Sachs and McArthur, 2002; Bilbao‐Osorio and Rodríguez‐Pose, 2004; Rosenberg, 
2004; Fagerberg et al., 2010; Galindo and Méndez-Picazo, 2013; Fan, 2014). Thus, 
innovation has been increasingly studied over the last five decades because of its 
importance for the economic development of nations. Based on the economic 
scholarly literature, Solow (1956), Mansfield (1972), and Nadiri (1993) 
theoretically and empirically examined how innovation contributes to the economic 
growth of nations. Drawing on this literature, therefore, innovation is selected in 
this study to be the primary independent variable. Figure (2-1) shows the growth 
trend of the world’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP)1 and Innovation2, using the 
average data of 178 countries over the period 2000-20163. According to Figure (2-
1), the global GDP is distinctly increasing, yet the spending in R&D is fluctuating 
from one year to another. During the period of 2000-2015, the spending in R&D 
has increased by 23 % despite the fact that the global GDP has increased by 71% 
since 2000.   
                                                          
1 GDP is constant in 2011 prices and at Purchase Power Parity. 
2 Innovation is represented in research and development expenditure (R&D) and it is a proportion 
of GDP. 
3 The data of GDP and R&D are averages of the countries which are used in this thesis. 













Additionally, Figure (2-2) shows World’s R&D expenditure in 2015 and 
demonstrates that countries which have a similar spending on innovation are 
neighbours. This relationship has further encouraged us to focus on innovation and 
investigate more deeply the knowledge spillover which might be due to several 
reasons including the location of a country, its common language, common culture 
or any other reasons. 
Figure 2-1. Global GDP vs. Global R&D  
Source. World Bank  
Figure 2-2. World's R&D expenditures 2015 
Source: World Bank. 




Corruption becomes an increasingly interesting factor for many researchers in 
different fields, each of which has defined it in different ways. According to the 
World Bank, the most prevalent definition of corruption is that it is the abuse of 
public power for private benefit. Transparency International (TI) has defined 
corruption as “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain which eventually hurts 
everyone who depends on the integrity of people in a position of authority”. 
Regarding the cost of corruption, the United Nation (2018) stated that it is around 
5 percent of the Global GDP. This means that trillions of dollars are being spent for 
corruption activities every year, being paid in bribery, nepotism, theft and other 
illegal forms (United Nations, 2018). Therefore, corruption is a serious problem for 
almost every country, especially those in the developing and emerging economies. 
According to Transparency International4, more than 65% of the countries which 
are included in the organization’s surveys and are considered corrupt, are facing a 
serious corruption issue because they score below 50 on the Corruption Perception 
index (CPI). The rest of the countries are considered to be clean, and although they 
do have some corruption activities, it is a small value compared to corrupt countries. 
Figure (2-3) shows the trend of global corruption5 over the period of 2000 to 2017, 
which was illustrated by taking the average of the corruption of countries included 
in the present thesis over each year. It is clearly visible that the world’s corruption 
level increases over the time, and the worst year was 2010, in which the average 
corruption index was approximately 60 points in a scale of 100.  
                                                          
4 Transparency International is the leading global responsible organization in fighting against 
corruption. 
5 In this research study, we reversed the index so that it ranges from 100 (highly corrupt) to 1 (very 
clean). 











Figure (2-4) illustrates the world’s corruption in 2018, indicating that corrupted 
countries are clustered together and clean countries are also gathered together. This 
trend of cohesion encouraged us to study contagious corruption by investigating the 
reasons behind this infection and its impact on neighbouring countries economic 
growth. We claim that corruption infection can affect home country innovation 
through affecting home country corruption. We argue that the contiguity of 
corruption among countries can harm the innovation of a home country which 
impacts the growth of a country’s economy. 
Figure 2-3. World Corruption Growth Trend 
Source. Transparency International  
Figure 2-4. World's Corruption 2018 
Source: Transparency International Organization 
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Corruption is considered as one of the most challenging features for many 
economies around the world, yet, the literature has not achieved a firm agreement 
regarding the effect of corruption on economic growth. On the one hand, some 
researchers claim that corruption is beneficial to the growth of an economy when it 
is efficient because it can help speed up unnecessary bureaucratic procedures to 
overcome the distortion policies and thus boost official governmental performance 
(Mauro, 1995; Aidt, 2003). On the other hand, other researchers have provided 
evidence that corruption might be desirable and that it boosts the wheel of economic 
development and growth (Leff, 1964b; Huntington, 1968; Tanzi and Davoodi, 
2000; Mahagaonkar, 2008; Wang and You, 2012; Nguyen et al., 2016).  
However, most of the literature has reported that corruption can be considered an 
obstacle to economic growth and development because it decelerates the economic 
wheel (Murphy et al., 1993; Mauro, 1995; Rose-Ackerman, 1999; Acemoglu and 
Verdier, 2000; Acemoglu et al., 2001; Mo, 2001; Lambsdorff, 2002; Rock and 
Bonnett, 2004; Anokhin and Schulze, 2009; Heckelman and Powell, 2010; Lau et 
al., 2015). Many researchers have attempted to explore the relationship between 
corruption and the economic development of the nations through the GDP per capita 
(La Porta et al., 1999; Treisman, 2000; Okada and Samreth, 2012).  
Figure 2-5 shows the average of 178 countries’ distribution between corruption and 
economic wealth, represented in GDP per capita between the period 2000-2017. 
The graph shows a clear adverse association between corruption and GDP per capita 
in which countries with more corruption level have a lower GDP per capita (i.e. 
countries with a higher level of GDP per capita are cleaner).The graph also makes 
it apparent that developing countries are clustered at the end of the chart, while the 
wealthier nations are at the top and the beginning of the scale (cleaner countries). 
In sum, we can conclude that although countries which have less corruption tend to 
have a higher GDP per capita compared to the countries with a higher level of 
corruption, we cannot generalize this to all countries. For instance, Kuwait and 
Qatar which have high GDP per capita are corrupted compared to Singapore which 
is less corrupted with less GDP per capita. 











2.2 Innovation and Corruption 
Goel and Nelson (2007) have stated that corruption as a social and economic 
problem has persisted since time immemorial. However, due to the limited nature 
and diversity of empirical evidence regarding the influence of corruption on 
innovation, not many studies reveal a clear relationship between innovation and 
corruption at the country level. Moreover, researchers have never reached an 
explicit agreement on whether corruption is beneficial or detrimental to innovation. 
Due to the ambiguous relationships associated with data limitations for conducting 
studies in order to compute the direct influences of corruption on innovation 
activities, the results of existing empirical projects are divergent. Some studies have 
found that corruption is an impediment, while others consider it as a boost to 
innovation. For instance, results by Lau et al. (2015) demonstrate that corruption is 
positively related to innovation, which is proxied by the number of patent 
applications. This result is consistent with Bayley (1966) and Leff (1964a), 
confirming that corruption may help remove rigid obstacles to investment and foster 
innovation which can eventually grease the economic wheel. Likewise, 
Mahagaonkar (2008) demonstrated that corruption has a positive effect on 
marketing innovation. Still, Johari and Ibrahim (2017) have examined the effect of 
innovation on corruption levels, and their results revealed that when the country is 
 Figure 2-5. The relationship between Corruption and Economic Wealth 
Source. World Bank 
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considered innovative with high levels of innovation, neither people nor businesses 
will have the incentive to be corrupted through bribing precisely because they are 
focusing on innovation in order to gain competitive advantage. In simple words, 
innovation can help a country to be less corrupt. 
Rather differently, and in the same study, Mahagaonkar (2008) found that 
corruption has an adverse effect on product innovation and organisational 
innovation. Additionally, using macro level data for 64 countries Anokhin and 
Schulze (2009) concluded that corruption is detrimental to innovation. Furthermore, 
Smith et al. (2014) empirically examined the same relationship on the micro-level 
using multi-national firms, institutions and innovation in Russia. They found that 
in environments with high political risk — in corrupt environments — corruption 
may act as a hedge against such risk, boosting the scope and scale of innovation.  
According to the World Bank indicators statistics (World Bank, 2019), innovation 
is growing on a slow and steady rate which is shown in terms of R&D expenditures 
in Figure (2-6). R&D expenditures have increased by almost 23%. Conversely, the 
corruption level fluctuates at an increasing rate during the same period and increases 
Figure 2-6. World's Corruption vs. World's Innovation 
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noticeably by more than 100% for 15 years only — between 2000 and 2015 —, 
which means that the world is going towards more corruption.  
2.3 The Three Papers 
The final section of the context chapter presents extended abstracts for each of the 
three papers that compose this thesis. The abstracts provide an overview of the 
studies’ objectives, methods, findings and contributions.  
2.3.1 Papers’ Abstracts 
2.3.1.1 Paper 1: Is Corruption Detrimental to Innovation? 
Although the relationship between corruption and innovation has been the object of 
scrutiny, existing research has not yielded any conclusive results regarding the 
influence of corruption on innovation. The unavailability of data in this regard has 
spurred this thesis to carry out further investigations to explore this influence. 
Unlike usual approaches, we apply four proxies to represent innovation for 176 
countries over a period of 18 years (2000-2017). These proxies are divided into two 
main categories: 1) innovation inputs (i.e. R&D expenditures and researchers 
working in research and development sectors), and 2) innovation outputs (i.e. 
residential patents and the number of journals and articles published). A fixed 
effects model is used for innovation inputs, while for innovation outputs, we used 
random effects. The results show that corruption could sand the wheel of innovation 
inputs such that when the corruption index is raised by 1 point both the R&D 
expenditure and the number of researchers decreased by 0.0056 percentage points 
and 0.0105 researchers (per million), respectively. However, corruption shows no 
impact on innovation outputs. In conclusion, innovation inputs are adversely 
affected by corruption. Nevertheless, this is not the case for the Sub Saharan Africa 
region, where corruption can grease innovation activities. Therefore, the 
governments shall firstly focus on anti-corruption campaigns as the effectiveness 
of these has been demonstrated, and they secondly shall concern themselves with 
setting rules and regulations in order to reduce corruption levels in countries.    
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2.3.1.2 Paper 2: Does Contagious Corruption Affect Home 
Innovation? 
 
Innovation is a key pillar in the economic growth of nations. However, previous 
studies show that home county innovation can be affected by home corruption that 
is contagious and can travel from one country to another. This paper empirically 
investigates the effect of neighbouring corruption on home country innovation 
using a dataset of 140 countries over the period of 2003 to 2017. To address this 
issue, we use the Two Stages Least Squares (2SLS) method and to address the 
impact of neighbouring innovation on home corruption, we use random effect 
technique. Our empirical evidence demonstrates that neighbouring corruption 
negatively affects home innovation, as well as being adversely affected by 
neighbouring innovation. Also, geographical proximity results show that closeness 
between capital cities can make increase corruption rates in both countries and also 
impair their innovative efforts. Furthermore, neighbouring openness acts as an 
obstacle to home country corruption, and it can help in reducing corruption. Thus, 
we can conclude that countries can be affected corresponding to their neighbours, 
and hence, it is challenging to remain uncorrupted while surrounded by corrupt 
countries. Therefore, governments should construct laws and regulations to reduce 
contagious corruption.    
2.3.1.3 Paper 3: Can Corruption Distress Research Productivity? 
Research productivity is a key output of innovation activities. Publications are 
considered to be the main determinant of research productivity, and more than 50 
million documents have been published worldwide for the last 23 years. However, 
the factors of trade openness and English Language might have an impact on 
published documents. For this reason, this study empirically examines the 
influences of these factors on research productivity levels, using mixed models, the 
Hierarchal linear model, for 170 selected countries over the period of 1996-2018. 
This study, furthermore, has considered the factor of corruption. The results show 
that research productivity was negatively affected by trade openness and corruption 
in an adverse relationship. Even though countries where English is the official 
language have a higher level of research activity in terms of citations compared to 
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countries with official languages other than English, the latter were not necessarily 
publishing less than their counterparts. Therefore, the governments should 
encourage the researchers to translate locally published documents into English 
because English is the global language (Northrup, 2013) so that a local piece of 
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Figure 2-7. Illustration of the Thesis  
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2.4 Chapter Summary 
The objective of this chapter was threefold.  First, it aimed at presenting an 
overview of the main two main elements in this thesis. Second, it reflected the 
conflict relationship between innovation and corruption using the related literature. 
Finally, the chapter provided extended abstracts of the papers included in the thesis, 
and also highlighted the interrelationship among them.   
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This paper intends to examine the influence of corruption on innovation as the 
existing literature has not yielded conclusive results in this regard. Four proxies 
have been used to represent innovation, which are divided into two main categories: 
1) innovation inputs (i.e. R&D expenditures and researchers working in research 
and development sectors), and 2) innovation outputs (i.e. residential patents and the 
number of journals and articles published). A fixed effects model is used for 
innovation inputs, while for innovation outputs, we used random effects. The results 
show that innovation inputs are adversely affected by corruption while, corruption 
has no control over innovation outputs. Although this is not the case for sub Saharan 
countries where corruption is found to fuel innovation activities. Establishing anti-
corruption campaigns were demonstrated to be effective, hence it’s recommended 
that governments should focus on setting such rules and regulations in order to 
reduce corruption, which eventually can help innovation to flourish. 
 
 
Keywords: Innovation, Corruption, Fixed Effects, Random Effects




Innovation is one of the sophisticated features of economic growth and Schumpeter 
(1934) was the first to introduce the importance of innovation regrading economic 
growth. Indeed, it was stated to be the primary driver of countries’ economic growth 
(Nelson and Winter, 1982; Romer, 1990; G. M. Grossman and Helpman, 1993; 
Pece et al., 2015; Broughel and Thierer, 2019). Cirera and Maloney (2017) adopt 
Schumpeter’s description of innovation, albeit in a broader view. According to 
these researchers, innovation is “the ability to use knowledge to develop and apply 
new ideas that result in changes in the production and organisational structure”6. In 
2018 the United Nations have reported that corruption costs the world more than 
two trillion dollars annually, or 5% of the global GDP, while those resources could 
be reallocated for innovation. However, corruption is an intricate phenomenon, and 
its impact on innovation is realised both at macro and micro levels (Bicchieri and 
Ganegonda, 2016; Dimant and Schulte, 2016). The micro-level investigation took 
the largest share of the corruption and innovation literature (de Waldemar, 2012; 
Wang and You, 2012; Smith et al., 2014; Nguyen et al., 2016; Habiyaremye and 
Raymond, 2018), while this effect is largely overlooked at the macro level. 
However, economists have addressed the relationship between innovation and 
corruption on macro and micro levels despite the ambiguous findings. DiRienzo 
and Das (2015) find that innovation can be badly harmed by corruption, yet at 
varied levels, meaning that unlike in poor countries, the effect of corruption is 
mitigated in the wealthier countries. Therefore, some countries focused on 
controlling corruption levels in order to help innovation to flourish (Anokhin and 
Schulze, 2009). According to the World Bank (2008), nations’ institutional 
foundations needs to sustain and promote innovation are being weakened by 
corruption despite the form of corruption7. Johari and Ibrahim (2017) conclude that 
innovation can help countries to reduce corruption through focusing on innovation 
so that the private sectors can become less reliant on nepotism. In a recent study 
                                                          
6 The concept of innovation is discussed further in Chapter 1 in “The innovation paradox: 
Developing-country capabilities and the unrealized promise of technological catch-up” by Cirera 
and Maloney (2017).  
7 For more elaboration of forms of corruption see Morris (2011). 
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introduced by Dincer (2019), who investigates the long-run relationship between 
corruption and innovation activities, it is found that corruption indeed slows down 
innovation in the long run. Some governments, such as that in China, emphasise 
anti-corruption activities8 which helps firms to innovate more by increasing their 
investment in research and development (R&D) (Dang and Yang, 2016; Gan and 
Xu, 2018) and generate more patents (Xu and Yano, 2017).  
In contrast to this interpretation, Nguyen et al. (2016) hypothesise that innovation 
activities can be greased by corruption by means of overcoming the ineffectiveness 
of the public sector with the help of small informal fees (bribes), and Mahagaonkar 
(2008) suggests that corruption facilitates innovation in marketing9. Furthermore, 
Wang and You (2012) stress the greasing effect of corruption on firms’ growth in 
China which eventually leads to the economic growth of the nation. All these 
researchers support Leff’s (1964) argument about corruption being rent-seeking 
rather than a hindrance. 
The results of existing empirical studies to compute the direct influence of 
corruption on innovation activities are divergent mainly due to the complicated 
relationships associated with data limitations for conducting these studies. 
Consequently, researchers never reached an explicit agreement on whether 
corruption is beneficial or detrimental to innovation. For example, some researchers 
have found that corruption is an impediment, and others see it as a boost to 
innovation (Mahagaonkar, 2008; Veracierto, 2008; Habiyaremye and Raymond, 
2013; Smith et al., 2014; Goedhuys et al., 2016; Gan and Xu, 2018). The current 
study aims to fill the gap in the literature by studying the relationship between 
corruption and innovation at macro level, with the focus on the greasing and sanding 
hypothesis. 
The objective of this study is threefold. First, we examine the relationship between 
corruption and innovation inputs represented by (R&D) expenditures and the 
number of researchers using a cross-country data set of 176 countries over 18 years 
(2000-2017). Secondly, we investigate the same relationship yet with innovation 
                                                          
8 Please refer to (Wedeman*, 2005) for eclectic analysis of the anti-corruption campaigns. 
9 For more details see (Mahagaonkar, 2008) 
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outputs (residential patents and articles published)10. Thirdly, we compare these 
relationships in all seven regions around the world, namely, in East Asia and 
Pacific, Europe and Central Asia, Latin America, Middle East and North Africa, 
North America, South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa11 in order to investigate if the 
country’s location matters in light of the relationship between corruption and 
innovation. In order to fulfill the objectives of this study we have used a cross-
country data set of 176 countries over 18 years (2000-2017). Based on the Hausman 
test, the fixed effects model is considered to be a suitable method to quantify the 
influence of corruption on innovation inputs. Furthermore, random effects is an 
appropriate method to examine the impact of corruption on innovation outputs.  
This study offers three unique contributions to the literature. Firstly, this paper 
seeks to contribute to the empirical literature of innovation and corruption, as it 
provides a cross country empirical analysis of how corruption distresses innovation 
activities. Although this effect has been investigated on a smaller scale of countries 
by previous empirical studies12, this paper uses a larger scale of countries which 
gives general, comprehensive and more confident results. While most of the 
previous literature focused on measuring the impact of corruption on the micro-
level (firms), this study has carried out a macro level (countries) investigation. 
Secondly, this paper adds to the literature by measuring the impact of the same 
controlled factor, corruption, on the level of innovation inputs and outputs together 
which have not been considered in previous studies using four proxies of 
innovation. The employment of four proxies is intended to check the validity, 
robustness and consistency of the results. To this end, we have used two related but 
different proxies representing the innovation inputs and outputs as the results of the 
number of researchers should justify the results of R&D. Finally, this study 
contributes to the literature by showing through regional comparison the influence 
of countries’ geographical location on the relationship between innovation and 
corruption, which has not been addressed yet. During this comparison, we examine 
                                                          
10 These variables are elaborated in section 6.  
11 The division of the regions is based on the World Bank division 
12 For example DiRienzo and Das (2015) who used 113 countries 
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the combined effect of corruption on the level of innovation for all the seven 
regions.  
On the one hand, the results regarding innovation inputs confirm the conclusion that 
innovation can be harmed by corruption (i.e. countries with a higher level of 
corruption tend to invest less in the innovation sector). On the other hand, and 
differently from Lau et al. (2015), the results related to innovation outputs show an 
insignificant influence of corruption (i.e. corruption has no impact on the innovation 
outputs). Furthermore, the results of the East Asia and Pacific regions are consistent 
with the national level results, namely that corruption sands innovation activities. 
At the same time however, the Sub-Saharan Africa region, including the corrupt 
countries in our sample, shows that corruption can facilitate innovation. 
The rest of the study is organised as follows. The next section discusses the link 
between innovation and corruption according to previous theoretical and empirical 
studies. Section 4 gives a detailed explanation of the theoretical framework. Section 
5 explains the methodology and it is followed by the description of the data and 
variables in section 6. Section 7 gives a comprehensive interpretation and analysis 
of the results along with a discussion of these. Section 8 provides the conclusion of 
the chapter, and finally, section 9 details the limitations of the research project and 
avenues of future research.  
3.3 Literature Review 
There is a considerable amount of empirical literature along with some theoretical 
literature that discusses how corruption affects economic growth. Bayley (1966) 
and Leff (1964) support the hypothesis that corruption such as bribes and nepotism 
(favoritism) can grease the wheel of economic growth through removing the rigid 
obstacles which lead to investing more in firms at micro level. At the end of the 
chain this can aid the innovation to flourish at macro level. With reference to 
innovation, it is well established in the economic literature that innovation is the 
key driver for nations to grow at a faster pace. However, corruption can influence 
economic growth via several channels such as political stability and human capital 
(Dridi, 2013). Innovation was proposed by many as one of the channels through 
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which corruption can affect economic growth directly or indirectly. However, a 
thorough study of the empirical connection between the two was not carried out at 
the macro level (Mahagaonkar, 2008). There is no clear consensus in the literature 
as to whether the impact of corruption is beneficial or detrimental to innovation 
either on macro or at micro level. Hence, a complex relationship between them has 
led to limitations in data required for studying the direct influence of corruption 
upon innovation.  
There are several empirical pieces of the literature that investigate the relationship 
between innovation and corruption, yet a clear relationship between these two 
variables is not elucidated at the macro-level. Some have found that corruption is 
an impediment, while others consider it as a boost to innovation. Mo (2001); 
Bentzen (2012) and Dridi (2013) provide empirical evidence on how corruption 
sands the economic growth wheel by hampering private investment which 
negatively affects the productivity levels of countries. Per contra, Mendoza et al. 
(2015) and Mahagaonkar (2008) provide empirical evidence that corruption can 
accelerate the innovation level especially in developing countries where the quality 
of governance is poor, through overcoming the bureaucratic obstacles. However, 
researchers in this field pay more attention to the micro-level, in particular the firm 
level. Goedhuys et al. (2016) find that corruption has a direct adverse effect on the 
likelihood that a firm is an innovator and conclude that corruption has a positive 
effect on institutional obstacles. Additionally, Fisman and Svensson (2007), De 
Rosa et al. (2010) and de Waldemar (2012) provide evidence that corruption13 sands 
a firm’s growth. Similarly, Mahagaonkar (2008) finds that corruption can be a 
hindrance to organisational and product innovation14. Thus, corruption interrupts 
innovation directly via several channels, the allocation of the resources being the 
primary and most evident one. In contrast, corruption can hasten innovation by 
overcoming the bureaucratic procedures such as bribes, small fees, payments and 
nepotism. This is argued by Mahagaonkar (2008) and Habiyaremye and Raymond 
(2013) who confirm the hypothesis that corruption can facilitate innovation, and in 
particular, the marketing innovation, of firms. Besides this, Lau et al. (2015) support 
                                                          
13 Bribery is used as an indication of corruption. 
14 For more details see (Mahagaonkar, 2008). Furthermore, he depended on the OECD (2005) 
manual on innovation types. 
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the argument that corruption along with investing in the education sector (in human 
capital) can grease the wheel of innovation through generating more patent 
applications and innovation output. Mendoza et al. (2015) support the idea of 
corruption greasing the wheels of economic growth via Philippine SMEs, 
particularly in cities with poor business environments15. However, other researchers 
examine the relationship between innovation and corruption from the perspective 
of anti-corruption campaigns. Gan and Xu (2018) claim that environments with 
stronger anti-corruption efforts encourage firms to invest more in the R&D sector. 
Furthermore, firms which are in a high political risk environment could benefit from 
corruption, which may act as a hedge against such risk by boosting the scope and 
scale of innovation (Smith et al., 2014). 
The Europe and Central Asia region were mentioned more frequently than the other 
six regions of the world in the literature on corruption and innovation16 (Lau et al., 
2015). The literature on innovation for the rest of the regions is less abundant than 
that on the impact of corruption on innovation in the Middle East and Northern 
Africa (MENA) regions which, in particular, is limited and relatively obsolete 
(Helmy, 2013). Therefore, there is a need to investigate the assumption that 
corruption hinders innovation empirically. In this context, we take the approach that 
corruption is a barrier to innovation because corruption, as discussed previously, 
has negative economical and ethical consequences (Habib and Zurawicki, 2002). 
Therefore, our focus in this paper is to assess empirically the ways in which 
corruption could impact the level of innovation in the seven regions of the world.  
The literature examines other variables for their impact on the innovation level, in 
both the input and output innovation forms. For instance, Bloom et al. (2016), 
Akcigit et al. (2018) and Chen et al. (2018) use trade openness to address its 
relationship with innovation and they notice that the more open the country is to 
trade, the more innovative it is. We have added GDP per capita as economy scale 
                                                          
15 Bribes can either put ‘grease’ or ‘sand’ in the wheels of commerce, affecting firm performance (at 
the micro-level) and, ultimately, economic growth (at the macro-level). This study examines this 
issue using a unique and exceptionally rich dataset on over 2000 micro, small and medium scale 
enterprises in over 30 cities in the Philippines. 
16  I think it is due to the availability of the data and most of the countries within this region are 
developed countries. 
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for the countries included in this paper and researchers have concluded that 
countries with higher GDP per capita tend to innovate more (Papageorgiadis and 
Sharma, 2016; Paunov, 2016)17. Country size is used as a proxy for the population 
to examine the impact of populated countries on the innovation (Papageorgiadis 
and Sharma, 2016) and they find that country size is positively significant with the 
innovation level in that countries with more population tend to be more innovative. 
Moreover, Dakhli and De Clercq (2004), Lau et al. (2015) and van Uden et al. 
(2017), addressing the question of whether the size of the human capital can have 
an impact on innovation, conclude that human capital is important for the countries 
to innovate. 
Corruption, therefore, can grease innovation activities via overcoming any 
unnecessary bureaucratic practices in governmental offices and can thus lead the 
economies of the nations to grow. However, logically, corruption sands innovation 
activities via increasing the costs, in terms of the reallocating of resources, and via 
impairing the trust between public officials and people. Besides, corruption is 
considered to be an unethical practice regardless of the reason for practicing it. This 
paper debates the suggestion that corruption hinders innovation activities via 
reallocating innovation inputs that decelerate innovation outputs. Consequently, the 
wheel of the economic growth is to be sanded. 
3.4 Theoretical Framework  
Corruption can affect the portion of resources allocated to innovation activities, that 
is to the research and development sector of a business. The devoted resources are 
continually allocated to bribes that businessmen have to pay in order for them to 
enter the market, regardless of whether they fulfill the requirements to being in the 
market or not. This means that the amount of resources dedicated to innovation 
activities is reduced in corruption activities (Acemoglu and Verdier, 2000; 
Veracierto, 2008). This can result in a misallocation of the resources for corruption 
activities. Corrupt environments can also provide disincentives for investors 
                                                          
17 Papageorgiadis and Sharma (2016) concluded that as the real GDP per capita increases, the 
innovation output—patents— obtained more. 
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(entrepreneurs) to invest in these kinds of environments because there is no fair 
competition in the market.  
Consider a group of n firms, competing in the market, choosing the amount of R&D 
expenditures 𝑑𝑖 , 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑛. Suppose that R&D leads to a reduction in the 
production cost of the firm, in which: 
∁𝑖= 𝑐(𝑑𝑖),      𝑐
′ < 0   
Where ∁𝑖 is the production cost in a function of R&D expenditures (𝑑𝑖),  𝑐
′ is the 
marginal cost of R&D expenditures, meaning that the cost decreasing. 
Suppose that the inverse market demand be as follows: 
𝑃 = 𝑎 − 𝑏𝑞   
Where P is the market price, 𝑎 is the chock-off price with 𝑎 > 0 — parameter 
indicator of economic activities —, 𝑏 is the slope of the inversed market and 𝑞 is 
the total output supplied (consumed) market which is given by: 
𝑞 = 𝑞1 + 𝑞2,  𝑛 = 2   
Where 𝑞1is the quantity supplied by firm 1 and 𝑞2 is the quantity supplied by firm 
2. 
We consider a scenario where firms chose 𝑑𝑖 in period 1 and after cost realization 
at the end of period 1, choose quantities 𝑞𝑖 in period 2. For simplicity, there is no 
discounting. 
In period 2, firms compete in a Cournot fashion and profits (𝜋) are given by: 18 
𝜋𝑖 =
(𝑎 − 2∁𝑖 + ∁𝑗)
2
9𝑏
            𝑖, 𝑗 = 1,2   
                                                          
18 It can be applied to most models of competition. This is only for illustration. 
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In period 1, the total payoff is given by: 
𝑉𝑖 = 𝜋𝑖 (𝑑𝑖) − 𝑥(𝑑𝑖) = 𝜋𝑖 (𝑑𝑖) − 𝑥. 𝑑𝑖   
Where 𝑉𝑖 is the total pay-off, 𝜋𝑖  (𝑑𝑖) is the profit (revenue) and 𝑥(𝑑𝑖) is the cost. 
Since 𝜋𝑖(𝑑𝑖) is increasing and concave in 𝑑𝑖, we can find the optimum amount of 
expenditure 𝑑𝑖
∗
. In fact, firm1’s expenditure 𝑑1 will also depend on firm2’s R&D 
expenditure and we can have a case of strategic complementarity19. Ignoring this 




∗    
More appropriately, 𝑑𝑖 can be interpreted as R&D activity and 𝑥 is the per unit cost. 
For example, 𝑥 can be seen as the cost of hiring scientists/ researchers or the cost 
of setting up and running a scientific laboratory. For developing countries, 𝑥 is 
likely to be high. It can be shown in Figure (3-1) that the demand for R&D activity 
is a decreasing function of 𝑥. At the same time however, for a large market, 
higher 𝑎, 𝑑∗ will be higher20. This is because the marginal benefit of extra spending 






At the other end of the market, we have a household deciding whether to become 
scientists/researchers. A simple occupational model can be used to show that the 
supply of R&D activity will be an increasing function of 𝑥. This is assuming that 
returns from other occupations stay the same. In poorer countries, this supply could 
                                                          
19 Higher 𝑑𝑖  leads to more investment by 2 and so on. 
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be a vertical straight line if the supply of human capital is low and occupation choice 
is constrained. 
Corruption affects both sides of the market. First, households will find that other 
occupations (bureaucrats) are likely to be more lucrative, and this will invariably 
lead to an inward shift in supply. Consequently, the economy will have fewer 
scientists/researchers21. For firms, however, the effect is varied. Corruption 
undermines competition in a way that firm 𝑖 investing in corrupt practices can have 
a bigger market share or is able to enjoy monopoly status by bribing officials. As 
mentioned previously, this leads to resources being diverted (Acemoglu and 
Verdier, 2000; Veracierto, 2008). R&D activities will thus decrease, which also 
leads to an inward shift in demand. Figure ((3-2) (case A)) shows how corruption 
leads to a reduction in R&D activities (innovation) in the presence of corruption. 
But corruption can facilitate investment also in certain cases as shown in Figure ((3-
2) (case B)). For example, if 𝑥 is the cost of importing scientific equipment and 
there are restrictions in place, 𝑥 is likely to be very high. With corruption, these 
constraints can be avoided. Likewise, unnecessary regulations may stifle economic 
activities and corruption can open up these markets. This can be interpreted as an 
increase in parameter 𝑎, leading to an outward shift in demand as shown in Figure 
((3-2) (case B)).  
                                                          
21 This argument was put forward by Shleifer and Vishny (2002) in their “Allocation of Talent: Implications 
for Growth” chapter in “The Grabbing Hand” book 





However, this does not mean that equilibrium innovation activities will be higher. 
Overall, the equilibrium will depend on the strength of variance forces. However, 
our empirical exercise aims to pin this down.  
To summarise, corruption can affect the innovation level in countries by lowering 
the rate of product innovation in an organisation (private or public). If many 
industries have corrupt practices this will result in a fall in the organisation’s 
innovation level, which consequently affects the whole economic growth of the 
nation. 
3.5 Methodology  
We carry out an analysis to investigate the impact of corruption on the level of 
innovation. Beside this paper’s main variables of corruption and innovation, we 
also consider several other variables which might influence innovation. Hence, we 
use unbalanced panel data for 176 countries over the period between 2000 and 2017.  
The general panel model is given by equation (3-7). 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡   
 𝐷𝑐 : 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 













Case A Case B 
 
Figure 3-2. The effect of Corruption in R&D market 
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where 𝒀 signifies the innovation level represented by innovation inputs (i.e. R&D 
and number of researchers) and innovation outputs (i.e. patents and articles 
published). The X vector represents our main variable which is corruption beside 
other exogenous variables22. The number of countries (176 countries) studied in this 
paper is represented by 𝒊 while 𝒕 represents the time frame (2000 to 2017).  
There are four models to be estimated in this paper, which are given as follows: 
𝑟𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑖𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑝1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑖𝑡 𝑝𝑜𝑝2𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑖𝑡 ℎ𝑐3𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽4𝑖𝑡 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎4𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽5𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒5𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽6𝑖𝑡 𝑛𝑎𝑡6𝑖𝑡
+  𝛾7𝑖𝑡𝑊𝐶𝐼7𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡 
  
where rnd signifies research & development expenditures, corp represents 
corruption, pop is the country size, capita signifies GDP per capita, trade indicates 
trade openness, nat denotes natural resources and WCI signifies to worst corruption 
incidents dummy variable.   
 
𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡
= 𝛽𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑖𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑝1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑖𝑡 𝑝𝑜𝑝2𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑖𝑡 ℎ𝑐3𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽4𝑖𝑡 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎4𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑖𝑡𝑛𝑎𝑡5𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾6𝑖𝑡𝑊𝐶𝐼6𝑖𝑡 +  𝜇𝑖𝑡 
  
where researchers signifies number of researchers working in the R&D sector (per 
million), corp represents corruption, pop is the country size, hc denotes human 
capital, capita signifies GDP per capita, nat symbolizes natural resources and WCI 
signifies to worst corruption incidents dummy variable.   
𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑖𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑝1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑖𝑡 𝑝𝑜𝑝2𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑖𝑡𝑟𝑛𝑑3𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽4𝑖𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑠4𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑠5𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝑖𝑡𝑛𝑎𝑡6𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑖𝑡𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎7𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾8𝑖𝑡𝑊𝐶𝐼8𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡 
  
where pat signifies number of patents, corp represents corruption, pop is the 
country size, rnd symbolizes research & development expenditures, researchers 
                                                          
22 The variables are elaborated in detail in section 6 of this chapter. 
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indicates the number of researchers working in the R&D sector, articles denotes to 
the number of articles published, capita signifies GDP per capita, nat symbolizes 
natural resources and WCI signifies the worst corruption incidents dummy variable.   
𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑖𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑝1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑖𝑡𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎2𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽3𝑖𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑠3𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑖𝑡𝑛𝑎𝑡5𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾5𝑖𝑡𝑊𝐶𝐼5𝑖𝑡
+ 𝜇𝑖𝑡 
  
where articles signifies the number of articles published, corp represents 
corruption, capita signifies GDP per capita, researchers indicates to the number of 
researchers working in the R&D sector, nat symbolizes natural resources and WCI 
signifies the worst corruption incidents dummy variable.   
3.5.1 Fixed Effects Model 
For Models (3-8) and (3-9), where the dependent variables are R&D and the number 
of researchers, respectively, the fixed effects model is satisfactory according to the 
Hausman test results, as given in Table (3-1). The fixed effects model is considered 
to be a reasonable model to investigate the impact of corruption, along with other 
variables, on innovation inputs. The fixed effects model can be written as (3-12):  
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛾1𝑥1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑥2𝑖𝑡 + ⋯ + 𝛾𝑘𝑥𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡   
where Y signifies the R&D and number of researchers. 𝜶 is the intercept which 
differs for each country. x indicates the independent variables which are shown in 
Models (3-8) and (3-9). 𝝁 is the error term. i indicates the countries included in this 
study (176 countries) while t represents the time period of this study (2000-2017). 
 
3.5.2  Random Effects Model 
According to the Hausman test results, the random effects model is the satisfactory 
model for (3-10) and (3-11) Models where the dependent variables are the number 
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of patents and articles published. These variables are regressed using random 
effects model. The random effects model can be expressed as (3-13):  
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛾1𝑥1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑥2𝑖𝑡 + ⋯ + 𝛾𝑘𝑥𝑘𝑖𝑡 + (𝜀𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡)   
where Y signifies the patents and number of articles. 𝜶 is constant for all countries. 
x indicates the independent variables which are given in Models (3-10) and (3-11). 
𝝁 is the error term and 𝜺 is the standard random variable which differs for each 
country, i indicates the country (176 countries) while t indicates the time (the period 
of the study) as 2000–2017. 
3.5.3 Hausman Test 
In order to choose the most suitable approach between fixed effects and random 
effects— for the four Models (3-8), (3-9), (3-10) and (3-11), the Hausman test is 
used (Hausman, 1978) because its main objective is to help to decide between fixed 
effects or random effects, the, where the null hypothesis. Ho states that the random 
effects model is more appropriate than the fixed effects because random effect are 
consistent and efficient. H1: the fixed effects will always be consistent. The 
Hausman test principally examines whether the error terms are correlated with the 
explanatory variables or not. For the panel data, the appropriate choice between the 
fixed effects and the random effects methods investigates whether the regressors 
are correlated with the individual (in most cases unobserved) effect. The Hausman 
test uses the following test statistics: 
𝑯 = (?̂?𝑭𝑬 − ?̂?𝑹𝑬) ́[𝑽𝒂𝒓(?̂?𝑭𝑬) − 𝑽𝒂𝒓(?̂?𝑹𝑬)]
−𝟏
(?̂?𝑭𝑬 − ?̂?𝑹𝑬)~𝒙𝟐(𝒌)           (3-14) 
In other words, the key difference between the fixed effects model and the random 
effects model for testing panel data is that the first model assumes that each country 
of our sample has its own intercept 𝛼𝑖 , as shown in Model (3-12), whereas the 
random effects model adopts the idea that each country differs in its standard 
random variable 𝜀𝑖 , as shown in Model (3-13).  
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3.5.4 Durbin Wu-Hausman Test (DWH) 
While no a specific test to check endogeneity exists, there is a technique which 
helps us to check if one of the independent variables is correlated with the 
dependent variable error term by using the Durbin Wu Hausman test. This test 
compares the coefficients of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and the Two Stages 
Least squares (2SLS) (in other words, the null hypothesis states that the preferred 
estimator is the OLS) (Hausman, 1978). However, the test results support the 
application of the OLS technique for all four models precisely because of our 
inability to reject the null hypothesis and conclusion that FE and RE are the 
appropriate methods for the four models23. 
3.6 Variables Description and Data Source 
This section presents the variables used in this paper which consist of three sub-
sections. The first sub-section discusses in detail the dependent and independent 
variables as well as the logic intuition behind including them in the model. This is 
followed by a brief description of the sample of the study and the sources of the 
data. The third sub-section discusses the stationarity level of all variables using the 
unit root test.  
3.6.1 The Variables 
3.6.1.1 The Dependent Variable 
Innovation is a crucial factor for development both in less advanced countries and 
advanced ones (Cirera and Maloney, 2017). It is a well-established stylised fact 
within the literature that innovation contributes to the economic growth of nations, 
as stated by Schumpeter (1912), Solow (1956) Mansfield (1972), King and Levine 
(1993), Nadiri (1993), Ulku (2004) Aghion et al. (2005) and Adak (2015), who have 
examined it both theoretically and empirically. The level of innovation shows how 
a country can capture the multi-dimensional aspects of innovation that promote 
policies in order to encourage long-term growth. The dependent variable in this 
                                                          
23 DWH test is explained in more details in Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
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study is innovation, yet there is no strictly defined theory on the determinants of 
innovation. The simplest procedure in determining the level of innovation is to find 
approaches that can capture the richness of innovation in a country. Therefore, it is 
very important to detect the determinants of innovation in order to enhance 
economic growth by planning operative policies. The use of innovation as the 
dependent variable was motivated by the literature (Mahagaonkar, 2008). 
Increasingly, studies have begun to investigate the ways in which innovation can 
be measured or quantified either on a national-level or firm-level, and the well-
known and traditional measure of innovation that has mainly been used by 
researchers is the number of patents. Furthermore, according to Morck and Yeung 
(2001), innovation can be measured by three quantitative measures: 1) number of 
patents, 2) innovation counts, and 3) research and development spending. 
Moreover, Fan (2014) considered that patent statistics, research and development 
inputs, paper citations and new product announcements can be used to measure or 
quantify the level of innovation.  
Investing in research and development has a positive influence on the number of 
patents in both developed countries (Furman and Hayes, 2004) and developing 
countries (Hu and Mathews, 2005). Continuous investment in R&D is essential for 
innovation. Countries with strong commitments towards innovation and significant 
investment in R&D achieve relatively high levels of innovation. Figure (3-3), which 
uses World Bank data to reveal a non-linear positive relationship between R&D  
expenditures and the number of patents across countries. Furthermore, the figure 
reveals that the innovation level of countries represented by the number of patents 
rise at an fast rate when the R&D expenditure increases. Consequently, the more 
investments occur in R&D expenditure, the more patents can be established 
(Varsakelis, 2006; Artz et al., 2010; Czarnitzki and Hussinger, 2018). 













Based on the literature, innovation function has been measured using different 
features either by inputs such as R&D expenditures and number of researchers, or 
by outputs such as patents and articles published24 (Cirera and Maloney, 2017). In 
the case of this paper, the level of innovation is measured using the same input and 
output measures. The following section introduces the dependent variables that 
represent the level of innovation. 
3.6.1.1.1 Innovation inputs 
1. Research and Development 
The World Bank defines R&D as the “current and capital expenditures (both public 
and private) on creative work undertaken systematically to increase knowledge 
including knowledge of humanity, culture, and society, as well as the use of 
knowledge for new applications”. R&D is one of the main ways to gain a 
competitive advantage in science and technology for both the government and 
private sector. This aspect reflects the extent to which a country allocates resources 
for growing the overall stock of knowledge including fundamental research, applied 
                                                          
24 Cirera and Maloney (2017) have explained in detail the innovation function in terms of its inputs 
and outputs in The innovation paradox: Developing-country capabilities and the unrealized promise 
of technological catch-up- Chapter 2. 
Figure 3-3. The relationship between research and development expenditure and Patents 
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research and experimental development work leading to new devices, products or 
processes. in detail expenditure is considered to be one of the most important 
elements in improving the innovation capacity both of nations and firms (Audretsch 
and Feldman, 2004). Therefore, the R&D expenditure is the main output measure 
proxy of innovation, which is measured as a proportion of the GDP of each country. 
The R&D expenditure variable has been considered in many studies as an 
innovation input (Furman et al., 2002; Bottazzi and Peri, 2003; Hu and Mathews, 
2005; Varsakelis, 2006; Smith et al., 2014; Lau et al., 2015). 
2. Researchers (Per Million) 
The number of researchers variable according to the World Bank refers to “the 
number of personnel (researchers and technicians) in the research and development 
sector who are professionals engaged in the conception of new knowledge, 
products, processes, methods, or systems. Data on researchers in R&D are 
measured as full-time equivalent. The data are obtained through statistical surveys 
that are regularly conducted at national level covering R&D performing entities in 
the private and public sectors”. In this paper, we are considering the number of hired 
researchers as a dependent variable representing the level of the innovation of a 
country (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Flatten et al., 2011).  
3.6.1.1.2 Innovation outputs 
1. Patents 
 The number of patents variable refers to residential patents where the first-named 
applicant or assignee is a resident of the state or region concerned. Patent data is a 
great resource in the study of technical change in a country or region. The number 
of residential patents is used to quantify the level of innovation. However, the 
number of residential patents has been accepted as the most appropriate and most 
common measure in quantifying the level of innovation capability (Acs et al., 2002; 
Furman et al., 2002; Cheung and Ping, 2004; Hu and Mathews, 2005; Varsakelis, 
2006; Anokhin and Schulze, 2009; Fan, 2014; Smith et al., 2014; Lau et al., 2015; 
Igami and Subrahmanyam, 2019). The number of patents is a valid measure for 
tapping a country’s innovative output because this measure captures an important 
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aspect of the level of technological activity, and because several fundamental 
conditions need to be fulfilled in order for an activity or invention to qualify for 
patent eligibility (Crosby, 2000; Varsakelis, 2001; Hu and Mathews, 2005).  
2. Scientific and Technical Journal Articles 
 This variable refers to an absolute number of scientific and engineering articles 
published in peer reviewed journals in each country. Hu and Mathews (2005) used 
this variable as an independent one, yet it has not been used broadly as the 
representation of innovation level. Thomas et al. (2011) have used it as the outcome 
of the R&D process, where R&D is considered as an innovation input. Therefore, 
in this paper, the number of publications is treated as an innovation output (Katz, 
2016). 
3.6.1.2 The independent variables 
In addition to our principal factor, corruption, we control for other variables that are 
expected to be important factors of innovation. The choice of explanatory variables 
is inspired by the related empirical and theoretical literature as well as the 
availability of data. 
1. Corruption 
 This variable is designed to emphasise the misuse of public office for private or 
personal benefit. Transparency International, the “global civil society organization 
leading the fight against corruption”, pointed out that corruption is difficult to 
capture because it happens “behind closed doors and underneath the tables” (Smith 
et al., 2014). Subsequently, measuring corruption directly and quantifying it has 
proven to be a daunting task. There are several indexes measuring corruption, such 
as Control of Corruption Index (CCI), Public Integrity Index (PII) and others25, yet 
they suffer from a high correlation issue (Heywood, 2015). We are using Corruption 
Perception Index (CPI) which is the most widely accepted measure of corruption 
(Heywood, 2015). Furthermore, it is “an index claiming to capture the informed 
views of analysis, business people and experts around the world on corruption in 
                                                          
25 For more details see (Heywood, 2015) 
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different countries”. Transparency International is the organisation responsible for 
collecting corruption data. Even though certain academics claim that CPI lacks 
objectivity because it measures individuals’ perceptions of the level of corruption 
in a particular country, it is generally accepted as the best corruption measure that 
the international community has identified (Mo, 2001; Varsakelis, 2006; 
Mahagaonkar, 2008; Veracierto, 2008; Anokhin and Schulze, 2009; Lau et al., 
2015; C.-J. Huang, 2016; Ali et al., 2019; Kimhi and Oliel, 2019).  
Transparency International measures the perceptions of corruption on a scale of 0 
to 100, with 0 indicating the highest level of corruption and 100 indicating the 
lowest. But, for the purpose of this paper and to avoid any confusion, we reversed 
the scale, so that 0 indicates the lowest level of corruption (i.e. clean countries) and 
100 indicates the highest level of corruption (i.e. highly corrupt countries).  
2. Human Capital 
Coleman (1988) has defined the human capital concept as “individuals’ knowledge 
and abilities that allow for changes in action”. Education plays a critical role in 
developing the innovative capability of a country. The level and standard of 
education and research activity in a country are prime determinants of the 
innovation capacity of a nation. Human capital may be developed through formal 
training and education aimed at updating and renewing one’s capabilities in order 
to do well in society. The most vital component in a nation’s innovation scheme is 
the learning ability of individuals, firms and countries (Lundvall et al., 2002). The 
argument regarding the human capital variable is that the level of educated people 
can affect the level of innovation i.e. a lower number of educated people in a 
country can hold back the level of innovation in that country. Furthermore, this 
variable is being used widely to measure the labor force in a nation or a company 
(Dakhli and De Clercq, 2004; Hu and Mathews, 2005; van Uden et al., 2017). The 
expected relationship between this variable and the innovation level is positive. 
For this paper, to proxy for human capital, the Educational Attainment for 
Population Aged 25 and over data has been utilised (Barro and Lee, 2013) 26. Barro 
                                                          
26Data extracted from  http://barrolee.com/data/oup_download_c.htm,  
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and Lee has updated their data until 2040 at 5 years intervals and as they stated, 
“Our estimates of educational attainment provide a reasonable proxy for the stock 
of human capital for a broad group of countries and should be useful for a variety 
of empirical work”. Due to the availability of the data by 5-year intervals, 
interpolation has been employed to forecast the observations for the missing years.  
3. Country Size  
This variable is included in terms of total population as a control variable since 
country-level innovation is also affected by the number of people within a country. 
Larger countries are characterised by more extensive exchange of all types of 
resources at multiple levels. Therefore, larger countries may generate more patents, 
be involved in more R&D expenditures, and have more high-tech export compared 
to smaller countries even in per capita terms. In addition, we included population 
because it indicates the scale of workers that are potentially available for innovative 
activity. We are interested in the potential production of innovative output relative 
to national population, therefore, we are including this variable where it is 
necessary, such as in Models (3-8), (3-9) and (3-10) (Furman et al., 2002; Bottazzi 
and Peri, 2003; Dakhli and De Clercq, 2004; Hu and Mathews, 2005; Anokhin and 
Schulze, 2009; Papageorgiadis and Sharma, 2016).  
4. Trade openness  
The data of trade openness is expressed as a percentage of total GDP. We argue that 
trade can enhance the innovation level in a country by creating positive externalities 
which improve knowledge diffusion/flow. Furthermore, it increases the 
competition between the agents, hence the incentive, and at the final point it means 
to innovate (G. Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Roper et al., 2013; Papageorgiadis 
and Sharma, 2016; Akcigit et al., 2018).  
5. Natural resources rent  
We would like to examine if the abundance of the natural resources is a blessing or 
a curse for the nations’ innovation (Namazi and Mohammadi, 2018). We are 
expecting that countries with an abundance of natural resources are more likely to 
Chapter Three: Is Corruption Detrimental to Innovation? 
55 
 
innovate for two reasons. Firstly, countries which heavily depend on natural 
resources tend to invest a fine proportion of their GDP in innovation because those 
countries understand both the finality of natural resources and the fact that, because 
of technological inventions, these natural resources might lose their use in the 
future. Secondly, as Sachs and Warner (2001) argued, the abundancy of natural 
resource could crowd-out the activities of the entrepreneurial which could lead to 
more innovation. 
6. GDP per Capita  
Bottazzi and Peri (2003), Furman et al. (2002) and Hu and Mathews (2005) had 
used this variable as independent in their research study, because it captures the 
ability of a country to translate its knowledge stock into a realised state of economic 
development. Furthermore, Paunov (2016) and Papageorgiadis and Sharma (2016) 
have used GDP per capita in the same context as we do, that of innovation, where 
they examined the relationship between GDP per capita and the innovation level. 
The World Bank calculates it by dividing the gross domestic product (GDP) by 
midyear population. We argue that the level of GDP per capita has an impact on the 
level of innovation outputs: lower level of GDP per capita reduces innovative 
outputs. 
7. The Worst Corruption Incidents (WCI) 
This variable is introduced by the author based on the CPI data mentioned above. 
This variable is a dummy variable which represents two subgroups of the sample: 
highly corrupted and less corrupted countries. WCI can take only two values: 1 or 
0. Countries that score lower than 58 point, which is the mean of the corruption. 
less corrupt countries/clean countries, were assigned a value of 1, whilst countries 
with a corruption level higher than the mean (more corrupt countries) have a value 
of 0. This variable is mainly used in the dataset to explore the innovation level 
performance in the countries associated with a high level of corruption. 
Furthermore, this variable is meant to quantify the impact of corruption on the 
innovation level. Furthermore, this variable is included in all models to compare 
the level of innovation on less corrupt countries with more corrupt ones. The 
Chapter Three: Is Corruption Detrimental to Innovation? 
56 
 
dummy variable is identified by corruption data compiled from the International 
Transparency Organization.  
Dummy variable = WCI countries > mean (corruption) =1, otherwise 0. 
3.6.2 The sample 
The data which we are using to run the regression is an unbalanced panel dataset. 
It is unbalanced because the sources which we extracted the data from do not have 
the full dataset. The World Bank is the main source for the data in this paper, who 
have reported a number of reasons why data is not available for certain indicators 
for certain countries and certain years. Firstly, certain indicators are derived from 
sporadic surveys and are only available for some years. Secondly, certain data sets 
or indicators are only available from the year they were initiated. Thirdly, some 
countries do not regularly report data due to conflict, lack of statistical capacity or 
other reasons. Fourthly, certain countries do not have data for earlier years simply 
because they did not exist. Because we have missing observations for certain time 
periods of certain countries, we are using the annual data of 176 countries for the 
period of 2000–2017. 
Table (3-1) shows a summary of the variables and the data source. Table (3-2) 
describes the summary statistics of the dependent variables and the explanatory 
variables which include their number of observations, mean, standard deviation, 
minimal value and maximum value. Table (3-3) shows the countries which are 
included in the regression and they are divided region-wise according to the World 
Bank division.  
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Table 3-1. The Glossary of Variables
Symbol of the Variables Name of the Variable Variable definition Source of Data Unit of Measurement 
Dependent 
Variables 
Rnd Research & development Research & development Expenditure World bank % of GDP  
Pat Patents 
The number of residential patents where the first-named 
applicant or assignee is a resident of the state or region 
concerned 
World bank Absolute number 
Researchers Researchers 
Number of Researchers and technicians working in the R&D 
Sector (per Million) 
World bank Absolute number 
Articles Articles 
number of scientific and engineering articles published in 
peer reviewed journals 




Corruption Perception Index (0 indicates clean countries, 100 








All the residents in the country regardless of legal status or 
citizenship 
World bank Absolute number 
Hc Human Capital (,000,000) Educational Attainment for Population Aged 25 and Over Barro & Lee, 2013 Absolute number 
Capita GDP per Capita (0,000) 
GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear 
population. 
World bank US $ 
Trade Trade Openness value of exports plus the value of imports (% of GDP) World bank % of GDP  
Nat Natural Resources rent 
Total natural resources rents are the sum of oil rents, natural 
gas rents, coal rents (hard and soft), mineral rents, and forest 
rents  
(% of GDP) 
World bank % of GDP  
WCI Worst Country Incidents  
Dummy variable = WCI countries < mean (corruption) =1, 
otherwise 0 
 1,0 
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 Table 3-2. Summary of the statistics results
Variables Observations Mean Standard Deviation Min Max 
Research & Development 3,168 0.410 0.784 0 4.405 
Patents 3,168 0.6499 4.756 0 120.498 
Researchers 3,168 0.677 1.475 0 8.255 
Articles 3,168 0.807 3.607 0 44.023 
Corruption 2,767 57.898 21.207 0 100 
Country size (,000,000,000) 3,168 0.0384 0.1386 0 1.386 
Human Capital (,000,000) 3,204 0.0190 0.0773 0 0.8721 
GDP per Capita (0,000) 3,168 1.651 1.934 0 12.935 
Trade Openness 3,168 83.666 56.877 0 442.62 
Natural Resources Rent 3,168 7.949 12.142 0 82.529 
Worst Country Incidents 3,204 0.322 0.468 0 1 
Notes: 
1) The summary of statistics is provided based on a time period from 2000 to 2017 for 176 countries worldwide. 
2) The dataset used in this paper is unbalanced beca4se there are some gaps in year for some countries due to the unavailability of the data. 








Latin America & 
Caribbean 
East Asia & 
Pacific 
Middle East & 
North Africa 
South Asia North America 
Albania Angola Argentina Australia Algeria Afghanistan Canada 
Armenia Benin Bahamas, The Brunei 
Darussalam 
Bahrain Bangladesh United States 
Austria Botswana Barbados Cambodia Djibouti Bhutan 
 
Azerbaijan Burkina Faso Bolivia China Egypt, Arab Rep. India 
 
Belarus Burundi Brazil Hong Kong 
SAR, China 
Iran, Islamic Rep. Maldives 
 




Cameroon Colombia Japan Israel Pakistan 
 
Bulgaria Central African 
Republic 
Costa Rica Korea, Rep. Jordan Sri Lanka 
 
Croatia Chad Cuba Lao PDR Kuwait 
  
Cyprus Congo, Dem. Rep. Dominica Malaysia Lebanon 
  
Czech Republic Congo, Rep. Dominican Republic Mongolia Libya 
  
Denmark Cote d'Ivoire Ecuador Myanmar Malta 
  
Estonia Equatorial Guinea El Salvador New Zealand Morocco 
  




France Ethiopia Guatemala Philippines Qatar 
  
Georgia Gabon Guyana Singapore Saudi Arabia 
  





Greece Ghana Honduras Thailand Tunisia 
  
Hungary Guinea Jamaica Timor-Leste United Arab 
Emirates 
  
Iceland Guinea-Bissau Mexico Vanuatu Yemen, Rep. 
  
Ireland Kenya Nicaragua Vietnam 
   
Italy Lesotho Panama 
    
Kazakhstan Liberia Paraguay 
    
Kosovo Madagascar Peru 
    
Kyrgyz Republic Malawi St. Lucia 
    
Latvia Mali St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines 
    
Lithuania Mauritania Suriname 
    
Luxembourg Mauritius Trinidad and Tobago 
    
Macedonia, FYR Mozambique Uruguay 
    
Moldova Namibia Venezuela, RB 
    
Montenegro Niger 
     
Netherlands Nigeria 
     
Norway Rwanda 
     
Poland Sao Tome and 
Principe 
     
Portugal Senegal 
     
Romania Seychelles 
     
Russian Federation Sierra Leone 
     
Serbia Somalia 
     
Slovak Republic South Africa 
     
Slovenia South Sudan 
     
Spain Sudan 
     
Sweden Tanzania 
     
Switzerland Togo 
     
Tajikistan Uganda 
     
Turkey Zambia 
     
Turkmenistan Zimbabwe 
     
Ukraine 
      
United Kingdom 
      
Uzbekistan 
      
Table 3-3. List of countries included in this study 
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3.6.3 Unit Root Test 
The dataset which we are using is an unbalanced panel dataset. The appropriate unit 
root test to be used is the Fisher-type test because it does not require strongly 
balanced data and the individual’s series can have gaps (Baltagi, 2008; p.244-245). 
Therefore, we are using the Fisher-type test (Fisher, 1932) using ADF and PP tests 
(Maddala and Wu, 1999; Choi, 2001). Furthermore, the lag lengths of the individual 
augmented Dicky-Fuller tests are allowed to differ. Fisher-type tests were used to 
test the null hypothesis which represents the presence of an “individual unit root”. 
The Fisher-type test uses p-value from unit root tests for each country i. The test is 
asymptotically chi-square distributed with 2N degrees of freedom, 𝑻𝒊
𝒊
→ ∞ 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒊𝒕𝒆 𝑵, (Nell and Zimmermann, 2011). The formula of the test is 
expressed as follows: 




Furthermore, the results show that all variables are stationary. Table (3-4) shows 
the results of the unit root for all variables. It can be concluded from these results 
that the null hypothesis — the presence of an “individual unit root”— is strongly 
rejected. Thus, it can be assumed that all the series are stationary at the same level 
(no unit root). 
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Patent  Individual effects 1893 117 416.388*** 1989 117 431.167*** 
Research & Development  Individual effects 1944 118 441.403*** 2006 118 510.108*** 
Researchers  Individual effects 1550 94 380.793*** 1598 94 460.972*** 
Articles Individual effects 2886 175 439.809*** 2975 175 404.629** 
Corruption Individual effects 2500 176 465.298*** 2561 176 488.143*** 
Trade Openness 
Individual effects, 
individual linear trends 
2832 173 465.865*** 2941 173 387.625* 
 Natural Resources None 2942 174 534.715*** 2958 174 522.061*** 
Country Size 
Individual effects, 
individual linear trends 
2603 176 844.904*** 2992 176 437.944*** 
Human Capital  
Individual effects, 
individual linear trends 
2213 140 315.458* 2380 140 43.767 
GDP per Capita 
Individual effects, 
individual linear trends 
2799 173 441.263*** 2941 173 443.293*** 
legend: * p<0.1;** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Ho: All panels contain unit roots  
Ha: At least one panel is stationary 
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3.7 Empirical Results and Discussion 
This section is divided into three sub-sections: the first presents the results on the 
national level for 176 countries over the period 2000-2017 of the innovation inputs, 
while the results of the innovation outputs are presented in the second sub-section, 
and are followed by the results of the seven regions comparison. The dependent 
variables have been illustrated against the main variable (i.e. corruption) using 
scatterplots to visually investigate the relationship between them. 
3.7.1 Country Level 
The histogram with kernel density, shown in Figure (3-4) has been illustrated by 
using CPI data from Transparency International. The mean of the CPI is 58, which 
is low, and indicates that most of the countries have a high level of corruption 
compared to the number of clean countries. During the study period, 31 countries 
from the sample were consistently clean, yet, 91 countries were corrupt, mainly 
from the sub-Saharan Region. The rest of the 54 countries were unstable between 
corruption and clean categories. Most of the clean countries (less corrupt) are 
located in the European Continent. On average, Denmark is considered to be the 
cleanest country in the world since 2000. Contrarily, Somalia is considered to be 
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3.7.2 Innovation Inputs Results 
The scatter plots shown in Figures (3-5) and (3-6) provide the relationship between 
innovation’s input and corruption27 based on the average values over the period 
(2000-2017), which indicates a negative association. This indicates that countries 
with higher levels of corruption are investing less in the R&D sector than those with 
lower levels of corruption (clean countries). Furthermore, the same association can 
be concluded from the number of researchers and corruption: countries with 
corruption activities tend to have fewer researchers working in the R&D sector 
compared to less corrupt countries (clean countries).  
                                                          








































0 20 40 60 80 100
Corruption
2000-2017
Corruption and Innovation Input
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According to the Hausman test and time-fixed effects test, the first two Models —
(3-8) and (3-9) — in which the innovation input is the dependent variable, we 
conclude the fixed effects model to be the appropriate one as shown in Table (3-5). 
Additionally, Table (3-5) also shows the estimations of fixed effects of the 
determinants of innovation inputs. The main variable in this study is corruption, and 
our aim is to investigate its impact on innovation level, and it appears to be 
significant in some models.  
 Table 3-5. Fixed Effects estimates of Innovation inputs determinants
                                                          
28 Corruption square is not added in the models, as the significant level is the same as corruption 
variable and the coefficients of corruption square is almost zero, therefore adding it in the models 
does not change the results. 
29Natural resources rent: the results showed that this variable has no impact either positively or 
negatively on the level of innovation input, even though we expected a positive relationship. 
Nevertheless, we can conclude that depending on natural resources has nothing to do with the 
innovation level of nations. 
 Innovation Input 
  
R&D Researchers 
Fixed Effects Fixed Effects 




Country Size (,000,000,000) 
-15.751*** -23.4858*** 
(-4.16) (-2.84) 
Human Capital (,000,000) 
26.9259*** 43.9676*** 
(4.14) (2.67) 















t-statistics is reported in the parentheses ( ). 
Robust standard errors have been used. 
legend: * p<0.1;** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Hausman Specification test of Random 
Effects 
chi2 (6) *** chi2(6)*** 
154.960 92.15 
Testing for time-fixed effects 
4.88*** 3.65*** 
0.000 0.0000 




The results of innovation input are expressed in Model (3-8) and Model (3-9) as 
shown in Table (3-5). The results of Model (3-8), where R&D is the dependent 
variable, reveal that corruption is negatively significant in that increasing 1 point in 
the corruption index leads the R&D expenditure to decrease by 0.0056 percentage 
points, which means that the countries with higher levels of corruption are less 
likely to invest in the R&D sector than less corrupt countries (clean countries). 
Sivak et al. (2011)30, DiRienzo and Das (2015)31 and Alam et al. (2019)32 have 
supported the same results as the present study, yet with different controls. This 
result is consistent with the results shown in Figure (3-5) where the corruption level 
is negatively associated with R&D, meaning that countries with low levels of 
corruption (clean countries) are more likely to invest in R&D than countries with 
high levels of corruption. The results of Model (3-9), where the number of 
researchers is the dependent variable, are aligned with the results of the previous 
model. The findings from Model (3-9) show that corruption has a significant 
negative effect on the number of researchers — increasing one point in corruption 
index unit leads to a decrease in the number of researchers who are working in the 
R&D sector by 0.0105 researchers per million (10500 researchers) . Countries with 
a relatively high level of corruption are likely to have fewer researchers than 
countries with lower levels of corruption. Likewise, Figure (3-6) is consistent with 
our findings where corruption negatively associates to the number of researchers. 
Based on the results of this paper, innovation inputs are significantly harmed by 
corruption. This negative impact can affect the economic growth of the nations 
through slowing down the technological advancement or innovation which is a 
main pillar of economic growth. The impact of corruption can be seen through the 
misallocation of resources (rising costs), namely that some resources are being paid 
into corrupt practices such as bribes and favoritism in order to overcome any 
bureaucratic issues. Vanishing corruption is challenging, therefore, we have to deal 
with it. To minimize the cost of corruption on innovation inputs and to enhance 
                                                          
30 Sivak et al. (2011) conclude that corruption does affect innovation levels even though they 
focused on a smaller scale of countries. 
31 DiRienzo and Das (2015) used Global Innovation Index (GII, 2009) as innovation indicator and 
they suggest that corruption harms innovation activities across countries. 
32 Alam et al. (2019) used Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation and their results 
are consistent with the current paper stating that corruption is detrimental on R&D investment. 




innovation, the governments should deliberate policies and regulations to diminish 
this impact (DiRienzo and Das, 2015). Furthermore, other countries are fighting 
corruption through anti-corruption campaigns which mainly aims at making people 
aware of the shortfalls of the corruption at personal, societal, community and 
country level and most importantly, on the level of economic development and 
growth. China is a good example in adopting anti-corruption campaigns to fight 
corruption in the country (Gan and Xu, 2018). Xu and Yano (2017) and Gan and 
Xu (2018), empirically supported the positive impact of anti-corruption campaigns 
toward decreasing the effect of corruption, as they found that the Chinese provinces 
which have a strong anti-corruption campaigns are more likely to invest in 
innovation inputs. Furthermore, organizing corruption is a different concept which 
can be adopted, to minimize the impact of corruption and grease innovation to 
eventually help economic growth (Krammer, 2013). Therefore, to enhance 
innovation, resources (i.e. R&D and number of resources) must be allocated 
efficiently, and that will foster innovation and more generally grease the wheels of 
economic growth. It is worth mentioning that most of the literature that examines 
the relationship between innovation and corruption is at firms’ level, and they show 
that corruption can grease innovation within firms33. When it comes to corruption 
at macro level, however, it shows a sanding effect on innovation.   
Other variables which are included in our estimation have shown significant 
relationship with innovation inputs. Human capital is positively significant with 
innovation inputs: countries with educated people are more likely to invest in 
innovation inputs (Dakhli and De Clercq, 2004; Kato et al., 2015). We can interpret 
the results by suggesting that when human capital increases by 1 million, the 
investment in the R&D sector increases by almost 27 percentage points and this 
does make sense as the innovation rises by human capital, so countries which focuse 
on improving the level and number of human capital by providing the proper 
education can improve their levels of innovation. In contrast to our argument, 
however, country size shows a significant negative relationship with the innovation 
input: when the country size increases by 1 billion, R&D expenditures decrease by 
15.7 percentage points. This is because governments might focus on providing 
                                                          
33 For more details see (Krastanova, 2014) and (Goel and Nelson, 2018). 




educational, healthcare and infrastructural necessities to the people rather than 
focusing on the innovation sector. Even though, we have added this variable as an 
indication of the scale of workers that are potentially available for innovative 
activity. We can conclude that populated countries are both less likely to have 
people working in the R&D sector and to invest in the R&D sector. Our economy 
scale variable of GDP per capita shows significant negative relationship with the 
innovation input34.When GDP per capita increases by 1 unit, the investment in the 
R&D sector decreases by 0.1872 percentage points. Natural resources is a main 
variable that we added in the models to examine its relationship with the innovation 
level, yet the results show no impact in all models. Although we argued that 
countries with an abundance of natural resources are more likely to innovate 
because those countries understand both the finality of natural resources and the 
usefulness of technological inventions. Furthermore, as Sachs and Warner (2001) 
argued, the abundancy of natural resources could crowd-out the activities of the 
entrepreneurial which could lead to more innovation. Yet the results allowed us to 
conclude that being rich in natural resources does not constitute an advantage but 
rather a difficulty precisely because countries that overly depend on natural 
resources in their economic growth are easier to corrupt (Ades and Di Tella, 1999; 
Gatti, 1999; Leite and Weidmann, 1999; Treisman, 2003; Lambsdorff, 2007; Goel 
and Nelson, 2010).  
Trade openness and innovation inputs such as the number of researchers are likely 
to have a positive relationship: when the trade of a country increases by 1 
percentage, the number of researchers increases by 214. Therefore, we can conclude 
that trade can enhance the innovation level in a country by creating positive 
externalities which improve knowledge diffusion/flow. Furthermore, it increases 
the competition between the agents, hence the incentive, and at the final point it 
leads to innovation (G. Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Roper et al., 2013; 
Papageorgiadis and Sharma, 2016; Akcigit et al., 2018). Those countries which 
trade more are less likely to be corrupted because those countries are exposed to 
international trade, which leaves little room for effective policy tools for 
policymakers to fight corruption. Additionally, when a country is more open to 
                                                          
34 GDP per capita shows no significant in the number of researchers as indicated by Model (3-9). 




trade, it means that this country has economic freedom as one of the determinants 
reducing corruption (Saha et al., 2009). 
3.7.3 Innovation Outputs Results 
The scatter plots shown in Figures (3-7) and (3-8) provide the relationship between 
innovation’s output and corruption35 based on the average values over the period 
(2000-2017), which indicates that there is no clear relationship. For instance, China 
has the highest number of patents yet it is corrupt as shown in Figure (3-7). 
Furthermore, in terms of number of articles published, China shows the second 
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Figure 3-7. The relationship between the level of corruption and patents 
(Source: World Bank data) 
Figure 3-8.The relationship between the level of corruption and the number of articles 
























According to the Hausman test and the time-fixed effects test, Models (3-10) and 
(3-11), in which the innovation output is the dependent variable, we conclude the 
random effects model to be the appropriate model as shown in the Table (3-6). 
Table (3-6) shows the estimations of the random effects of the determinants of 
innovation output. The main variable in this study is corruption, and our aim is to 
investigate its impact on innovation levels, and it appears to be significant in some 
models. 
Table 3-6. Random Effects estimates of Innovation outputs determinants 
 Innovation Output 
  
Patents Articles 
Random Effects Random Effects 













Country Size (,000,000,000) 
4.783  
(0.88)  












t-statistics is reported in the parentheses ( ). 
Robust standard errors have been used. 
legend: * p<0.1;** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 








                                                          
36Natural resources rent: the results showed that this variable has no impact either positively or 
negatively on the level of innovation output. Although we expected a positive relationship, we can 
conclude that depending on natural resources does not impact the innovation level of nations. 




The results of innovation outputs are represented in Model (3-10) and Model (3-11) 
that show divergence from the results of innovation inputs. However, the results of 
Model (3-10), where the number of patents is the dependent variable, although do 
not indicate that corruption might significantly affect the number of patents, the 
sign is consistent with the previous models’ negative sign. This result explains the 
data in Figure (3-7), which we found difficult to interpret because of the unclear 
relationship between corruption and residential patents. We cannot, in this way, 
conclude that the number of patents can be harmed by the corruption level across 
countries. Corruption levels, in fact, seem to be unrelated to patents (Varsakelis, 
2006). Finally, in Model (3-11), where the number of articles is the dependent 
variable, the same conclusion is found: the results show that corruption has no 
impact on the number of articles. We can thus suggest that corruption has no impact 
on the number of articles published. In brief, we can conclude that corruption level 
has no impact on innovation output. Mahagaonkar (2008), empirically shows that 
corruption plays a inhibitory role rather than facilitating innovation products – with 
articles and patents considered as products or outputs of innovation – similarly to 
the opinions of Anokhin and Schulze (2009), Q. Huang and Yuan (2016) and Xu 
and Yano (2017). Rather differently, Lau et al. (2015) and Xie et al.(2018) have 
found that corruption can be facilitative rather than inhibit5ng towards innovation 
outputs. 
Nonetheless, other variables included in our models are significant. Articles as 
explanatory variables in a number of patent models show significant positive 
relationship. Furthermore, GDP per capita which is the economy scale in our model 
shows a positively significant relationship with innovation outputs namely number 
of articles: when the GDP per capita37 increases by 10,000 US dollars, the number 
of articles published increases by 0.5686 articles. Countries with a high level of 
GDP per capita publishes more articles than countries with lower GDP per capita, 
but this is in conflict with the results found by Hu and Mathews (2005). Our results 
suggest that country size is unconnected with innovation outputs (Anokhin and 
Schulze, 2009).  
                                                          
37 GDP per Capita is in US dollar (PPP, constant at 2011 prices), where we have rescaled all data 
by dividing them by 10,000. 




In summary, our findings indicate that global corruption is more detrimental to 
global innovation inputs rather than being a rent seeking, while we find no stifling 
effect on global innovation outputs. Our findings also point out that highly 
populated countries are less likely to invest in the innovation sector (R&D). At the 
same time, however, human capital size shows a positive impact on innovation 
inputs in that countries with more educated people are more likely to have them 
work as researchers. It was possible to conclude from our findings that it is 
unnecessary to be innovative for those countries that are blessed with natural 
resources, yet those resources could be a curse because the country becomes more 
likely to be corrupt. GDP per capita, our economy scale variable shows that wealthy 
countries are less likely to invest in the innovation sector, yet they are more likely 
to publish papers, which might be because they tend to publish in local journals 
instead of high ranking international journals. Furthermore, countries with more 
researchers are more likely to publish. These corrupt practices are generally 
considered to be detrimental to the economic growth of a country, and innovation 
is a main pillar in the economic growth model. 
3.7.4  The Seven Regions 
The plot in Figure (3-9) is based on World Bank data, and it shows that the regions 
are scattered in terms of the relationship between innovation and corruption. As 
shown in the figure, the sub-Saharan region has the most corrupt countries, while 
North America is considered to be the cleanest region among others. We think, 
however, that we cannot consider North America to be the cleanest region because 
it includes only two countries, namely the USA and Canada. Regions consisting of 
countries with low levels of corruption such as Europe and Central Asia are more 
likely to spend more on the R&D sector than countries which have high levels of 
corruption such as the Middle East and Northern Africa.  













Using data from the World Bank, Figure (3-10) shows the distribution of the 
European and Central Asian countries. This is a heterogeneous region because it 
includes the cleanest countries and some corrupt ones. It can be observed that the 
Netherlands, Switzerland, Norway, Denmark and Finland are clustered almost on 
the same area of the figure (even though it might be because of the spillover effect 
of innovation, which will be analysed in a later study). Albania is situated at the 
bottom of the figure, suggesting both that the government does not invest in R&D 
and that the country is quite corrupt. 
 
Figure 3-10. Relationship between corruption and innovation in Europe and Central Asia 
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Figure 3-9. The relationship between corruption and innovation region-wise. 

































After running the regressions for the 7 regions using the suggested models, the 
results for innovation inputs are shown in Tables (3-7) and (3-8). In regard to the 
results of innovation output, these are shown in Tables (3-9) and (3-10). However, 
the results vary from one region to another due to geographical and cultural 
characteristics, language, and regional characteristics. Corruption, which is our 
main variable, has a diverse relationship with the innovation proxies which we are 
using in this paper. Most current studies examine different divisions of regions, 
such as Eastern Europe and Central Asia (Habiyaremye and Raymond, 2018), the 
African region (Oluwatobi et al., 2015) and OECD countries (Salinas-Jimenez and 
Salinas-Jimenez, 2006). Other research projects focus on one country only (Gan 
and Xu, 2018). The current project, however, is distinct in that it uses the World 
Bank division of regions.  
Referring to our first and second models where innovation inputs — R&D and the 
number of researchers — are the dependent variables, Tables (3-7) and (3-8) show 
the results of the seven regions. East Asia & Pacific (EAP) is the only region which 
shows that corruption is detrimental to the innovation inputs: when corruption 
increases by 1 point in the scale, investing in the R&D decreases by 0.016 
percentage points and the number of researchers decreases by 0.0423 researchers 
per million. Similarly to this, Habiyaremye and Raymond (2018) also empirically 
found that corruption stifles R&D activities in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. 
Furthermore, WCI, the dummy variable, for corrupt countries shows dissimilar 
results in the EAP region and SSA region; the EAP region shows a negative 
significant association with the innovation inputs such as R&D, and this is because 
most of the countries in this region are less corrupt. The joint negative significant 
relationship between corruption and the WCI dummy variable with innovation 
inputs points to the fact that corruption harms innovation in developed countries. In 
contrast, WCI shows a positive significant impact on innovation inputs —R&D and 
researchers— in the SSA region. This relationship suggests that corruption can 
grease innovation inputs by investing more both in R&D and researchers. We can 
argue, however, that those resources — innovation inputs — can be used in corrupt 
practices in that unreal researchers might be the reason behind this positive 
association. The amount of R&D and researchers are only recorded in governmental 




records with no sensed outcome – and those resources go to the benefit of a few 
people rather than the common good. Furthermore, it might be possible that 
corruption is a tax on the inputs, just as it is a tax on other activities. Hence, this 
should not necessarily be interpreted as a corruption boosting innovation. Rather, 
corruption adds to the cost of doing research and development, which is definitely 
inadvisable. Most of the SSA region depends on natural resources and a fine 
proportion goes to innovation inputs as shown in Table (3-7). Wealthy yet less 
developed countries in the SSA can make use of corruption in order to augment 
innovation, consequently, the economic growth of those countries can accelerate. 
However, in regard to the rest of the regions included in this study, the results of 
corruption show no significant relationship to innovation inputs. 
Based on the results in Tables (3-7) and (3-8) where natural resources are unrelated 
to the innovation inputs, the results in the regions show that wealthy countries that 
depend on natural resources or have an abundance of natural resources are located 
in the MENA, NA, SA and SSA regions and invest a fine proportion in the R&D 
sector. Furthermore, wealthy countries that are located in the LAC, MENA, and NA 
regions have a higher number of researchers than those which have less abundance 
of natural resources. Consequently, we can argue that wealthy countries seek to 
match developed countries by investing in innovation inputs because they know 
that technological advancement is the future. We can also argue that those inputs 
might be spent in corrupt activities through a misallocation of resources (Acemoglu 
and Verdier, 2000) because we cannot see any tangible results of those resources. 
Also, the results indicate that country size is negatively significant with innovation 
inputs in some of the regions as presented in the Tables (3-7) and (3-8). Indeed, 
innovation has a direct positive effect coming from the human capital size for 
almost all regions except the MENA region, where it shows a negative relationship 
in that 1,000,000 human capital can result in a decrease of circa 10 percentage 
points in innovation inputs (R&D). As all countries in the MENA region are 
developing countries with young generations, the governments focus on building 
the human capital (education) rather than spending in the innovation sector (R&D).  
 




Table 3-7. Fixed Effects estimates of Innovation Inputs- Research & Development- Regions 
Innovation Inputs/ Research & Development 
  EAP ECA LAC MENA NA SA SSA 
Corruption -0.016* -0.0085 -0.00064 0.0048 0.0183 0.00157 -0.0017 
Country Size 
(,000,000,000) 
-9.989 -23.671* -46.0424*** 7.033 7.6375 -9.978*** 0.630 
Human Capital 
(,000,000) 
21.464** 78.790*** 60.070*** -10.131* 24.415* 14.1695*** -19.31 
GDP per Capita -.2679*** -.26291*** 0.0107 -0.0701 -1.451 -0.0193 -0.1384 
Trade Openness 0.0030* 0.00061 0.00077 0.0022 0.01697 -0.0011 -0.00 
Natural Resources 0.0034 -0.0011 0.000999 0.0013*** 0.256*** 0.01895* 0.00113* 
WCI -.3874*** 0.0145 -0.0622 -0.1169 (omitted) (omitted) .0665** 
Constant 1.614*** 1.517*** .50805** 0.0423 3.0062 .8938*** .23** 
legend: * p<0.1;** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
Table 3-8. Fixed Effects estimates of Innovation Inputs- Number of Researchers- Regions 
Innovation Inputs/ Researchers 
  EAP ECA LAC MENA NA SA SSA 
Corruption -0.0423** -0.0150 -0.00066 0.0203 -0.0347 0.0000034 -0.00055 
Country Size 
(,000,000,000) 
-19.959 -36.954 -44.254*** -0.775 21.307** 0.595 -0.0683 
Human Capital 
(,000,000) 
28.991 140.999*** 50.294*** 37.599 81.523* -0.888 -3.558 
GDP per Capita -0.244 -0.0336 .115** 0.0258 -2.326 -0.0292 0.0164 
Natural Resources 0.006 0.0134 0.00099* 0.0033* 0.6281*** 0.00083187 0.00014 
WCI -0.768 0.0753 -0.0023 0.180 (omitted) (omitted) 0.0389* 
Constant 4.624*** 1.643* .429** -1.529 1.025 -0.0130 0.0275 
legend: * p<0.1;** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Based on our third and fourth models where innovation outputs such as patents and 
articles are the dependent variables, Table (3-9) and (3-10) show the results of the 
seven regions. The SSA region has a significant positive relationship with the 
innovation outputs: when the corruption increases by 1 point in the scale, the 
number of residential patents in SSA region increases by 0.00018 patents and this 
amount is almost 0. Consequently, corruption shows an unreal greasing effect on 
innovation output in the SSA region, and, as mentioned previously based on TI data, 
the SSA region involves the most corrupt countries. Drawing on empirical evidence 




by Oluwatobi et al. (2015) we argue in this paper that controlling corruption that 
results in a fall in corruption can help innovation to flourish. 
Table 3-9. Random Effects estimates of Innovation Outputs- Number of Patents-Regions 
Innovation Outputs/ Patents 
  EAP ECA LAC MENA NA SA SSA 
Corruption 0.0619 -0.0028 -0.0005 0.0012 0.0122 0.00028 .00018** 
Country Size 
(,000,000,000) 
-4.539 14.711*** .7291* 0.549 60.663*** .09487*** -0.0536 
R&D -1.249 0.118* 0.0532 -.01196** 1.756** .12108*** 0.00499 
Researchers 1.075 -0.0226 -0.0029 -0.0043 -0.641 -0.254* 0.0121 
Articles  1.920*** .0584*** .05799*** .26911*** .312*** .10829*** .08513*** 
GDP per Capita -0.148 -0.058 -0.0045 0.00075 -6.831 0.0061 -0.00051 
Natural Resources -0.1034 0.0036 0.00 0.00039 -0.498 -0.0128* -0.00 
WCI -2.268 0.0192 0.0099 -0.0159 (omitted) -0.0583* -0.0096 
Constant -0.845 0.1539 0.0165 -0.0941 25.87 0.0315 -0.00327 
legend: * p<0.1;** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
Table 3-10. Random Effects estimates of Innovation Outputs- Number of Articles Published-Regions 
Innovation Outputs/ Articles 
  EAP ECA LAC MENA NA SA SSA 
Corruption -0.042 0.019 0.0128 0.0048 0.8218* -0.0898 -0.00052 
GDP per Capita 1.079 .619*** 0.368 0.0142 25.015*** 0.8545 0.0287 
Researchers 0.366* .2009** -0.331 .0587*** 2.378*** 3.425 .4013** 
Natural Resources 0.038 0.0047 0.0045 0.00 1.550 .5236*** -0.000199 
WCI 2.38 -0.1996 -0.393 -0.0483 (omitted) 5.186 -0.000135 
Constant -0.081 -1.761 -0.728 -0.0622 -123.417*** 1.136 0.0502 
legend: * p<0.1;** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
In summary, corruption has a negative effect on the innovation inputs of R&D and 
researchers in the EAP region, yet has no effect on the rest of the regions included 
in this study. Furthermore, WCI shows divergent results for the EAP region and the 
SSA region. WCI has a negative significant relationship with the innovation inputs 
in the EAP region, yet a positive significant relationship in the SSA region. The 
joint negative relationship in the EAP region points to the argument that corruption 




is detrimental to innovation in developed countries. The positive relationship in the 
SSA region reveals, however, that corruption can spur innovation inputs in poor 
countries. In addition, corruption statistically showed a significant positive impact 
on the innovation outputs (patents), thus we can argue that some corruption in poor 
countries can be useful to overcome any bureaucratic issues. We can also argue that 
the resources of innovation inputs are being spent in corruption activities because 
we cannot sense any results of these. Significantly, therefore, the misallocation of 
resources can harm innovation, and this means that the answer to the study’s main 
question is yes: corruption is detrimental to innovation.  
The relationship between corruption and innovation has a received a lot of attention 
by researchers in the field of economics . This study provides novel insights into 
this relationship at macro-level, and it contributes to the empirical literature of 
innovation and corruption, by providing a cross country empirical analysis of how 
corruption distresses innovation activities. Furthermore, this paper adds to the 
strand of the literature by means of employing four proxies of innovation input and 
output. Using four proxies is expected to yield consistent and valid results and that 
is what we have received in this paper: corruption is indeed detrimental to 
innovation input for both measurements and it clearly has no impact on innovation 
output for both measurements. 
3.8 Conclusion 
This study answered its main question, which enquires “is corruption detrimental 
to innovation?” The empirical evidence reveals that there is a significant adverse 
impact of corruption on innovation activities representing in innovation input. This 
impact is harming a nation’s ability to innovate through the misallocation of 
resources that raises costs and impairs trust (Acemoglu and Verdier, 2000; 
DiRienzo and Das, 2015) and thus, eventually, deters economic growth. On the 
other hand, corruption shows no impact on innovation output. Regarding the 
comparison between regions, the corruption in the EAP region has a negative effect 
on the innovation inputs of R&D and researchers. In contrast to this, corruption is 
positively significant to the innovation inputs of R&D and researchers in the SSA 
region. It seems, therefore, that corruption greases innovation inputs. However, this 




result should not necessarily be interpreted as a corruption boosting innovation 
because this positive impact is merely due to corruption being a tax on the inputs 
just as on another activity. Rather, by adding to its cost, corruption has a negative 
effect on research and development. In the same region, although corruption has a 
positive impact on innovation outputs (the number of patents) because the impact 
is economically insignificant, it is difficult to call it reliable and suggest that 
corruption greases innovation. Therefore, it is possible that, similarly to national 
level results, corruption has no impact on innovation outputs. In light of these 
results, the conclusion remains that in general, corruption is detrimental to 
innovation. 
In accordance with the empirical evidence, we suggest certain policy implications 
as follows. Firstly, due to the misallocation of resources, 
governments/policymakers must focus on anti-corruption campaigns which have 
shown their effectiveness in reducing corruption (Dang and Yang, 2016; Xu and 
Yano, 2017; Gan and Xu, 2018). Secondly, governments shall consider putting 
some policies in order to trigger innovation activities such as eliminating 
unnecessary bureaucratic and red tape barriers. Thirdly, policymakers are urged to 
undertake serious measures to spur innovative activities by eliminating the 
unnecessary bureaucratic matters which are the main reason of corruption and 
which lead to hindering both economic growth and innovation. Fourthly, we 
recommend encouraging innovation-friendly procedures by enforcing the e-
government services designed to reduce the time spent in the governmental 
procedures and eliminate unnecessary intermediaries and induce a fair access to 
information and services. All these measures can eventually help a country to 
innovate more and thus potentially allow the global innovation to flourish. 
3.9 Limitations and Future Research Directions 
Some of the findings in this research project are unique to the literature, while others 
shed additional light on previous results due to working with a larger sample of 
countries. While this work provides some interesting insights and ideas for future 
work in the strain, it has some limitations. One limitation is, and this is common in 
quantitative studies using real data for cross-country analyses of corruption, 




innovation and economic indicators: in our paper case we used unbalanced panel 
data most likely containing measurement errors. As with all cross-country studies 
exploring such country factors, the results presented here are limited to the quality 
of these data measures, which are imperfect. Therefore, it will be necessary to use 
more accurate, better quality, more reliable and easier access data for further robust 
examination. For robustness, it would be worthwhile to try other measures of 
innovation inputs and outputs drawing on Cirera and Maloney (2017) or use the 
Global Innovation Index (GII) considered to be another proxy for global innovation. 
More interestingly, it would be of relevance to combine corruption with policies 
and regulations. For the robustness of results, an anti-corruption index might be 
used to check with it the current results consistence. 
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Corruption can be contagious and innovation can spillover, therefore, this paper 
investigates the effect of neighbouring corruption on home country innovation by 
using Two Stages Least Squares (2SLS) method. Furthermore, random effects 
technique is used to address if the neighbouring innovation has an impact on the 
home corruption. The empirical evidence reveals that neighbouring corruption 
negatively affects home innovation, as well as being adversely affected by 
neighbouring innovation. Moreover, geographical proximity of corrupted countries 
can lead to worsen corruption levels in both (home and neighbouring). In 
conclusion, countries can be affected corresponding to their neighbours, which can 
be challenging to overcome as such proximity cannot be changed. However, 
governments should strain to enforce laws and regulation to fight corruption 
spillage over the borders. Additionally, anti-corruption campaigns can be 
established in the home country to tumble corruption in home country, subsequently 
tumbling corruption in the neighbouring country. 
 
Keywords: Neighbouring Corruption, Neighbouring Innovation, Geographical 
Proximity, Economic Openness. 





Countries with common borders usually have similar economic, political and 
cultural characteristics (Becker et al., 2009), linguistic similarities (Helliwell, 
1997), shared histories and culture (Anselin, 1988; Herwartz et al., 2011). 
Consequently, corruption in the home country cannot be isolated from corruption 
in neighbouring countries, which is an issue that many recent studies attempt to 
explore. However, many researchers claim that corruption within a country is 
largely dependent on the corruption with its neighbouring countries (Goel and 
Nelson, 2007; Becker et al., 2009; Lee and Guven, 2013; Feng et al., 2018; Sui et 
al., 2018). These researchers found that corruption is contagious: corruption in one 
place, country, and state inevitably influences corruption in a neighbouring place, 
country, and states.  However, one of the reasons behind the spreading of this 
infection among neighbour countries is that those countries show an imitation 
behavior for corruption (Fichtlscherer et al., 2010; Accinelli and Carrera, 2012). 
Besides investigating the existence of corruption as a contagion phenomenon, some 
researchers extend the contagious corruption perspective by considering the 
influence of corruption between the host country and its surrounding countries. 
According to the literature, corruption can spillover from neighbouring countries to 
the home country through two main determinates or channels, which are economic 
openness and geographical proximity. Economic Openness is related to trade flow 
and foreign direct investment, including inflow and outflow (Ades and Di Tella, 
1999; Wei, 2000; Gokcekus and Knörich, 2006; O'Trakoun, 2017). On the other 
hand, geographical proximity is associated with the common border neighbors and 
the distance between cities (Goel and Nelson, 2007; Becker et al., 2009; Quazi et 
al., 2013; Goel and Saunoris, 2014; O'Trakoun, 2017; Feng et al., 2018; Sui et al., 
2018). Additionally, some researchers like Becker et al. (2009) who argued that 
corruption could contagious or travel from a place to another because of the 
common culture. 
Although in our previous study —Chapter 3 of this thesis, entitled “Is corruption 
detrimental to Innovation?—we have shown that corruption in the home country 
has a significant effect on the innovation level, it is worth extending that study 




through including the influence of other factors such as neighbours’ corruption. 
According to the literature, as mentioned earlier, these factors have a strong 
influence on home corruption. Because, to the best of our knowledge, it has not 
been addressed, this paper provides an empirical study to examine the influence of 
neighbouring corruption on home innovation.  This is important because innovation 
is the main pillar of the nation’s economic growth, and it might lead to slowing the 
economic growth of the home country. Moreover, the impact of neighbouring 
innovation on the home country corruption is also considered.  
We believe that previous studies neglect the phenomenon that neighbouring 
corruption might infect home innovation, which leads to slowing the economic 
growth of the home country. Therefore, this paper aims to fill this gap by providing 
empirical evidence on whether contagious corruption affects home country 
innovation. In sum, this study seeks to investigate two main issues: 1) examining 
the impact of neighbouring countries’ corruption on home innovation, and 2) 
examining the impact of neighbouring countries’ innovation on home corruption. 
According to the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test, we use the Two Stages Least Squares 
(2SLS) technique to address the first issue as it solves the problem of endogeneity 
by correcting the problem of an endogenous variable by adding instrumental 
variable—. Regarding the second objective in this study, according to the Hausman 
test result, the random effects model is appropriate to investigate. Hence, we used 
a data set of 140 countries over 15 years and assumed that the input variables for 
the home country are determined from the average values of the neighbouring 
countries. This study presents new evidence which shows that home innovation can 
be harmed terribly because of being a neighbour of corrupted countries and thus 
have its economic growth slowing down . Furthermore, when the neighbouring 
countries focus on the innovation in their country, that can help in reducing 
corruption at the home country (Johari and Ibrahim, 2017).  
This paper has several unique and novel elements compared to the extant work in 
this area as it carries three unique contributions to the literature. Firstly, to the best 
of our knowledge and while the past literature focused on studying the corruption 
contagious on home corruption, this study focuses on investigating the spillover 
impact of neighbouring country corruption on home country innovation — how 




much the neighbour corruption will affect the home country in terms of 
innovation—. Secondly, we are examining for 140 countries over the period 2003-
2017, which is different from studies conducted by either Becker et al. (2009) who 
used cross-sectional data for 123 countries or Goel and Nelson (2007) who focused 
only on US states. Finally, we believe that our findings offer a significant 
contribution to academia in the field of corruption and innovation literature. 
After this brief introduction, the next section discusses theoretical and empirical 
previous studies on the corruption infectivity. Section 4 explains the methodology 
used in this paper and is followed by the description of the data and variables 
construction for this study in section 5. Section 6 provides a comprehensive 
interpretation and analysis of the results along with discussion. Lastly, section 7 
provides the conclusion of the paper. Finally, the limitations of the research and 
avenues for future work are drawn in section 8. 
4.3 Literature Review 
Corruption is one of the most challenging obstructs to economic growth and 
Transparency International (TI), which is the global civil society organisation 
leading the fight against corruption and the organisation responsible for collecting 
corruption data, has defined it as the abuse of entrusted power for private gain. 
Although it happens behind closed doors (underneath tables); yet the results of 
corruption can be sensed/seen. Corruption can affect economic growth through 
several means, and innovation is one of these. Thus, there is vast literature on 
corruption and its impact on economic growth at macro-level (Mo, 2001; Bentzen, 
2012; Dridi, 2013; Dutta and Sobel, 2016) and micro-level (Fisman and Svensson, 
2007; De Rosa et al., 2010).The relationship between corruption and economic 
growth has been well established, as stated by the sanding and greasing hypothesis. 
Aside from this, there is a considerable amount of literature on the relationship 
between corruption and innovation on micro level (de Waldemar, 2012; Smith et 
al., 2014; Nguyen et al., 2016; Habiyaremye and Raymond, 2018) and also on 
macro level (Anokhin and Schulze, 2009; DiRienzo and Das, 2015; Johari and 
Ibrahim, 2017). 




Consequently, corruption plays a major role in the economic growth of the home 
country because innovation is the main pillar of the nation’s economic growth, and 
it might result in slowing down this growth. Corruption is considered as a global 
trend in which its destruction can exceed the home country, yet it can cross 
boundaries of the home country and reach neighbour countries and vice versa. This 
means that corruption can spillover between firms which can reach between 
countries, and it can also be regionalised (Sui et al., 2018). Therefore, recent 
literature consistently points out that corruption is not only a problem of an 
individual country, but it is also a common phenomenon that may spread across 
most of the developing countries, especially in the era of globalization when 
interactions between countries have been increasing and forming a bridge for the 
contagion of corruption (Attila, 2008). Furthermore, several studies have offered a 
consistent view regarding this phenomena, such as Attila (2008) and Becker et al. 
(2009), who discover that countries with frequent economic trade might be more 
easily affected by the diffusion of corruption, whereas those with similar economic, 
political and institutional environment might be more susceptible to the spreading 
of corruption. 
The literature on contagious corruption is scarce because it was established 
recently. However, the idea of corruption being contiguous started from the study 
carried out by Goel and Nelson (2007) who used US States data and empirically 
demonstrated that an increase in neighbouring corruption of states results in 
increasing the convections within the state. They concluded that corruption is 
contagious within US states. Then, Attila (2008) who uses cross-sectional data over 
the period 1996-2002 and Becker et al. (2009) who uses the cross-sectional analysis 
of 123 countries both provide empirical evidence at the country level that corruption 
is contagious among countries. Hence, a higher level of perceived corruption in 
adjacent economies leads to a domestic increase in perceived corruption. Also, 
Quazi et al. (2013) presented consistent results with the previous studies in which 
corruption is contagious when they used 16 countries from the South and East Asia 
regions. Moreover, in a recent study, O'Trakoun (2017) has shown that corruption 
in neighbouring countries can have adverse contagion effect on the domestic 
economy. Also, Sui et al. (2018) provide empirical evidence not only to confirm 




contagious corruption through geographical distance, but also that corruption can 
spread even to countries that have similar levels of GDP per capita. However, the 
previous evidence regarding the idea that corruption is contagious contradicts the 
outcomes of the study presented by Márquez et al. (2011) who examined the same 
theory (hypothesis) of detecting if corruption is contagious or not using spatial 
econometrics techniques. Márquez et al. found that neighbouring countries tend to 
show similar levels of corruption because they face similar characteristics and 
similar institutional environments. Based on the above literature, we can conclude 
that corruption is indeed contagious, and isolating the countries from this infection 
is not an individual responsibility, yet it is everyone’s responsibility.   
According to previous literature, Sui et al. (2018) have summarised and presented 
several reasons that assist corruption to spillover/ or spread among people, agents, 
states and countries. First, learning and peer-group behaviour can lead to the 
dispersal of corruption in countries that have numerous contacts in business 
(Kaymak and Bektas, 2015). Second, neighbouring countries with similarities in 
economic development tend to imitate corrupt behaviour from next door, which 
points to a demonstration effect of corruption (Accinelli and Carrera, 2012). Third, 
the availability of international platforms for exchanging information and 
experiences can promote the fast diffusion of corruption among countries using 
these platforms. Among these are the World Bank and the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (Becker et al., 2009). Fourth, 
the transfer of illegal assets by some officials away from their countries to other 
places will transfer corruption as well. This is due to the increased awareness of 
personal corruption and the sensibility of asset protection (Attila, 2008). 
Past studies that focused on examining the spillover of corruption from a country 
to another, divided the determinants or channels in which corruption can be a 
spillover into two main categories: 1) economic openness; and 2) geographical 
proximity. Economic openness can be considered as a constraint to corruption 
through trade as well as-by altering economic incentives — due to the cost-benefits 
balance changes; and they concluded that openness could help to reduce the 
corruption in the country (Ades and Di Tella, 1999; Wei, 2000; Gokcekus and 
Knörich, 2006; O'Trakoun, 2017). However, the main difference between other 




studies and our study is that we argue that the openness of the neighbouring 
countries can be inversely related to the home country innovation via reducing the 
home country corruption while other studies focused on investigating the impact of 
the openness of the same country rather than focusing on the neighbouring 
countries. We argue, furthermore, that economic openness to other countries can 
help the spillover to take place. The two main variables we are using and indicating 
to economic openness in this study are trade and foreign direct investment-outflow.  
As mentioned before, early geographical proximity is one of the main channels that 
corruption can spillover from the neighbouring countries to impair innovation at the 
home country. Many researchers have argued that corruption can travel from the 
neighbouring countries to the home country through this channel. Thus,  it  has been 
used by many researchers through  different measurements, i.e. distance and 
common borders are two determinants for geographical proximity and have been 
widely used in the literature  (Goel and Nelson, 2007; Becker et al., 2009; Quazi et 
al., 2013; Goel and Saunoris, 2014; O'Trakoun, 2017; Feng et al., 2018; Sui et al., 
2018).  Thus, in this study, we are using three different measurements for 
geographical proximity, namely, geographical closeness between capital cities, the 
number of neighbours, and being a landlocked country. The main difference 
between other related studies and our study is that we are investigating if the 
neighbouring corruption can affect the level of innovation of the home country due 
to geographical proximity.  
In summary, we believe that previous studies focused on examining corruption 
spill-over from a country to another —being contagious— (Goel and Nelson, 2007; 
Attila, 2008; Becker et al., 2009; Lopez-Valcarcel et al., 2017; Feng et al., 2018; 
Sui et al., 2018), yet they neglected that this contagious corruption can infect the 
innovation at home country. Therefore, we are considering contagious corruption 
as a potential channel in which this infection can spillover, harming home 
innovation. Thus,   ignoring the contagion phenomenon can have severe 
consequences on the economic growth of countries and can eventually slow 
economic growth. Overall, to the best of our knowledge, no one has investigated 
the impact of neighbouring corruption on innovation at home country. Although all 
previous studies have investigated if corruption is contagious or not, in our project 




we present a different view where we are quantifying the impact of the contagious 
effect on the home country innovation. 
4.4 Methodology  
We carry out an analysis to investigate the spillover effects of neighbouring 
countries corruption to home country innovation. Furthermore, we are investigating 
the spillover effects of neighbouring countries innovation on home country 
corruption. Therefore, in order to address these issues, we consider other variables 
which might influence corruption and innovation together with our main variables 
of corruption and innovation in this paper. Hence, we use unbalanced panel data for 
140 countries over the period (2003-2017). 
The general panel model is given by equation (4-1). 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡 (4-1) 
where, Y signifies home innovation level, represented by R&D and in the Model 
(4-1), and Y refers to the corruption level of the home country. X is a vector that 
represents our main variables of the two models: average corruption of the 
neighbouring countries, and average innovation of the neighbouring countries, 
respectively. Furthermore, it represents other exogenous variables which are: 
geographical closeness, average trade of the neighbouring countries, average 
foreign direct investment-outflow of the neighbouring countries, land lock dummy, 
natural resources, a log of gross domestic product, year effects dummy and the 
neighbour’s dummies38. In this study, there are two models to be estimated in the 
(4-2) and (4-3) models, which are given as follows:  
𝑅&𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑖𝑡 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑝1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑖𝑡 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡2𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽3𝑖𝑡 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒3𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑖𝑡 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑓𝑑𝑖4𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝑖𝑡 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘5𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑖𝑡 𝑛𝑎𝑡6𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑖𝑡 𝑙𝑔𝑑𝑝7𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽8𝑖𝑡 𝑦𝑟8𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑖𝑡𝑛𝑜𝑛9𝑖𝑡 +  𝜇𝑖𝑡 (4-2) 
                                                          
38 The variables are elaborated in section 5 of this paper. 




where R&D signifies research & development, avencorp denotes average 
corruption of the neighbouring countries, avendist indicates the average distance  
between the home country capital city and the neighbouring capital cities, 
aventrade shows the average trade of the neighbouring countries, avenfdi signifies 
the average foreign direct investment od the neighbouring countries, lock indicates 
to the landlocked dummy variable, nat signifies to the natural resources, lgdp 
denotes the GDP (log form), yr indicates to the year dummy variables and non 
denotes to the number of neighbours dummy variable.  
𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑖𝑡 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑟𝑛𝑑1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑖𝑡 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡2𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽3𝑖𝑡 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒3𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑖𝑡 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑓𝑑𝑖4𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝑖𝑡 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘5𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑖𝑡 𝑛𝑎𝑡6𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑖𝑡 𝑙𝑔𝑑𝑝7𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽8𝑖𝑡 𝑦𝑟8𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑖𝑡𝑛𝑜𝑛9𝑖𝑡 +  𝜇𝑖𝑡 
(4-3) 
where corp signifies corruption, avenrnd denotes average research & development 
of the neighbouring countries, avendist indicates the average distance  between the 
home country capital city and the neighbouring capital cities, aventrade shows the 
average trade of the neighbouring countries, avenfdi signifies the average foreign 
direct investment od the neighbouring countries, lock indicates to the landlocked 
dummy variable, nat signifies to the natural resources, lgdp denotes the GDP (log 
form), yr indicates to the year dummy variables and non denotes to the number of 
neighbours dummy variable. 
4.4.1 Two Stages Least Squares (2SLS) 
Two-Stage least squares (2SLS) regression analysis is a statistical technique that is 
used in the analysis of structural equations. It is used when the dependent variable's 
error terms are correlated with the independent variables and that is the case in our 
(4-2) Model where the error terms of home innovation is correlated with the 
avencorp. This problem called endogeneity problem which occurs when the error 
term is affecting the independent variables —avencorp— and therefore indirectly 
affecting the dependent variable —home innovation—. The rest of the variables in 
(4-2) model are considered exogenous variables where they have no direct or 
formulaic relationship, yet the endogenous variable is a problematic causal 




variable. Therefore, this problem must be solved in order to have accurate and 
robust results, consequently to solve the problem of endogeneity, instrumental 
variables are being used; which is used to create a new variable by replacing the 
problematic variable. The instrumental variables job is to correct for the 
endogeneity problem in the model, so IV should be are associated with the regressor 
only (not with error term and affecting the dependent variables) it just corrects for 
the error term to solve the endogeneity problem. The requirement for IV to correct 
for the endogeneity problem; the IV should be correlated with regressor. And it 
should not be correlated with the error term and it should not directly cause of the 
dependent variable. 
After applying the IVs in the 2SLS model for Model (4-2), Durbin Wu-Hausman 
(DWH) test shall take place to check the exogenity and endogeneity of the suspect 
variable (avencorp). Furthermore, the main objective of the DWH is to compare 
coefficients of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and that of Two Stages Least squares 
(2SLS)  (i.e. the null hypothesis states that the preferred estimator is the OLS) 
(Hausman, 1978). However, the test results support the application of the 2SLS 
technique for (4-2) model where home innovation is the dependent variable as we 
rejected the null hypothesis and concluded that 2SLS is the appropriate method, 
because there is a violation where OLS appeared to be biased —there is correlation 
between avencorp and the error term—. Therefore, to correct for this bias, we 
replaced the problematic/endogenous variable —avencorp—with the predicted 
avencorp values by using an instrumental variables.  
 In other words, 2SLS is about sequentially running two OLS regressions. The first 
OLS (first step) is regressing the problematic/endogenous which is avencorp 
variable on all the exogenous variables in the model including the instrumental 
variable which tends to correct for the problem of endogeneity.  Then we obtain the 
predicted values of avencorp —endogenous variable— to find the fitted values, as 
the instrumental variable that is uncorrelated with the residuals. The second step is 
about regressing the initial equation by using the fitted values from the first step as 
instruments to replace the original endogenous variables. This model has been 
developed independently by Theil (1953) and Bassman (1957) as cited in Gujarati 




(2009). The elaboration of the endogeneity problem and how to solve it is explained 
below. Firstly, we assume that the model (4-4) can be expressed as follows: 
𝑦 = 𝛼1𝑥 + 𝛼2𝜍 + 𝜇 (4-4) 
Where y is the home innovation and 𝝇 is the avencorp, independent variable, yet 
problematic, and x is the independent variable in the model and 𝝁 is the error term. 
So, in order to solve the endogeneity problem, there is a need to use the 2SLS 
model, which is all about replacing the problematic/endogenous variable avencorp 
— with the predicted values of this variable. These predicted values can be 
calculated by adding the average of neighbouring governmental stability variable 
(avenlaw, avenburc, avendemo39), which is an instrumental variable. The predicted 
values of avencorp can be calculated from Model (4-5): 
𝜍 = 𝑥𝛾1 + 𝜚𝛾2 + 𝑒 (4-5) 
Where 𝝇 is the predicted value of avencorp, x is the exogenous variable — the rest 
of the independent variables — and 𝝔 is the instrument variable which is 
represented by avenlaw, avenburc and avendemo. After calculating the predicted 
values for avencorp (𝝇), we substitute these values in the original model so that the 
new model can be written as: 
𝑦 = 𝛼1𝑥 + 𝛼2𝜍 + 𝜇 (4-6) 
Where y is dependent variable — home innovation —, 𝝇 is the predicted values for 
avencorp measured from (4-5), and x is the exogenous variables. 
1. Instrumental Variables (IV) 
The incentive for using instrumental variables is the existence of the endogeneity 
problem in the model, which means that OLS estimations are suspected to be biased 
                                                          
39 The IVs are elaborated in section 5.  
 




and inconsistent due to the correlation between the error terms of the dependent 
variable and at least one of the independent variables. However, the challenge that 
arises here is to find a valid IV which satisfies some requirements that are necessary 
to correct the problem of endogeneity. These requirements are:  
1. The instrument must be correlated with the endogenous variable. 
2. The instrument should not be correlated with the error term.  
However, it is very difficult to find variables that meet these requirements because; 
theoretically, most variables which are correlated with the endogenous variable may 
have a direct impact on the dependent variable. Despite that, some instruments can 
be found, even though they may be considered weak, to identify the problematic 
variable weakly, and this is considered a significant problem. However, weak 
identification of the endogenous variables can cause another problem, that of 
inconsistency in the coefficients of 2SLS. Therefore, a chosen instrument shall be 
tested firstly to see whether it is either a weak instrument or it can solve the problem 
of endogeneity in the model.  
4.4.2  Random Effects Model 
According to the Hausman test results as shown in the Table (4-5) in section 5 of 
this chapter, P115, the random effects model represents a satisfactory model for the 
(4-3) Model where we are quantifying the impact of neighbour innovation on the 
home corruption. This random effects model can be expressed as (4-7):  
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛾1𝑥1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑥2𝑖𝑡 + ⋯ + 𝛾𝑘𝑥𝑘𝑖𝑡 + (𝜀𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡) (4-7) 
Where Y signifies the home corruption and 𝒙 indicates the independent variables 
which are given in model (4-3); 𝝁 is the error term, 𝜺 is the standard random variable 
which differs for each country. 𝒊 is an index of the country (140 countries) number 
while t indicates to the time (period of the study ) 2003-2017 and α is a constant.   
It is worth mentioning and according to Asteriou and Hall (2006) who stated that 
when the panel data is balanced (i.e. contains all existing countries’ data), one might 
expect that the fixed effects model will provide better results compared with the 
random effects model. However, this is not applicable  in our case, as we are using 




unbalanced panel data, where the sample contains limited observations of the 
existing countries — there is some missing data for certain countries in certain years 
—, and thus applying the random effects model might be more appropriate than the 
fixed effects model. Furthermore, using the random effects approach can handle the 
constant for each country as random parameters. This is not the only advantage of 
using random effects, but also using this approach allows for including additional 
variables that have equal values for all observations within a given country 
(Asterious & Hall, 2006, p.348). This means that it allows us to easily comprise 
dummy variables in the model, as in our case, we have year dummies, several 
neighbours dummies and la and lock dummy (i.e. almost 30 dummy variables).  
4.5 Variables Description and Data source 
This section presents the variables used in this paper, and it consists of three sub-
sections. The first sub-section discusses in detail the dependent and independent 
variables as well as the logic theme behind including them in the models. Following 
this is a brief description of the sample data used in this study and the sources of 
the data. The third sub-section discusses the stationarity level of all variables using 
the unit root test.  
4.5.1 The Variables 
4.5.1.1 The Dependent Variable 
1. Home Innovation 
 Home country innovation is the dependent variable in the model (4-2), where it is 
expressed in research & development expenditure (R&D). It has been a candidate 
as an innovation proxy in many studies (Furman et al., 2002; Bottazzi and Peri, 
2003; Hu and Mathews, 2005; Varsakelis, 2006; Smith et al., 2014; Lau et al., 
2015). Also, R&D is one of the main tools used to gain a competitive advantage in 
science and technology for both the government and the private sector. This aspect 
reflects the extent to which a country allocates resources for growing the overall 
stock of knowledge, including fundamental research, applied for research and 
experimental development work that leads to new devices, products or processes. 




Moreover, R&D is considered to be one of the most critical elements in improving 
the innovation capacity of nations (Audretsch and Feldman, 2004). Therefore, R&D 
is selected in this study as the primary output measure proxy of innovation, which 
is measured as a proportion of the gross domestic product (GDP) of each country.  
2. Home Corruption  
Home country corruption is the dependent variable in the model (4-3), expressed in 
this study by the Corruption Perception Index (CPI).  This index claims to capture 
the informed views of analyses by business people and experts around the world, 
of corruption in different countries. Moreover, the organization of Transparency 
International (TI) is responsible for collecting the data of the country’s corruption, 
and it is the global civil society organisation that is leading the fight against 
corruption. However, TI points out that corruption is challenging to be captured 
because it is happening ‘behind closed doors and underneath the tables (Smith et 
al., 2014). D' and Ulman (2014) and many other researchers have used CPI to 
examine the effect of corruption. On the other hand, Anokhin and Schulze (2009); 
Lau et al. (2015); Mahagaonkar (2008) claim that CPI measures lack objectivity 
because it measures individuals’ perceptions about the level of corruption in a 
particular country; yet it is generally accepted as the best corruption measure tool 
that the international community has come up with until now.  
TI measures corruption as a scaled index starting from 0 to 100. The zero value is 
indicated to the most corrupted countries, while the one hundred value is assigned 
to the most uncorrupted countries or clean countries. For research and interpretation 
purposes, we reversed the scale of corruption in order to avoid any confusion. 
Therefore, the scale used in this study starts from 100 that has been assigned to very 
corrupted countries and ends at 0, which refers to most uncorrupted countries or 
clean countries.   
4.5.1.2 The independent variables 
In addition to our principal factors — neighbouring corruption & neighbouring 
innovation — we control for other variables which we expect to be significant to 




home innovation and home corruption, and they are categorized under three types: 
1) geographical proximity; 2) economic openness, and 3) other variables. The 
choice of explanatory variables is inspired by the related empirical and theoretical 
literature.  
1. Average corruption of the neighbouring countries (avencorp) 
Avencorp is the main explanatory variable for Model (4-2) where the home country 
innovation is the dependent variable. In chapter 3 of this thesis, entitled “Is 
Corruption Detrimental to Innovation?” has concluded that home corruption is 
detrimental to home innovation and argues that corruption of the neighbours’ 
countries can harm home country innovation, taking into account the fact that 
corruption is contagious, and this is empirically approved by many studies (Goel 
and Nelson, 2007; Attila, 2008; Becker et al., 2009; Lopez-Valcarcel et al., 2017; 
Feng et al., 2018). Furthermore, Figure (2-4)—in chapter 2 of this thesis— shows 
the world’s corruption in 2018, which indicates that corrupted countries are 
clustered together and clean countries are also gathered together. Thus, we claim 
that corruption infection can affect home country innovation through affecting 
home country corruption, or in other words; we are argue that the contagious of 
corruption among countries can harm the innovation of home country. 
In order to measure the neighbouring countries corruption (𝒂𝒗𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒑𝒉𝒄), we 
adopt Anselin and Moreno (2003); Becker et al. (2009) and Márquez et al. (2011) 
definition of a neighbour —two countries are sharing a common land border, hence 
islands are not considered as they do not have neighbours—. Thus, we measure the 
average corruption of neighbouring countries with the home country by summing 
up the corruption values of all neighbours, which share only a common adjacent 
border with the home country, meaning that neighbours with a maritime border are 
ignored. Then the summation of the corruption values is divided by the number of 
these neighbours. Thus, the neighbouring countries corruption (𝒂𝒗𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒑𝒉𝒄) is 
expressed as follows: 
𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑝ℎ𝑐 =









2. Average innovation of the neighbouring countries (aveninnov) 
Aveninnov is our second main variable in this paper, where the home country 
corruption represents the dependent variable in (4-3) Model. Here we are argue  that 
innovation of the neighbouring countries can spillover to home country via trade, 
FDI outflow and many other channels. This spillover of innovation to the home 
country can help in reducing the home corruption level because countries which 
trade more tend to be less corrupted. Hence, those countries are more exposed to 
international trade, which thus maintains a little room for effective policy tool to 
fight corruption by the policymakers. As per the results of the first paper, that 
corruption negatively impacts the level of innovation of the home country (meaning 
that countries with a high level of innovation have a lower corruption level 
compared to those having a low level of innovation, because those countries —
which have  a lower innovation level— invest less in the innovation sector). 
Mahagaonkar (2008) and Goedhuys et al. (2016) and others have argued that 
innovation could help countries to minimise the cost of corruption via focusing on 
innovation. Figure (2-2)—in chapter 2 of this thesis—, which shows World's R&D 
expenditures in 2015, demonstrates that countries which have a similar spending on 
innovation are neighbours. Hence, we are investigating whether focusing on the 
innovation of a country — neighbouring countries — via investing in the R&D 
sector does impact the corruption level of the home country. 
In this paper, R&D expenditure is the proxy that used to represent innovation 
because it is the most appropriate and most common measure in quantifying the 
level of innovation capability (Acs et al., 2002; Furman et al., 2002; Cheung and 
Ping, 2004; Hu and Mathews, 2005; Varsakelis, 2006; Anokhin and Schulze, 2009; 
Fan, 2014; Smith et al., 2014; Lau et al., 2015). We can compute the average 
innovation of the neighbouring countries similarly to our previous computing of the 
neighbouring countries corruption. Thus, the average innovation of the 
neighbouring countries (𝒂𝒗𝒆𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒏𝒐𝒗𝒉𝒄) is given by : 
𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣ℎ𝑐 =








3. Geographic closeness (avedist) 
This variable is represented by the average circle distance between the capital city 
of the home country and its neighbours’ capital cities.  This distance can be easily 
calculated by using the Haversine formula (Sinnott, 1984), which computes the 
circle distance between two cities giving the latitude and longitudes of both cities 
(Chopde and Nichat, 2013). However, this distance represents the shortest distance 
over the earth’s surface because it ignores any hills or valleys. Furthermore, the 
geographic distance (Geographic closeness or not) was also employed by several 
studies (Becker et al., 2009; Goel and Saunoris, 2014; Feng et al., 2018), but unlike 
this paper, they used distance weighted matrix technique to compute the 
geographical distance. However, even though the distance weighted matrix 
provides more accurate results compared to the average circle distance technique, 
it is more complicated, and not only does it requires more computational time but 
it is also only applicable for a balanced panel data type which is not available in this 
study.     
The coordinates used to calculate the circle distance in (km) have been extracted 
from the Mayer and Zignago (2011) database. This variable — avedist — is 
calculated by summing up the distance between the home country’s capital city and 
the neighbouring countries’ capital cities. This mathematically can be expressed as: 
 
𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡 =





Innovation can be facilitated due to the proximity between the countries through 
interaction between agents and people. Hence, we argue that this closeness can 
optimise the innovation level between countries via flattening interactive learning 
(Boschma, 2005). Furthermore, the closeness between countries makes it easy for 
people to move (migrate) to the neighbouring country, and thus transfer norms from 
their home country to the host country. 




Corruption can be contagious because of the closeness of cities to each other (Goel 
and Nelson, 2007; Zhu, 2009). Therefore, we argue that proximity of countries’ 
capital cities has a positive consequence on corruption level; that corruption can 
travel from a country to another through flows of FDI and trade (B. Larraín and 
Tavares, 2004).  
4. Landlocked  
There are 49 landlocked countries around the world, of which we have included 38 
because the rest do not have sufficient data for the variables which we are using to 
run the regressions. However, this variable is considered as a dummy variable 
which indicates a unity for a landlocked country and zero otherwise.  
Innovation and being a landlocked country is a complicated situation because those 
countries are vulnerable to the neighbours, as everything they import/export must 
pass via their neighbour countries if they use land ways. We argue that being a 
landlocked country will not help to innovate, unless a sea is created (Casal and 
Selamé, 2015).  
Corruption and landlocked countries have an interesting relationship. Countries 
with no marine borders that are surrounded by other countries are more likely to 
adopt he corrupt practices from the neighbouring countries — one country would 
induce individuals in the Border States to “learn” to be more corrupt. Moreover, 
landlocked countries are more accessible for people to move in or out compared to 
unlocked ones. Thus, the chance of carrying norms to neighbouring countries is 
increased. (Goel and Nelson, 2007; Zhu, 2009). Furthermore, being a landlocked 
country means being subject to bureaucratic procedures and paperwork, which 
means making everything slower and more expensive (Faye et al., 2004). All these 
issues might incentivise people to pay/accept bribes (i.e. corrupted) in order to make 
their lives easier.  
5. Number of neighbours’  
This variable is expressed as the countries which have common land borders with 
the home country —adjacent countries and it ignores maritime borders, which is 




island countries. We argue that a country can be affected by its neighbour as 
corruption is contagious and innovation can spillover. We claim that this influence 
increases as the number of neighbours increases. When a country is bordered by 
another country/countries, people who live on the borders can easily travel from 
their home country to the neighbouring country irrespective of their reasons for 
travelling or their ways of travelling (legally or illegally), and these people can 
transit their norms/ habits to the host country. 
Furthermore, people who live on the borderlines between the neighbouring 
countries can take both countries habits, language, accent, etc. Therefore, we adopt 
the idea that more neighbours to a country might have a negative impact on the 
home country, because we assume that if the home country is surrounded by 
innovative countries, the innovation level in the home country can flourish, and 
consequently, corruption levels will be reduced. This fact is also applicable to 
corruption (i.e. we assume that if the home country is surrounded by corrupted 
countries, so the home country is more likely to be corrupt as well, and thus 
innovation levels might decrease because of the increase in levels of corruption). 
However, this variable is expressed as a dummy as follows: 
Countries with one neighbor =1, otherwise 0. Countries with 2 neighbors =1, 
otherwise 0, and so on.   
6. Average Trade of the neighbouring countries average)  
The data of trade is expressed as a percentage of total GDP. Although corruption or 
innovation can be either greased or sanded by trade, however, in order to quantify 
this variable, we adopted the same definition of neighbour to avencorp, aveninnov 
and avedist —considering the countries which are sharing a common land border 
while ignoring the island counties—. Thus, the trade of the neighbouring countries’ 
𝒂𝒗𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒅𝒆 can be expressed mathematically as a proportion of GDP as follows: 
𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 =









Innovation is considered as a contrary to trade association. Therefore, we argue that 
trade can enhance the innovation level in a country, and that trade openness can 
enhance the innovation level in a country by creating positive externalities which 
improve knowledge diffusion/flow. Furthermore, it increases competition between 
agents, through which the incentive increases, and at the final point it results in 
innovation (Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Roper et al., 2013; Papageorgiadis and 
Sharma, 2016; Akcigit et al., 2018). 
Corruption: We argue that there is a negative association between trade and 
corruption. Hence, countries which trade more tend to be less corrupted, because 
those countries are more exposed to international trade, which leaves little room for 
effective policy tools for policymakers to fight corruption. Additionally, when a 
country is more open to trade, it means that this country has economic freedom as 
one of the determinants reducing corruption (Saha et al., 2009). Conversely, 
countries that are less exposed to international trade have higher levels of 
corruption, pointing to the fact that competition is lower in these countries, which 
results in larger rents. In other words, we argue that neighbouring trade can acts as 
a constraint on home corruption through spilling-over or positive externalities. 
Although many studies have investigated the relationship between corruption and 
trade at the home country (Ades and Di Tella, 1999; F. Larraín and Tavares, 2000; 
Bonaglia et al., 2001; Sandholtz and Gray, 2003; Saha et al., 2009), no one has 
addressed the impact of neighbouring trade openness on home corruption. 
7. Average foreign direct investment of the neighbouring countries- 
outflow,(avenfdiout)  
Although avenfdiout lies under the category of economic openness, the same 
definition of neighbour is adopted here as in the case of avencorp, aveninnov, 
avedist and average. The formula of avenfdiout is expressed as follows, where FDI-
out is expressed as a proportion of GDP: 
𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑓𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑡 =








Innovation and FDI relationship became an increasingly important element in 
global economic development and an important catalyst for economic growth 
because FDI is an important vehicle of technology transfer between countries (Yang 
and Zou, 2008). However, Cheung and Ping (2004) examined the impact of FDI on 
the innovation level of the home country China, yet, in this paper, we are 
investigating if the neighbouring FDI can boost the innovation level in the home 
country. 
Corruption and FDI have an interesting association, as we argue that FDI of the 
neighbouring countries can discourage corruption levels at the home country. 
Nevertheless, the economic literature on corruption demonstrated that countries 
which are highly corrupt, have a lower level of FDI (Mauro, 1995a; Wei, 2000). B. 
Larraín and Tavares (2004) studied the impact of corruption levels on the FDI at 
the country level, and F. Larraín and Tavares (2000) studied the opposite causality, 
while in our research we seek to examine and quantify if there is a relationship 
between the neighbouring countries FDI on the corruption level of the home 
country. 
8. Natural resources rent  
This variable is used in this paper to address its relationship with the country’s 
corruption and innovation levels. We would like to examine the question of whether 
the abundance of natural resources is a blessing or a curse for the nations 40(Namazi 
and Mohammadi, 2018). 
Innovation and abundance of natural resources is also complicated relationship. 
Therefore, we would like to understand if the richness of natural resources can help 
the countries to innovate. We claim that countries with natural resources are more 
likely to innovate for two reasons. Firstly, countries that heavily depend on natural 
resources tend to invest a fine proportion of their GDP in innovation. This is due to 
the fact that those countries understand both the finality of natural resources and the 
fact that these natural resources might lose their use in the future because of 
                                                          
40 Because in the first paper which is titled “Is corruption detrimental to innovation?” results, this 
variable is insignificant with the innovation level. 




technological inventions. Secondly, as Sachs and Warner (2001) argued, the 
abundance of natural resources could crowd-out the activities of the entrepreneurial, 
which could lead to more innovation. 
Corruption and the abundance of natural resources are unlikely to have a good 
relationship. Countries that depend mainly on natural resources in their economic 
growth are easier to corrupt (Ades and Di Tella, 1999; Gatti, 1999; Leite and 
Weidmann, 1999; Treisman, 2003; Lambsdorff, 2007; Goel and Nelson, 2010). 
Therefore, we are controlling for the natural resources and argue that the country’s 
natural resource endowments create unique opportunities for rent-generation and 
rent-seeking.  
9. Gross domestic product (GDP) 
GDP is used as an economy scale for the countries. Researchers have long debated 
the relationship between corruption and GDP: for instance, Ahmad et al. (2012) and 
Lau et al. (2015) have concluded that corruption can hinder economic growth. 
Conversely, some have found that corruption can grease the economic growth of 
countries (Mauro, 1995b; Aidt, 2003). However, in our study, we argue that 
corruption is slowing down or sanding the wheel of economic growth of the nations 
(Méon and Sekkat, 2005; Swaleheen, 2011). Contrarily, innovation and GDP have 
a positive relationship (Rosenberg, 2004; Galindo and Méndez-Picazo, 2013), 
where countries that are growing in a very fast manner such as China and Singapore 
are investing a very fine proportion of their GDP in the innovation sector. 
Innovation is the new trend for the countries to develop because it is the main pillar 
in the economic growth equation (Schumpeter, 1912; Solow, 1956; Mansfield, 
1972; King and Levine, 1993; Aghion et al., 2005; Adak, 2015).  
10. Year Dummy (2003-2017)  
Dummy variable equals 1 for a given year and 0 for all other years, where 2003 is 
considered as the base year. Therefore, we omitted this year in the regressions 
process to avoid the dummy variable trap problem. Because in this paper, we use 
panel regressions technique, to avoid any aggregate trends which have nothing to 




do with the casual relationships, we have to control for the year effects on any 
relationship. Since both our Model (4-2) and (4-3) favour random effects estimators 
and in order to make sure that the years’ effects on variables for a given year have 
the same amount, the years can be included in the fixed part as discrete time 
dummies. Thus, to control for time-specific effects expected to affect the whole 
sample over time, these effects are included as controls in the random effects model. 
11.  Instrument Variable (IV) 
Because of the endogeneity problem in Model (4-2) where avencorp is correlated 
with the home innovation’s error term, therefore three IVs have been used to correct 
for the problematic variable which are average law and order of neighbouring 
countries (avenlaw), average bureaurcy quality of neighbouring countries 
(avenburcq) and average democratic accountability of neighbouring countries 
(avendemo)41. The responsible organization for collecting this data is the Political 
Risk Services group. We chose those variables because the underlying hypothesis 
is that innovation which involves a commitment to the future is more likely in a 
stable political environment42.  
Nevertheless, the same definition of neighbour is adopted here, similarly to 
avencorp, aveninnov, avedist, aventrade and avenfdiout variables. The 
mathematical formula of 𝒂𝒗𝒆𝒏𝒍𝒂𝒘, 𝒂𝒗𝒆𝒏𝒃𝒖𝒓𝒄 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒂𝒗𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒎𝒐 are expressed 
as follows: 
𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑙𝑎𝑤 =





                                                          
41 For more details on the definition and methodology of measuring those variables please see 
(https://www.prsgroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/icrgmethodology.pdf). 
42 Other variables like average Government stability of neighbouring countries (avengovsab), 
average ethnic tension of neighbouring countries have been used to correct for the problematic 
variable (avencorp), but the results were not significant and couldn’t solve the endogeneity problem. 




4.5.2 The sample 
The data which we are using to run the regression is an unbalanced panel dataset. 
Nevertheless, the data is unbalanced because the sources which we extracted the 
data from do not have the full dataset.  The World Bank is the main source for the 
data in this paper. The World Bank has reported several reasons why data is 
unavailable for some indicators, some countries and some years. Firstly, some 
indicators are derived from sporadic surveys and are only available for some years. 
Secondly, some data sets or indicators are only available from the year they were 
initiated. Thirdly, some countries do not regularly report data due to conflict, lack 
of statistical capacity, or other reasons. Fourthly, some countries do not have data 
for earlier years simply because they did not exist. Therefore, we have some missing 
observations for some periods in some countries. Hence, we are using the annual 
data of 140 countries over the period 2003-2017. 
However, Table (4-1) shows a summary of the variables and the data source used 
in this paper. Table (4-2) describes the summary statistics of the dependent 
variables and the explanatory variables, which include their number of 
observations, mean, standard deviation, minimal value and maximum value. Table 
(4-3) shows the countries which are included in the regression, and they are divided 
region-wise according to the World Bank division.  
 
 




Table 4-1. The Glossary of Variables 
Symbols of the variables 
Name of the Variable 




Rnd Innovation  Research & Development expenditures (% of GDP) World bank  
% of GDP 
Corp Corruption 
Corruption Perception Index (0 indicates to clean 







Average Innovation of the 
neighbouring countries 
Average of Research & Development expenditures of the 
neighbouring countries  
(% of GDP) 
  
% of GDP 
Avencorp 
Average corruption level on 
the neighbouring countries 
Average Corruption Perception Index -0 indicates to 
clean countries, 100 indicates to corrupted countries-  of 
the neighbouring countries 
  
Index 
Nat Natural Resources 
Total natural resources rents are the sum of oil rents, 
natural gas rents, coal rents (hard and soft), mineral rents, 
and forest rents  
(% of GDP) 
World bank 
% of GDP 
GDP Log GDP 
the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in 
the economy plus any product taxes and minus any 
subsidies not included in the value of the products 
World bank 
Log form 
avedist2 Geographical Closeness 
The average distance between the home country’s capital 





Average trade of the 
neighbouring countries 
Average of trade of the neighbouring countries  
(% of GDP) 
World bank 
% of GDP 
Avenfdiout 
Average FDI outflow of the 
neighbouring countries 
Average of outward of Foreign direct investment of the 
neighbouring countries  
(% of GDP) 
World bank 
% of GDP 
Lock Landlocked dummy One if the country is landlocked, 0 otherwise    
1,0 
d20** Year Dummy     
 
no* 
Number of Neighbours 
Dummy 
Countries which have land borders with the home 
country  
Countries with no neighbours =1, otherwise 0. Countries 
with one neighbour =1, otherwise 0. And so on.   
  
1,0 




Table 4-2. Summary of the statistics results 
Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation Min Max 
Innovation (R&D) (% of GDP) 2,331 0.435 0.797 0 4.405 
Corruption 2,221 57.620 21.347 3 100 
Average Innovation of the neighboring countries (% of GDP) 1,950 0.549 0.695 0 3.087 
Average corruption level on the neighboring countries 1,948 60.860 15.283 6.333 84.667 
Natural Resources (% of GDP) 2,331 8.021 12.180 0 64.111 
Log GDP 2,273 4.475 1.983 0.013 9.963 
Geographical Closeness (km) 1,950 0.965 0.612 0.161 3.055 
Average trade of the neighboring countries (% of GDP) 1,950 77.041 30.563 0 291.020 
Average FDI outflow of the neighboring countries (% of GDP) 1,950 1.954 4.057 0.000079 58.008 
Land lock dummy 2,360 0.220 0.414 0 1 
Year Dummy 
2003 2,360 0.064 0.244 0 1 
2004 2,360 0.065 0.247 0 1 
2005 2,360 0.068 0.251 0 1 
2006 2,360 0.069 0.253 0 1 
2007 2,360 0.066 0.249 0 1 
2008 2,360 0.064 0.245 0 1 
2009 2,360 0.063 0.243 0 1 
2010 2,360 0.064 0.244 0 1 
2011 2,360 0.069 0.253 0 1 
2012 2,360 0.069 0.253 0 1 
2013 2,360 0.067 0.250 0 1 
2014 2,360 0.068 0.252 0 1 
2015 2,360 0.068 0.252 0 1 
2016 2,360 0.070 0.256 0 1 
2017 2,360 0.067 0.250 0 1 
Number of Neighbors Dummy 
countries with 1 neighbors 2,360 0.174 0.379 0 1 
countries with 2 neighbors 2,360 0.059 0.236 0 1 
countries with 3 neighbors 2,360 0.153 0.360 0 1 
countries with 4 neighbors 2,360 0.140 0.347 0 1 
countries with 5 neighbors 2,360 0.156 0.363 0 1 
countries with 6 neighbors 2,360 0.127 0.333 0 1 
countries with 7 neighbors 2,360 0.073 0.260 0 1 
countries with 8 neighbors 2,360 0.058 0.235 0 1 
countries with 9 neighbors 2,360 0.017 0.131 0 1 
countries with 10 neighbors 2,360 0.023 0.151 0 1 
countries with 11 neighbors 2,360 0.006 0.077 0 1 
countries with 12 neighbors 2,360 0.006 0.079 0 1 
countries with 13 neighbors 2,360 0.006 0.079 0 1 
Notes: 
1) The summary of statistics is provided based on a period from 2003 to 2017 for 140 countries worldwide. 
2) The dataset used in this paper is unbalanced, where there are some gaps in the year for some countries due to the unavailability of the data. 




Table 4-3. List of countries included in this study 






Middle East & 
North Africa 





Albania Angola Argentina Algeria Cambodia Afghanistan Canada 
Armenia Benin Bolivia Bahrain China Bangladesh 
United 
States 
Austria Botswana Brazil Egypt, Arab Rep. 
Hong Kong SAR, 
China 
Bhutan  
Azerbaijan Burkina Faso Chile Iran, Islamic Rep. Lao PDR India  
Belarus Burundi Colombia Iraq Malaysia Nepal  





Ecuador Jordan Myanmar Sri Lanka  
Bulgaria Chad El Salvador Kuwait Singapore   
Croatia Congo, Dem. Rep. Guatemala Lebanon Thailand   
Czech Republic Congo, Rep. Guyana Libya Vietnam   
Denmark Cote d'Ivoire Honduras Morocco    
Estonia Equatorial Guinea Mexico Oman    
Finland Ethiopia Nicaragua Qatar    
France Gabon Panama Saudi Arabia    
Georgia The Gambia Paraguay Tunisia    
Germany Ghana Peru 
United Arab 
Emirates 
   
Greece Guinea Suriname Yemen, Rep.    
Hungary Guinea-Bissau Uruguay     
Italy Kenya Venezuela, RB     
Kazakhstan Lesotho      
Kosovo Liberia      
Kyrgyz Republic Malawi      
Latvia Mali      
Lithuania Mauritania      
Luxembourg Mozambique      
Macedonia, FYR Namibia      
Moldova Niger      
Montenegro Nigeria      
Netherlands Rwanda      
Norway Senegal      
Poland Sierra Leone      
Portugal South Africa      
Romania South Sudan      
Russian Federation Sudan      
Serbia Tanzania      
Slovak Republic Togo      
Slovenia Uganda      
Spain Zambia      
Sweden Zimbabwe      
Switzerland       
Tajikistan       
Turkey       
Turkmenistan       
Ukraine       
United Kingdom       
Uzbekistan       




4.5.3 Unit root test 
We are using an unbalanced panel dataset of 140 countries over the period 2003-
2017. The appropriate unit root test to be used is the Fisher-type test because it does 
not require strongly balanced data, and the individual’s series can have gaps 
(Baltagi, 2008; p.244-245). Therefore, we are using a Fisher-type test (Fisher, 1932) 
using ADF and PP tests (Maddala and Wu, 1999; Choi, 2001). Furthermore, the lag 
lengths of the individual augmented Dicky-Fuller tests are allowed to differ. Fisher-
type tests were used to test the null hypothesis, which represents the presence of 
“individual unit root”. The Fisher-type test uses p-value from unit root tests for each 
cross-section (i.e. country i). This test is an asymptotically chi-square distributed 
with 2N degrees of freedom (𝑻𝒊
𝒊
→ ∞ 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒊𝒕𝒆 𝑵) (Nell and Zimmermann, 
2011). The formula of the test looks as follows: 




Furthermore, the results show that all variables used in this paper are stationary. 
However, Table (4-4) shows the results of the unit root test for all variables. 
According to the results shown in this table, the null hypothesis is strongly rejected 
because the P value is less than 0.05. Thus, it is assumed that all the series are 
stationary at the same level (no unit root). 






















individual linear trends 
2181 176 557.240*** 2289 176 586.047*** 
Research & Development  
Individual effects, 
individual linear trends 
1676 123 341.749*** 1722 123 432.139*** 
Average Corruption of 
Neighbouring Countries 
Individual effects, 
individual linear trends 
1965 146 448.291*** 2042 146 467.550*** 
Average trade of Neighbouring 
Countries  
Individual effects, 
individual linear trends 
1966 146 364.304*** 2044 146 412.074*** 
Average R&D Neighbouring 
Countries 
Individual effects 1930 142 397.053*** 1988 142 362.166*** 
Average Government stability 
of Neighbouring Countries 
Individual effects, 
individual linear trends    
1837 147 414.809*** 1911 147 341.671** 
Average FDI outflow of 
Neighbouring Countries 
Individual effects, 
individual linear trends    
1943 144 666.788*** 2016 144 823.552*** 
Natural Resources Rent  none 2423 174 488.599*** 2436 174 485.780*** 
log GDP 
Individual effects, 
individual linear trends    
2281 172 446.572*** 2389 172 420.059*** 
legend: * p<0.1;** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Ho:  All panels contain unit roots   
Ha:  At least one panel is stationary 




4.6 Empirical Results and Discussion 
This section is divided into two sub-sections, the first sub-section presents the 
interpretations of the results along with the discussion of Model (4-2) where home 
innovation is the dependent variable. While the second sub-section presents the 
results and the discussion of the model where home corruption is the dependent 
variable.  
4.6.1 Home Innovation 
Table (4-5) presents the results of Model (4-2) where we address the impact of the 
neighbouring corruption on the home innovations — which is the dependent 
variable. According to DWH test results, the 2SLS method is the appropriate one 
because of the endogenity problem where avenlaw, avenburc and avendemo are 
being used as an instrument variable to correct for the problem.  
 









Average Corruption of Neighbouring Countries 
-0.011 -0.018 -0.022*** 
(-3.487) (-7.299) (-4.008) 
Average trade openness of the neighbouring countries 
-0.001 -0.002 0.000 
(-1.825) (-2.206) (-0.251) 
Average FDI outflow of the neighbouring countries 
-0.009 -0.007 -0.007** 
(-2.613) (-2.143) (-2.389) 
Geographical closeness (omitted) 
-0.305 -0.253*** 
(-3.675) (-2.528) 




-0.009 -0.01 -0.005*** 
(-6.323) (-6.873) (-3.629) 
Log GDP 
0.245 0.142 0.11*** 
(3.443) (4.99) (2.823) 
2004 
0.024 0.029 0.019 
(0.536) (0.652) (0.486) 
2005 0.004 0.014 0.001 











(0.096) (0.306) (0.02) 
2006 
0.015 0.031 0.017 
(0.326) (0.691) (0.425) 
2007 
0.023 0.042 0.025 
(0.473) (0.922) (0.604) 
2008 
0.064 0.091 0.073* 
(1.269) (1.978) (1.689) 
2009 
-0.007 0.018 0.028 
(-0.152) (0.402) (0.684) 
2010 
0.022 0.053 0.055 
(0.425) (1.147) (1.298) 
2011 
0.033 0.071 0.06 
(0.631) (1.557) (1.378) 
2012 
0.002 0.025 0.008 
(0.037) (0.54) (0.198) 
2013 
-0.033 -0.004 -0.012 
(-0.601) (-0.095) (-0.292) 
2014 
-0.061 -0.034 -0.039 
(-1.095) (-0.749) (-0.946) 
2015 
-0.161 -0.132 -0.121*** 
(-2.815) (-2.886) (-2.89) 
2016 
-0.645 -0.614 -0.601*** 





2 Neighbour (omitted) 
-1.099 -1.227*** 
(-2.052) (-2.055) 
3 Neighbour (omitted) 
-1.072 -1.217*** 
(-2.048) (-2.101) 
4 Neighbour (omitted) 
-0.905 -1.062* 
(-1.731) (-1.835) 
5 Neighbour (omitted) 
-0.985 -1.099** 
(-1.878) (-1.898) 
6 Neighbour (omitted) 
-1.131 -1.256** 
(-2.156) (-2.173) 
7 Neighbour (omitted) 
-0.958 -1.094** 
(-1.828) (-1.896) 
8 Neighbour (omitted) 
-0.891 -0.983 
(-1.678) (-1.681) 











9 Neighbour (omitted) 
-1.155 -1.264*** 
(-2.014) (-2.001) 
10 Neighbour (omitted) 
-0.693 -0.775 
(-1.258) (-1.273) 
11 Neighbour (omitted) 
-0.647 -0.87 
(-0.931) (-1.136) 




0.318 2.456 2.814*** 
(0.753) (4.022) (3.51) 
Number of Observations 1876 1876 1753 
Number of Countries 140 140 140 
t-statistics is reported in the parentheses ( ). 
Robust standard errors have been used. legend: * p<0.1;** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Hausman test: Prob>chi 0.3943   
Hausman test: Prob>chi 0.000 
Average neighbouring corruption — avencorp —is our main variable. The results 
show that avencorp is significantly and negatively affecting the home innovation 
level; when the avencorp index rises by one point, the home innovation decreases 
by 0.02239 percentage points. This reduction in the home innovation is due to the 
contagious corruption from the neighbouring countries as a result of the 
neighbouring corruption affecting home corruption (Goel and Nelson, 2007; Attila, 
2008; Becker et al., 2009; Lee and Guven, 2013; Feng et al., 2018; Sui et al., 2018) 
and this impact reaching home innovation. This negative impact in the home 
innovation can be sensed through the misallocations of resources, eroding trust, 
rising costs —as we elaborated in the first paper. 
According to Table (4-5), it can be seen that geographical closeness is negatively 
affecting the home innovation. When the distance between home country’s capital 
city and its neighbour’s capital cities increases by 1 km, the home innovation 
decreases by 0.253 percentage points. Due to the geographical closeness, the home 
innovation is being harmed in an undesirable way. However, several researchers 
argued that innovation spill-over from neighbouring countries is geographically 
constrained and it can be captured within the home country innovation (Griliches, 
1991; Audretsch and Feldman, 1996). Furthermore, our results reveal that being 




landlocked or not has no impact on home innovation, yet, (Boschma, 2005) claims 
that geographical proximity has a negative impact on the home innovation levels 
due to the problem of lock-in. Additionally, MacKellar et al. (2000) confirm that 
landlocked countries experience slower economic growth — taking into 
consideration that innovation is a main pillar in the economic growth model. 
Regarding the number of neighbours, where the results show a negative impact on 
home innovation, more neighbours means better innovation. Furthermore, the 
results show a fluctuating trend depending on the number of neighbours. As the 
number of neighbours’ increases, the negative impact on the home innovation 
slightly decreases—. Thus, we can conclude that having more neighbours is better 
for home innovation. Yet, the conclusion remains the same: neighbouring countries 
impact home innovation negatively because, countries which have common borders 
with several countries are more likely to expect more migrants, people and their 
habits, imitation behaviour which consequently affect the economic growth. Hence, 
those countries will focus resources—on solving the problems brought by those 
people rather than focusing in improving the home innovation sector Eventually, 
having a limited number of neighbours does cost less than having many neighbours.   
Referring to economic openness, our results reveal that openness of the 
neighbouring countries has an adverse impact on home innovation. The more the 
neighbouring countries invest outside their countries, the less likely home 
innovation is to flourish. In other words, for the neighbouring country which invests 
more outside their home country, the innovation of the neighbouring country can 
be evaded, as the resources are being devoted outside their countries. So, the home 
country cannot take advantage of the knowledge spill-over of the FDI.  On the other 
hand, trade openness has no impact on the home country, not as we argued that the 
openness could positively affect innovation where openness can help the country to 
exchange technology/knowledge. Through openness, knowledge can spill over. 
Nevertheless, in the case of this paper, the results are different, where the trade of 
the neighbouring countries has no impact on the level of innovation in the home 
country. This is unlike Akcigit et al. (2018) who demonstrate that trade can help 
innovation to flourish.  




Furthermore, we controlled for other variables which are directly related to the 
home country; an abundance of natural resources and GDP. The abundance of 
natural resources has a negative impact on home innovation. Countries which 
depend on natural resources are less likely to invest in the innovation sector because 
most of the countries which depend mainly on the natural resources in their GDP 
are from developing countries where innovation is yet to come because at the 
current time those countries are investing in the infrastructure sector.  Our economy 
scale variable, which is represented in the log form of the GDP shows a positive 
significant impact on the home innovation. Countries with relatively high GDP tend 
to invest more in the innovation sector, a reliable portion of their GDP in the home 
innovation. When the GDP increases by 1%, the innovation in the home country 
increase by 0.1096 percentage points.  
In summary, according to our results, we can conclude that contagious corruption—
neighbouring corruption— can negatively and significantly affect home innovation 
through impacting home corruption, and it has been demonstrated by several 
researchers that corruption can travel from a country to another (Goel and Nelson, 
2007; Attila, 2008; Becker et al., 2009; Feng et al., 2018; Sui et al., 2018). The 
closeness of the capital cities distresses home innovation rather heavily. 
Furthermore, being surrounded by corrupt countries in a situation where countries 
which are relatively close to each other tend to exhibit imitation behaviour, 
corruption is one of those behaviours (Accinelli and Carrera, 2012). Therefore, 
geographical closeness and having neighbours are impact home innovation 
negatively. Moreover, when neighbouring countries invest more in other countries, 
home innovation decreases; because the resources are being invested outside the 
home and also because of neighbouring corruption, the home country cannot take 
advantage of knowledge spill-over from the host countries, countries that welcome 
the FDI.  Countries with abundant natural resources invest less in the innovation 
sector, as most of those countries are developing countries that mainly focus on 
infrastructure. Furthermore, countries with a higher GDP, tend to invest a fine 
proportion in the innovation sector.  




4.6.2 Home Corruption 
The results of Model (4-3) where home corruption is the dependent variable are 
shown in Table (4-6). This model is the main objective is to examine the impact of 
the neighbouring innovation on the corruption of the home country. Furthermore, 
according to Hausman test, a random effects model is the appropriate model to run 
the regression.  
 
Table 4-6. Empirical Results of Regression Analysis- Home Corruption 
The Variables 
Home Corruption 
Fixed Effects Random Effects 2SLS 
Average Innovation of the neighbouring countries 
-0.499 -0.874 -53.444 
(-1.428) (-1.823) (-2.08) 
Average trade openness of the neighbouring countries 
-0.059 -0.055 -0.1 
(-6.427) (-3.062) (-1.632) 
Average FDI outflow of the neighbouring countries 
-0.014 -0.027 -0.248 
(-0.368) (-0.478) (-1.705) 
Geographical closeness (omitted) 
11.47 -4.821 
(4.543) (-0.579) 




-0.075 -0.069 -0.245 
(-4.238) (-2.717) (-1.907) 
Log GDP 
-9.625 -7.507 3.625 
(-11.628) (-8.609) (0.701) 
2004 
0.411 0.298 1.249 
(0.759) (0.804) (1.266) 
2005 
0.569 0.346 0.492 
(1.054) (0.687) (0.568) 
2006 
1.483 1.126 1.67 
(2.694) (1.829) (1.445) 
2007 
2.149 1.681 2.75 
(3.729) (2.373) (2.082) 
2008 
2.702 2.126 4.441 
(4.561) (2.798) (2.514) 
2009 
2.007 1.497 2.957 
(3.496) (1.995) (2.29) 
2010 
2.647 2.029 5.112 
(4.43) (2.706) (2.459) 






Fixed Effects Random Effects 2SLS 
2011 
3.462 2.717 5.146 
(5.664) (3.58) (2.388) 
2012 
1.141 0.324 2.961 
(1.818) (0.356) (1.213) 
2013 
1.712 0.812 1.698 
(2.656) (0.877) (0.945) 
2014 
1.112 0.163 -0.171 
(1.704) (0.171) (-0.095) 
2015 
0.927 -0.098 -4.207 
(1.388) (-0.103) (-1.538) 
2016 
1.023 -0.234 -33.407 





2 Neighbour (omitted) 
-32.994 6.352 
(-4.57) (0.256) 
3 Neighbour (omitted) 
-15.946 12.599 
(-2.432) (0.717) 
4 Neighbour (omitted) 
-19.777 13.173 
(-2.686) (0.7) 
5 Neighbour (omitted) 
-14.536 7.559 
(-1.978) (0.525) 
6 Neighbour (omitted) 
-4.533 7.778 
(-0.739) (0.725) 
7 Neighbour (omitted) 
-1.738 3.087 
(-0.3) (0.335) 
8 Neighbour (omitted) 
-4.745 3.405 
(-0.689) (0.327) 
9 Neighbour (omitted) 
-1.731 -13.509 
(-0.283) (-1.38) 
10 Neighbour (omitted) 
-8.311 4.51 
(-1.479) (0.374) 
11 Neighbour (omitted) 
-9.51 12.386 
(-1.926) (0.969) 




109.048 103.955 78.126 
(27.956) (12.055) (4.192) 
Number of Observations 1830 1830 1707 
Number of Countries 140 140 140 






Fixed Effects Random Effects 2SLS 
t-statistics is reported in the parentheses ( ). 
Robust standard errors have been used. legend: * p<0.1;** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Hausman test: Prob>chi 0.9684   
Hausman test: Prob>chi 1.000 
 
The results of Model (4-3) where home corruption is the dependent variable are 
shown in Table (4-6). This model is the main objective to examine the impact of 
the neighbouring innovation on the corruption of the home country. According to 
Hausman test, a random effects model is the appropriate model to run the 
regression.  
The results of the home corruption model reveal that neighbouring innovation has 
a negative impact on home corruption. When neighbouring innovation increases by 
one percentage point, home corruption decreases by 0.8736 index points. We can 
justify that if a country is surrounded with highly innovative countries, the home 
country’s innovation can rise via knowledge spill-over from the neighbouring 
countries—and because the neighbouring countries show imitation behaviour, the 
home corruption can decrease (Johari and Ibrahim, 2017). Thus, focusing on 
improving innovation in one country can help other countries to focus on the 
innovation precisely because of knowledge spill-over, which indirectly can help 
corruption to decrease at the home country. Corruption in the home is adversely 
affected by the innovation of the neighbouring countries. Accordingly, the results 
reveal that focusing on neighbouring innovation can help to reduce the home 
corruption because vanishing corruption is not only one country’s duty, yet it is 
everyone's duty (Attila, 2008).  
Geographical closeness and home corruption have an interesting relationship and 
been argued by many researchers (Goel and Nelson, 2007; Becker et al., 2009; Feng 
et al., 2018; Sui et al., 2018), however, our results are more interesting. This is 
because the geographical closeness shows that the countries which are close to each 
other are more likely to be corrupted: when the distance between the home 
country’s capital city and it is neighbouring’ capital city increases by 1 km, the 




home corruption increases by more than 11 points in the corruption index. Because 
of contagious corruption occurring over geographic boundaries (Sui et al., 2018) 
and geographical closeness can help the corruption to travel as this closeness 
facilitates corruption links between cities (Correa et al., 2016). Moreover, 
geographic distance can affect the home corruption through openness, i.e. trade and 
FDI (Zhu, 2009). Contrarily to this, the landlocked result is quite different in that it 
reveals that the landlocked countries tended to be less corrupt. However, Faye et al. 
(2004) argue that landlocked countries are more corrupt than those with a sea 
access, and this is because landlocked countries live under the mercy of their 
neighbours. Landlocked countries are more likely to use the roads to cross 
international borders, and are thus subject to bureaucratic procedures which might 
lead to direct costs, even bribes—, and all this might slow down pace and increase 
costs (Faye et al., 2004). The number of neighbours’ results show that being 
neighboured by fewer countries makes one less likely to be corrupt, because more 
neighbours mean more migration, norms, people, and imitation behaviour. 
Consequently they are more likely to be corrupted. The countries with 12 
neighbours reveal that more neighbours mean and increase by 12 points in the 
corruption index scale  
Economic openness and home corruption relationship have been debated among 
researchers (F. Larraín and Tavares, 2000; Bonaglia et al., 2001; Gokcekus and 
Knörich, 2006; O'Trakoun, 2017). Our results show that the neighbouring trade can 
play a constraint on home corruption. When neighbouring countries trade increases 
by one percentage, the home corruption is less likely to be corrupt by 0.0549 points 
in the corruption index.  Thus, not only the home country trade can deter home 
corruption (F. Larraín and Tavares, 2000; Bonaglia et al., 2001; Gokcekus and 
Knörich, 2006; Saha et al., 2009; O'Trakoun, 2017), but also the openness of the 
neighbouring countries can help the home country to reduce its domestic corruption 
level. This is because their openness to the world and while dealing with other 
countries for business purposes, both countries (home and host) tend to be more 
careful about accepting any corruption activities such as like bribes, nepotisms to 
get advantage to enter the market because of their consequences.  




We controlled for other variables which relate to the home country corruption, that 
is natural resources and GDP. The results indicate that the abundance of natural 
resources in nations is adversely affecting the home corruption: when the share of 
natural resources in the national income increases by one percentage, home country 
corruption drops by 0.69 points in the corruption scale. This might be because those 
countries are investing in anticorruption campaigns aiming to reduce corruption. 
However, our results clearly contradict some other researchers’ results. For 
instance, Ades and Di Tella (1999) conclude that countries which depend heavily 
on natural resources are easy to corrupt. , At the same time, however, Sui et al. 
(2018) claim that the abundance of natural resources has no impact on corruption 
level. Furthermore, in the economy scale variable which is represented in the log 
form of the GDP, the result reveals that countries with higher GDP tend to be 
cleaner by 7 points of the corruption scale, so wealth can help countries be clean 
from corruption.  
According to our results, focusing on innovation in one country, can help to reduce 
corruption in a neighbouring country through knowledge spill-over. Furthermore, 
geographic closeness has a positive relationship with home corruption, because this 
closeness can help the movement of people between countries carrying norms from 
a country to another. Beside this, openness to the world via trade can deter 
corruption: openness and dealing with other countries means committing to the 
international laws and rules which give the home country very little room to corrupt. 
Finally, countries which are characterised with similar economic development are 
more likely to spread corruption (Sui et al., 2018). Thus, countries with higher GDP 
tend to be less corrupt than those with smaller GDP. 
In summary, when comparing the two models, we can see that results are consistent 
for the avencorp and aveninnov where home innovation and home corruption are 
the dependent variables, respectively. The results show that neighbouring 
corruption can harm home innovation and neighbouring innovation can help the 
home country to be less corrupt by negatively affecting corruption levels at home 
country. We can conclude that the neighbouring corruption and neighbouring 
innovation can travel to affect home innovation and home corruption,  yet with 
varied impact —neighbouring corruption is impacting home innovation in more 




significant means that the neighbouring innovation impacting home corruption. 
Likewise, geographical closeness appears to be not a good factor for both models, 
neither for home innovation nor home corruption. Geographical closeness affects 
home corruption more than its affects the home innovation —the closer capital 
cities are, the more likely they are to exhibit imitation behaviour, especially the 
corruption activities. Furthermore, regarding economic openness, the results show 
that openness is affecting home innovation statistically, yet economically the 
impact factor is not reliable, openness in fact, is a constraint to corruption. Also, 
our economy scale variable —GDP— shows that the countries with more GDP are 
more likely to invest in the home innovation and less likely to be corrupted. 
4.7 Conclusion 
This study has empirically presented the influence on the home country innovation 
of contagious corruption as well as the impact of neighbouring innovation on the 
home country corruption, using a dataset of 140 countries over 15 years period. Our 
findings reveal that home innovation activities are being negatively affected by 
neighbouring corruption. This confirms that corruption is contagious, and 
consequently, it will impact the economic growth which is consistent with the 
literature (Goel and Nelson, 2007; Attila, 2008; Becker et al., 2009; Feng et al., 
2018; Sui et al., 2018). Furthermore, our outcomes demonstrate that the innovation 
of neighbouring countries could help the home country to be less corrupt (i.e. 
cleaner).The results show also that geographical closeness significantly affects both 
home corruption and home innovation, however, it has more impact on home 
corruption than home innovation. This might be due to the closeness of capital cities 
in that they have more of a tendency to provoke imitation behaviour, especially for 
corruption activities. Moreover, the openness of neighbouring countries can play a 
constraint factor on home corruption in that openness helps countries to reduce the 
probability of corruption, therefore, neighbouring countries’ activities have an 
impact on the home country irrespective of the type of impact and vice versa. In the 
end, we can conclude that neighbouring countries corruption can travel to reach the 
home country and consequently affecting the home innovation. 




In line with the empirical evidence herein, we recommend some policy 
considerations. First our results suggests that combating corruption is thus not a 
responsibility of one individual, neither one country nor a single organization but, 
it is everyone’s responsibility. Furthermore, geographical proximity plays a leading 
role to worsen things in the countries via travelling of corruption and harming 
innovation, therefore governmental policymakers should set rules and regulations 
at the borderlines —as it is easier for the corruption to travel—to fight corruption 
locally and thus reduce home corruption. These activities then can travel and spill-
over into neighbouring countries and help those to be cleaner that is i.e. considered 
as positive externalities (Correa et al., 2016; Feng et al., 2018).  
4.8 Limitations and Future Research Directions 
This research project could be extended in some ways, for example, by gathering 
some additional information for more countries from different resources using 
different proxies to represent innovation and corruption. Furthermore, it is worth 
using a different approach to calculate the geographical closeness to get more robust 
results. We are planning to measure the same controlled variables yet using 
different tactics such as the ratio of the variables instead of the average of variables 
to the home country and its neighbours in order to get more accurate and valid 
results. Furthermore, this study can be extended to address the same issues 
regionaly, where countries share the same borders, habits, sometimes language and 
culture. 
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Research productivity is a key output of innovation activities. For this reason, this 
study empirically examines the influences of corruption, trade openness and 
English language on innovation outputs in terms of research productivity, using 
mixed models. The results obtained showed an adverse relation between both trade 
openness and corruption and research productivity. The study result that both trade 
openness and corruption are adversely related to research productivity. However, 
the results also demonstrate that countries which have the English Language as an 
official language are more active in the research field in terms of citations Reflected 
by number of citations than those countries which where the English is not an 
official language. On the other hand, the results in terms of publications showed 
that countries with English as an official language are not necessarily publishing 
more than those where English is not an official language. However, the results also 
indicate that number of publications is not necessarily higher in the former countries 
than the latter. Thus, the governments should establish international universities, 
moreover, granting funds (R&D) in order to support the international collaboration 
which eventually can lift the research productivity sector. 
 
Keywords: Research Productivity, English Language, Corruption, Trade 
Openness. 





The economic growth of any nation depends on three main factors, namely the 
accumulation of capital stock, labour —human capital— and technological 
advancement. Innovation and research are the main factors that undergird the 
lattermost. The significance of knowledge productivity —research productivity— 
is noticeably rising and it is considered to be a key indicator of the development of 
a nation, serving as an engine to drive economic growth (DeMaria, 2009; Meo et 
al., 2013). Furthermore, many researchers have determined that there is a direct 
relationship between research productivity with the economic development of 
nations (Meo et al., 2013).  
Many countries depend mainly on physical resources to develop their economy, 
yet, diversification is the key to sustainability in this respect. As a result, most 
countries have started reducing their dependency on natural resources and shifted 
towards a knowledge-based economy. This is an expression coined to describe 
trends in advanced economies towards greater dependence on knowledge, 
information and high skill levels. Thus, there is an increasing need for ready access 
to all of these resources by business and public sectors (Co-operation and 
Development, 1997). In a knowledge-driven economy, economic development is 
related to technological competitiveness, which is, in turn, driven by science and 
scientific research. In fact, in a knowledge-based economy, scientific research plays 
an essential role in economic growth. Many countries have been allocating 
resources to the research sector to improve their research productivity level. 
Notably, South East Asian countries (ASEAN) member countries experienced 
remarkable continuous economic growth in recent years; this is because these 
countries have increased investment in science and technology (Nguyen and Pham, 
2011). Furthermore, a few Asian countries have been observed to shift from 
dependent economy (natural resources, agriculture, and primary commodities) to a 
knowledge-based economy (Meo et al., 2013). 
However, many factors have a positive impact on the level of research productivity, 
which, in turn, stimulates the economic growth of nations. For instance, spending 
on education and investing in the research and development sector are essential 




factors to produce a substantial amount of innovative research.  (Macilwain, 2010). 
Although there is more than 50 years’ scholarly work of public, academic research, 
there is still little systematic evidence on how such investments can lead to 
increased levels of scientific output, improved patenting and innovative output, and 
hence better economic performance (Crespi and Geuna, 2008). However, research 
information seeking behaviour is essential to the economic success of a country 
(Preis et al., 2012).  
Despite research productivity having been defined by many researchers (Ramsden, 
1994; Ramesh Babu and Singh, 1998; DeMaria, 2009; Abramo and D’Angelo, 
2014; Gul et al., 2015), all definitions agree that new knowledge is the production 
of research activity which results in the research productivity (Al-Ohali and Shin, 
2013; Abramo and D’Angelo, 2014). Therefore, new knowledge production 
function has a multi-input and multi-output character (Abramo and D’Angelo, 
2014).  
Research productivity has been an increasingly growing field of study since the end 
of the last century, and many studies have been published in this area. For instance, 
some researchers studied the trend of the research productivity of collective nations 
or a specific country (Nguyen and Pham, 2011; H. Kim et al., 2012; 
Sooryamoorthy, 2013; Cavacini, 2016; Barrot, 2017; Horta, 2018). On the other 
hand, other researchers have focused on investigating the factors that affect research 
productivity such as GDP, R&D, and the number of universities (Dundar and 
Lewis, 1998; Gonzalez-Brambila and Veloso, 2007; Meo et al., 2013; Abramo and 
D’Angelo, 2014; Albert et al., 2016; Siddiqi et al., 2016; Barrot, 2017; Bonaccorsi 
and Secondi, 2017). However, these studies have neglected some other factors that 
might have an impact on the research productivity level such as having English as 
the official Language, precisely because most of the global journals and especially 
the top ranking ones are in English regardless of specialisation (King, 2004). The 
second factor to examine in this study is trade openness43 — and exchanging 
knowledge is a form of trade. Although the influence of corruption on the 
innovation level in terms of articles published was investigated in Chapter 3 of this 
                                                          
43 Trade openness is defined as exchanging goods and services between countries. 




thesis, the results were insignificant, and this is mainly due to using insufficient 
data. Therefore, to explore this issue in a more comprehensive way, a more 
extensive dataset over a larger time scale in terms of documents and citations is 
being used. The current study attends to examining the impact of corruption, trade 
openness and English language on the research productivity level of culled nations. 
Thus, the objective of this study is threefold. First, we investigate if having English 
as the official language has a direct impact on nations’ level of research productivity 
using a cross-country dataset of 170 countries over the periods1996-2018. Second, 
we examine if trade openness has a direct impact on the research productivity of 
countries. Thirdly, we study and quantify the impact of corruption on the research 
productivity level of selected countries. Mixed methods are the appropriate model 
in this study to quantify the impact of English language and trade openness on 
innovation —that is research productivity. Furthermore, the results of this study are 
quite ambiguous: on the one hand they confirm that English as an official language 
gives countries the privilege to cite more because of most journals being in English 
—and English is the official language across the world, as it is the most spoken and 
global language (Northrup, 2013; Noack and Gamio, 2015)—.  On the other, they 
reveal that English has nothing to do with the number of publications, and yet it still 
might be a reason to decrease the research productivity level in terms of number of 
documents published because most journals despite the level are in English. 
Furthermore, regarding trade openness, the results showed a surprising significant 
in that trade plays a constraint: trade openness hinders innovation in terms of 
research productivity. Moreover, the corruption factor results show that less corrupt 
countries are more likely to be innovative in terms of research productivity and 
conversely, more corrupt countries are less likely either to publish or cite. 
Research productivity is a very recent and popular topic of measuring innovation 
by using it as a proxy. This study offers four unique contributions to the literature. 
Firstly, it seeks to contribute to the empirical literature of innovation especially in 
the scientific research productivity —science wealth, bibliometric science—, as it 
provides a cross country empirical analysis of how English Language plays a role 
in improving the research productivity of nations. To the best of the researcher’s 
knowledge, this factor has not yet been studied in the context of English and 




research productivity using a larger scale of observations. Secondly, this paper adds 
to the strand of the literature by quantifying the impact of openness on the level of 
research productivity as a proxy for innovation. Thirdly, this study extends 
investigations of the relationship between corruption and research productivity and 
quantifies the effect level —in case it exists— consequently, it adds to corruption 
literature. Finally, it contributes to the bibliometric literature as we are using the 
rich panel data of 3124 observations for 17044 countries for 23 years over the period 
of 1996-2018.   
The rest of the study is organised as follows. The next section gives a brief 
explanation of the innovation in terms of research productivity according to 
previous theoretical and empirical studies. Section 4 explains the methodology, and 
it is followed by the description of the data and variables in section 5. Section 6 
provides a comprehensive interpretation and analysis of the results along with a 
discussion of these. Section 7 provides the conclusion of the chapter, and finally, 
section 8 details the limitations of the research project and the avenues for future 
research. 
5.3 Literature Review 
Research productivity —such as patents, publications, citations— is the result of 
research activities which have been carried out using innovations inputs of R&D 
and researchers. Furthermore, research productivity or scientific output has a direct 
association with the economy of countries which are in the process of transforming 
into a knowledge based economy (Nguyen and Pham, 2011). Although researchers 
have a recent but growing interest to study the research productivity and its relevant 
issues or determinants, the literature in this field is not abundant. However, the 
current literature has investigated the trends and the determinants of research 
productivity at micro (K.-H. Kim, 2014) and macro levels (Meo et al., 2013; 
Bentley, 2015).Countries share in research productivity is increasing yearly (Barrot, 
2017). Yet, there is a noticeable difference of publications at individual level 
(Bentley, 2015).There are several determinants that have been used by researchers 
                                                          
44 Some other researchers used a smaller scale of countries like Gul et al. (2015) who used 15 
countries in the Middle East region 




to address research productivity. For instance, investing in human capital — 
specifically investing in master and doctoral students — and granting governmental 
funds for research are the main drivers for enhancing research productivity (K.-H. 
Kim, 2014). Furthermore, investing in the R&D sectors and improving the quality 
of the universities along with increasing the quantity of universities are also 
important factors to improve the research productivity of nations (Kocher et al., 
2006; Meo et al., 2013). Moreover, collaboration between universities/laboratories 
is a crucial factor to improve innovation outputs, specifically publications (Lee and 
Bozeman, 2005). 
At the same time, however, the literature on research productivity in the Middle 
East and North Africa (MENA) region is relatively less abundant and it is not well 
documented (Waast and Rossi, 2010; Gul et al., 2015). (Waast and Rossi, 2010) 
showed the trends and local shades of the scientific output (in terms of 
internationally recognized publications) in west Asia and North Africa. However, 
there are some recent studies which have been done in specific regions in the 
MENA region such as Noruzi and Abdekhoda (2014) who examined the 
performance of research level at universities in the Kurdistan of Iraq. Gul et al. 
(2015) evaluated the research productivity and performance of 15 countries in the 
Middle East Region. (Sarwar and Hassan, 2015) analyzed the research productivity 
in the MENA region and found that Iran and Turkey have the highest level of 
research productivity in the MENA region. Cavacini (2016) compared the scientific 
output of 16 countries in the Middle East during the period of 1996-2014 to 27 
countries in West Europe and to the average world production, and analyzed data 
year by year in order to find trends (Cavacini, 2016). The scientific production 
landscape in the Middle East has been rapidly transforming over the last decades 
while this area has been in the international spotlight for regional conflicts. 
Recently, new countries from the Middle East gained significant share in terms of 
scientific contribution to the world, as they joined the world leading nations in the 
number of scientific documents produced and cited. 
However, many studies which are in the research productivity field take into 
consideration the determinants which impact on the level of research productivity 
such as R&D expenditure (May, 1998; Meo et al., 2013), GDP per Capita (Meo et 




al., 2013),  size of university (Meo et al., 2013; Bonaccorsi and Secondi, 2017), and 
collaborative research —international cooperation—(Lee and Bozeman, 2005; 
Sooryamoorthy, 2013; Sarwar and Hassan, 2015; Albert et al., 2016). 
5.3.1  Research Productivity Share (1996-2018) 
The USA dominated this, being in first place for all years of the study period. 
Nevertheless, its share of the globally published documents decreases noticeably 
—it reaches 18% in 2018, as opposed to 32% in 1996—, and this is not because the 
USA does not publish, but because other countries —mainly China— are increasing 
their research activity. Figure (5-2) shows the share of the documents published for 
the period of 1996-2018 for selected countries, namely, the USA, UK, India and 
China. As mentioned above, the graph shows that the USA has the most significant 
share of documents published, yet its share decreased steadily over the same period, 
whereas China’s share increased significantly. According to Scimago Journal & 
Country Rank, in the year 2018, almost 4 million articles have been published, with 
the USA contributing around 17% of the world’s total. However, China’s share of 
publications notably increased from 3% to 15% between 1996 and 2018, while the 
USA’s share decreased from 32% to reach 17% over the same period. The possible 
cause of this fluctuation of research production in the total world share is that some 
developing countries are emerging in the research productivity area as they are 
moving toward the knowledge-based economy. Another possible reason might be 
that some countries are not concerned regarding the quality of the journal to publish 
and tends towards the quantity over quality of publications. Consequently, the share 
 
Figure 5-2.Documents Share trend  
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of the citations fluctuates as well, as shown in Figure (5-1). According to Scimago 
Journal & Country Rank, the USA’s share of global citations decreased drastically 
from 41% in 1996 to 18% in 2018. While China’s citations share of the worldwide 
citations increased strikingly from 1% in 1996 to reach 14%.  
5.4 Methodology  
According to the main factors in this thesis, we carry out an analysis to examine the 
impact of trade openness along with corruption on the level of research productivity 
considered as a proxy for innovation. Due to the results of chapter three of this 
thesis — paper 1 titled “Is corruption Detrimental to Innovation?”—, that 
corruption has not impact on the innovation outputs specifically, has no impact on 
the articles published, therefore, we carried out this analysis for further research. In 
order to address the issues of investigating the relationship between the main factors 
and research productivity, we consider other variables that might influence research 
productivity45. Hence, we use unbalanced panel data for 170 countries over the 
period of 1996-2018. 
The general panel model is given by equation (5-1). 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡 (5-1) 
where, Y signifies research productivity, represented by the number of documents, 
number of citations and citations per document. X is a vector that represents our 
main variables of the three models: English Language, Corruption and trade 
openness. Furthermore, it represents other exogenous variables, which are: R&D, 
GDP per Capita, country size, GDP, and year dummies. In this study, there are three 
models to be estimated, which are given as follows:  
𝑙𝑑𝑜𝑐𝑠𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑖𝑡 𝐿211𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑖𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑝2𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑖𝑡 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒3𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽4𝑖𝑡 𝑔𝑑𝑝4𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑖𝑡 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎5𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑖𝑡 𝑝𝑜𝑝6𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽7𝑖𝑡 𝑦𝑟7𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡 (5-2) 
                                                          
45 The variables are elaborated in detail in section 5 of this chapter. 




where ldocs signifies number of documents published (log form), L21 denotes to 
the English language dummy variable, corp indicates to corruption, trade 
designates trade openness, gdp signifies gross domestic product (GDP), capita 
denotes to the GDP per capita, pop indicates to country size, yr denotes to the year 
dummies. 
𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑖𝑡 𝐿211𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑖𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑝2𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑖𝑡 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒3𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽4𝑖𝑡 𝑔𝑑𝑝4𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑖𝑡 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎5𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑖𝑡 𝑝𝑜𝑝6𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽7𝑖𝑡 𝑦𝑟7𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡 (5-3) 
where cites signifies number of citations, L21 denotes to the English language 
dummy variable, corp indicates to corruption, trade designates trade openness, gdp 
signifies gross domestic product (GDP), capita denotes to the GDP per capita, pop 
indicates to country size, yr denotes to the year dummies. 
𝑐𝑝𝑑𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑖𝑡 𝐿211𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑖𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑝2𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑖𝑡 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒3𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽4𝑖𝑡 𝑔𝑑𝑝4𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑖𝑡 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎5𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑖𝑡 𝑝𝑜𝑝6𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽7𝑖𝑡 𝑦𝑟7𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡 (5-4) 
where cpd signifies citations per document, L21 denotes to the English language 
dummy variable, corp indicates to corruption, trade designates trade openness, gdp 
signifies gross domestic product (GDP), capita denotes to the GDP per capita, pop 
indicates to country size, yr denotes to the year dummies. 
5.4.1 Mixed models (Hierarchical linear models) 
Based on the discussion in the previous section, model (1) was derived, which is 
the panel data model to be estimated for country i at time t. In order to quantify the 
impact of the main variables on the level of research productivity, a multilevel 
analysis model is used, because it allows for studying effects that vary by country, 
whilst also estimating country level averages. Furthermore, this method is allowed 
for unbalanced data—which is the case of this paper—. Multilevel models are also 
known in the literature as mixed models and hierarchical linear models. Mixed 
effects linear regression is characterised as containing both fixed and random 




effects, and our Models (5-2), (5-3) and (5-4) contains both fixed and random 
effects, with the former being measured directly (slope is the same across entities). 
In regard to the random effects, which are measured indirectly, according to their 
estimated variance and covariance (random coefficients and random intercepts). 
The mixed model offers two key advantages: it makes the specification of the 
random-effects term easier, and representing a mixed-model with the model above 
generalises easily to more than one set of random effects. Multilevel mixed effects 
linear regression can be extended to a more than two-level model, but in this paper, 
a two-level model is used including random effects at the second level. The model 
can be written as:  
 
𝑦𝑎𝑏 = 𝛼1 + 𝛼2𝑥𝑎𝑏 + 𝜗𝑏
(2)
+ ϣ𝑎𝑏 (5-5) 
Where y is the dependent variable represented by the research productivity which 
is expressed by three proxies:1) number of documents, 2) number of citations and, 
3) citations per document. x is the independent variables of corruption, research & 
development expenditure, country size, gross domestic product, trade openness, 
English language and year dummies. a is an index for the observations (panel data, 
so each year has an observation), b is an index for the countries (which are clustered 
into 170 countries). 𝝑𝒃𝒄
(𝟐)
 is the random intercept for the countries b. 
5.5 Variables Description and data source 
This section presents the variables used in this paper, which consists of three sub-
sections. The first sub-section discusses in detail both the dependent and 
independent variables and the logic theme behind them, including them in the 
model. This is followed by a brief description of the sample of the study and the 
sources of the data. The third sub-section discusses the stationarity level of all 
variables using the unit root test. ` 
Fixed effects  Random effects  




5.5.1 The Variables 
5.5.1.1 The dependent variable 
Research productivity has been used by many researchers in numerous instances of 
the literature as the dependent variable for different purposes. Research productivity 
is measured using different bibliometric indicators, for instance, Dundar and Lewis 
(1998) measured research productivity as”the ratio of total publications to a number 
of program faculty”. However, the most common bibliometric indicator for 
research productivity is the number of published documents, and it is a popular 
approach for measuring publication productivity (King, 2004; Meo et al., 2013; 
Albert et al., 2016; Horta, 2018).  In this study, we are using three bibliometric 
indictors representing research productivity, which are the number of documents, 
the number of citations and citation per document —we are using three different 
indicators for accurate and valid results. These variables are the dependent variables 
in this study, where the data for those variables has been extracted from the Scimago 
Journal & Country Rank, and are derived from the Scopus for 23 years (1996-2018). 
The dependent variables are elaborated below in detail. 
1. Documents 
The documents variable is measured as the number of published documents per 
country per year in the log form, it is usually called the country’s scientific output 
and this variable represents research productivity (King, 2004; Zavadskas et al., 
2011; Meo et al., 2013; Noruzi and Abdekhoda, 2014; Gul et al., 2015; Cavacini, 
2016; Barrot, 2017).  
2. Citations 
The number of citations are our second proxy for the level of the research 
productivity of nations (King, 2004; Zavadskas et al., 2011; Noruzi and 
Abdekhoda, 2014; Gul et al., 2015; Cavacini, 2016; Barrot, 2017). It is measured 
as “a number by the documents published during the source year to documents 
published during the same year” by Scimago Journal & Country Rank organization.  
 




3. Citation per document 
Citations per document are calculated as “the average of the citations per document 
during the source year to documents published during the same year”. It is used by 
Meo et al. (2013), Gul et al. (2015), Cavacini (2016) and Barrot (2017) as a proxy 
to represent the level of research productivity.  
5.5.1.2 The independent variables 
A number of factors are capable of influencing the research productivity of any 
country. According to DeMaria (2009), the most obvious and probably most 
important among these factors are the economic status, wealth and population size 
of a country. Furthermore, Brew et al. (2016) have argued that numerous studies 
have been carried out to examine factors that contribute to research productivity. In 
our study, in addition to our principal factor, language, we control for other 
variables that are expected to be important factors to research productivity. The 
choice of explanatory variables is inspired by the related empirical and theoretical 
literature and the availability of data. A detailed explanation for the chosen 
variables is elaborated below. 
1.  English Language  
English is the most spoken language in the world in terms of countries which 
consider it as one of the official languages in the country (Montgomery, 2013). The 
initial assumption is that English language is a barrier to the level of countries’ 
research productivity; keeping in mind that most of the journals in all fields are in 
English. Therefore, there is a need to empirically investigate if English hinders the 
increase of research productivity levels. The main reason for adding this variable in 
all models is to quantify the impact of the English language (as an official language) 
on the level of the research productivity of nations. English language has been 
added as a dummy variable in the three models (i.e. if English is an official language 
in a country=1, Otherwise 0). The argument is that the countries where English is 
an official language have higher research productivity levels than the countries 
where English is not an official language (DeMaria, 2009; Montgomery, 2013; 
Bentley, 2015). 




2. Trade openness  
Trade is expressed as a proportion —percentage— of a country’s GDP and trade in 
its general meaning is about importing and exporting goods and services between 
nations, therefore, the argument is that the countries which are more open to trade 
have a better chance to have researched or published documents than countries 
which are less open to trade, meaning that trade has a positive impact on the 
research productivity level of countries.  
3. Corruption  
We are controlling corruption, the main variable in this thesis as a proxy for the 
relative performance of governmental institutions (Mauro, 1995).  We argue that 
corruption has a negative impact on the level of research productivity of countries: 
countries with more corruption have less research specifically due to corruption. 
We are using the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) as the proxy for the corruption 
level of countries as it is the most accepted measure of corruption (Mo, 2001; 
Varsakelis, 2006; Veracierto, 2008; Lau et al., 2015; Huang, 2016).   
Transparency International (TI) is the leading organisation to fight against 
corruption, and it is the organisation which pointed to collecting CPI data. However, 
TI measures the perceptions of corruption on a scale of 0 to 100, with 0 indicating 
the highest level of corruption and 100 indicating the lowest. However, for this 
paper and to avoid any confusion, we reversed the scale so that 0 indicates the 
lowest level of corruption (clean countries) and 100 indicates the highest level of 
corruption (highly corrupt countries).  
4. Research & Development expenditure 
 Research & Development expenditure (R&D) is used as a proxy for capital inputs 
which are devoted to innovative activities, and it is measured as a share of the GDP 
(Varsakelis, 2006). Furthermore, by using overall R&D expenditure, we implicitly 
assume that the same proportion of such spending is devoted to economics in each 
country (Kocher et al., 2006). Research and development expenditure, which is 
defined as the current and capital expenditures (both public and private) on creative 




work, is undertaken systematically to increase knowledge. The R&D expenditure 
variable has been added in all three models as a proportion of GDP. The argument 
is that the countries which invest more in the public or private R&D sector are more 
likely to have a high level of research production (Meo et al., 2013). More R&D 
expenditures (input) means more published documents. The R&D aspect reflects 
the extent to which a country allocates resources for growing the overall stock of 
knowledge.   
5. Country Size 
 Country size is the proxy for the total population; we argue that countries with a 
larger population size can yield a larger pool of individuals with interest and talent 
in the scientific investigation as they have more opportunities for a higher level of 
research productivity (DeMaria, 2009).  
6. Gross Domestic Product  
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is the economic growth measured in terms of an 
increase in the size of a country’s economy. It is the main indicator used to gauge 
the strength of a country’s economy. The argument is that the growing GDP has a 
positive impact on the level of the research productivity of nations. It is used as a 
scale of economy for comparison purposes. The argument is that the growing GDP 
has a positive impact on the level of the research productivity of nations. It is used 
as a scale of economy for comparison purposes. Meo et al. (2013) are one of the 
researchers who used this variable in the same context as ours. However, we argue 
that the GDP has a positive impact on the level of research productivity of nations. 
7. The year dummy (1996-2015)  
1996 is omitted from the regressions to avoid the dummy variable trap. The year 
dummies have been added to capture the influence of the aggregate trends 
(citations) due to the time series. Additionally, the time year dummies are added in 
order for the cross country regression not to be influenced by the aggregate trends. 
The research productivity in the models changes over time for the reasons below: 




1. In terms of citations, the more recent the journals, the fewer chances the 
journals have to gain citations, which is termed the pure time effect;  
2. Many countries have been changing in recent years, particularly in the 
developing world. They have simply been getting better at research, and 
hence, more recent papers are of a higher quality;  
3. Fewer years are being cited, for researchers prefer to cite the most recent 
documents rather than old ones, and hence, there is a bias for more 
recent work to be cited;  
4. More journals are published and hence more papers for citation, for 
instance, the American Journal of Economics used to come out three 
times a year, while now it has four issues. 
5.5.2 The sample  
The data which we are using to run the regression is an unbalanced panel dataset.  
It is unbalanced because the sources which we extracted the data from do not have 
the full dataset.  The World Bank is the main source for the data in this paper. 
Nevertheless, the World Bank has reported several reasons why data is not available 
for certain indicators for certain countries and certain years. Firstly, certain 
indicators are derived from sporadic surveys and are only available for some years. 
Secondly, certain data sets or indicators are only available from the year they were 
initiated. Thirdly, some countries do not regularly report data due to conflict, lack 
of statistical capacity, or other reasons. Moreover, fourthly, certain countries do not 
have data for earlier years simply because they did not exist. Because we have 
missing observations for certain time periods of certain countries, we are using the 
annual data of 170 countries for the period of 1996-2018. 
Table (5-1) shows a summary of the variables and the data source. Table (5-2) 
describes the summary statistics of the dependent variables and the explanatory 
variables, which include their number of observations, mean, standard deviation, 
minimal value and maximum value. Table (5-3) shows the countries which are 
included in the regression, and they are divided region-wise according to the World 
Bank division.  




Table 5-1. The Glossary of Variables






absolute number of published documents per country 
Scimago Journal & country 
Rank 
Log Form 
cites Number of Citations absolute number of citations by the documents published 






It average of the citations per document during the source year to documents 
published during the same year 





L21 English Language (i.e. if English is an official language in a country=1, Otherwise 0) 
Central Intelligence Agency 
Fact Book 
1,0 












Research & development Expenditure (%of GDP) World Bank %of GDP 




The sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any 
product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. 
World Bank US $ 











Table 5-2. Summary of the statistics results 
 





Log Documents 4,648 5.945289 2.849329 0 13.43511 
Citations Per Document 4,648 17.9782 15.09425 0 471.8 
Citations (,000,000) 4,648 .2058622 1.072052 0 18.09516 
Independent 
Variables 
English Language 4,807 0.3062201 0.4609702 0 1 
Trade Openness 4,692 75.62668 61.64626 0 860.8 
Corruption 3,419 59.75984 23.47685 0 100 
Research & Development 4,692 0.3506888 0.7260307 0 4.42859 
Country Size 4,692 30.8036 124.2697 0 1386.395 
Gross Domestic Product 
(,000,000,000) 
4,692 381.2237 1428.524 0 21223.92 
GDP per Capita 4,488 15.55132 19.61225 0 135.3188 
Year Dummy 
1996 4,807 0.0434783 0.2039523 0 1 
1997 4,807 0.0434783 0.2039523 0 1 
1998 4,807 0.0434783 0.2039523 0 1 
1999 4,807 0.0434783 0.2039523 0 1 
2000 4,807 0.0434783 0.2039523 0 1 
2001 4,807 0.0434783 0.2039523 0 1 
2002 4,807 0.0434783 0.2039523 0 1 
2003 4,807 0.0434783 0.2039523 0 1 
2004 4,807 0.0434783 0.2039523 0 1 
2005 4,807 0.0434783 0.2039523 0 1 
2006 4,807 0.0434783 0.2039523 0 1 
2007 4,807 0.0434783 0.2039523 0 1 
2008 4,807 0.0434783 0.2039523 0 1 
2009 4,807 0.0434783 0.2039523 0 1 
2010 4,807 0.0434783 0.2039523 0 1 
2011 4,807 0.0434783 0.2039523 0 1 
2012 4,807 0.0434783 0.2039523 0 1 
2013 4,807 0.0434783 0.2039523 0 1 
2014 4,807 0.0434783 0.2039523 0 1 
2015 4,807 0.0434783 0.2039523 0 1 
2016 4,807 0.0434783 0.2039523 0 1 
2017 4,807 0.0434783 0.2039523 0 1 
2018 4,807 0.0434783 0.2039523 0 1 
Notes: 
1) The summary of statistics is provided based on the time period of 1996 to 2018 for 170 countries worldwide. 
2) The dataset used in this paper is unbalanced because there are some gaps in year for some countries due to the 








Europe & Central Asia 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
Latin America & 
Caribbean 
East Asia & 
Pacific 






Albania Angola Argentina Australia Algeria Afghanistan Canada 
Armenia Benin Bahamas, The Brunei 
Darussalam 
Bahrain Bangladesh United 
States 
Austria Botswana Barbados Cambodia Djibouti Bhutan 
 
Azerbaijan Burkina Faso Bolivia China Egypt, Arab Rep. India 
 
Belarus Burundi Brazil Hong Kong 
SAR, China 
Iran, Islamic Rep. Maldives 
 
Belgium Cabo Verde Chile Indonesia Iraq Nepal 
 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Cameroon Colombia Japan Israel Pakistan 
 
Bulgaria Central African 
Republic 
Costa Rica Korea, Rep. Jordan Sri Lanka 
 
Croatia Chad Dominica Lao PDR Kuwait 
  




Czech Republic Congo, Dem. Rep. Ecuador Mongolia Libya 
  
Denmark Congo, Rep. El Salvador Myanmar Malta 
  
Estonia Equatorial Guinea Grenada New Zealand Morocco 
  




France Ethiopia Guyana Philippines Qatar 
  
Georgia Gabon Haiti Singapore Saudi Arabia 
  




Greece Ghana Jamaica Thailand United Arab 
Emirates 
  
Hungary Guinea Mexico Vanuatu Yemen, Rep. 
  
Iceland Guinea-Bissau Nicaragua Vietnam 
   
Ireland Kenya Panama Timor-Leste 
   
Italy Lesotho Paraguay 
    
Kazakhstan Liberia Peru 
    
Kyrgyz Republic Madagascar Puerto Rico 
    
Latvia Malawi St. Lucia 
    
Lithuania Mali St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines 
    
Luxembourg Mauritania Suriname 
    
Moldova Mauritius Trinidad and 
Tobago 
    
Montenegro Mozambique Uruguay 
    
Netherlands Namibia Venezuela, RB 
    
Norway Niger 
     
Poland Nigeria 
     
Portugal Rwanda 
     
Romania Senegal 
     
Russian Federation Seychelles 
     
Serbia Sierra Leone 
     
Slovak Republic South Africa 
     
Slovenia Sudan 
     
Spain Tanzania 
     
Sweden Togo 
     
Switzerland Uganda 
     
Tajikistan Zambia 
     
Turkey Zimbabwe 
     
Turkmenistan 
      
Ukraine 
      
United Kingdom 
      
Uzbekistan 
      
Table 5-3. List of countries included in this study 
  




5.5.3 Unit root tests 
The dataset which we are using is an unbalanced panel dataset. The appropriate unit 
root test to be used is the Fisher-type test because it does not require strongly 
balanced data, and the individual’s series can have gaps (Baltagi, 2008; p.244-245). 
Therefore, we are using the Fisher-type test (Fisher, 1932) using ADF and PP tests 
(Maddala and Wu, 1999; Choi, 2001). Furthermore, the lag lengths of the individual 
augmented Dicky-Fuller tests are allowed to differ. Fisher-type tests were used to 
test the null hypothesis, which represents the presence of an “individual unit root”. 
The Fisher-type test uses p-value from unit root tests for each country i. The test is 
asymptotically chi-square distributed with 2N degrees of freedom, 𝑇𝑖
𝑖
→ ∞ 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑒 𝑁, (Nell and Zimmermann, 2011). The formula of the test is 
expressed as follows: 
𝑷 = −𝟐 ∑ 𝒍𝒏 𝒑𝒊
𝑵
𝒊=𝟏
  (5-6) 
Furthermore, the results show that all variables are stationary. Table (5-4) shows 
the results of the unit root for all variables. It can be concluded from these results 
that the null hypothesis is strongly rejected. Thus, it can be assumed that all the 
series are stationary at the same level (no unit root). 


















Individual effects, individual 
linear trends    
4246 206 825.382*** 4378 206 830.361*** 
Citations 
Individual effects, individual 
linear trends    
4215 206 507.221*** 4378 206 511.949*** 
Citations Per 
Document 
Individual effects, individual 
linear trends    
4220 206 1139.58*** 4378 206 1264.16*** 
Trade openness none 4158 191 518.357*** 4202 191 496.8*** 
Corruption 
Individual effects, individual 
linear trends 
2959 174 1038.98*** 3122 174 1190.63*** 
Research & 
Development 
Individual effects, individual 
linear trends    
2957 139 560.01*** 3058 139 722.474*** 
Country Size none 4106 194 738.907*** 4268 194 455.433*** 
Gross Domestic 
Product 
none 3998 186 625.489*** 4092 186 408.348* 
GDP per Capita 
Individual effects, individual 
linear trends    
3775 187 810.612*** 3927 187 420.813** 
legend: * p<0.1;** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Ho:  All panels contain unit roots   
Ha:  At least one panel is stationary 




5.6 Empirical Results & Discussion 
This section is divided into three sub-sections: the first one presents an overview of 
the global research productivity trend, while the second sub-section presents the 
national level results for 170 countries over the period of 1996-2018. The last 
subsection discusses the results of the three models comprehensively. 
5.6.1 World’s Research Productivity Trend 
The trend of the research productivity across the world of all nations cumulatively 
has been significantly growing in terms of the number of documents published. 
According, to the Scimago Journal & Country Rank, the volume of documents 
published has been more than double—the number of published documents has 
increased by 246% over the last 23 years, between the periods of 1996-2018. This 
is because many countries have been changing over time, particularly in the 
developing world. They have been getting better and hence more recent papers will 
be better. On the other hand, global citations have decreased by more than 90% 
within the same period, which might be because of the pure time effect: the more 
recent the journal, the less chance it has to gain citations. Nevertheless, it is worth 
mentioning the case of China, as it is a developing and growing economy whose 
share to the globally published documents has increased drastically by 15% 
between 1996 and 2018. Consequently, in terms of the number of citations, its share 
in terms of citations is 14% over the same period.  Figure (5-3) shows the trend of 









Figure 5-3. World Research Productivity Growth 




Figure (5-4) shows the intensity of the document vs, citations intensity over 23 
years, where document and citation intensity are measured as the ratio of the 
publications (volume of documents) and citation to the national GDP. Figure (5-5) 
exhibits the relationship between documents and citations (in log form), which 
shows a linear relationship between the two variables. While the USA is ranked in 
the first place, with the highest share of publications, when the intensity of the 






















Figure 5-4.Documents Intensity vs. Citations intensity over the period (1996-2018).  
Source: Scimago Journal & Country Rank  
 
Figure 5-5. Documents vs. Citations over the period (1996-2018).  
Source: Scimago Journal & Country Rank  
 
 




5.6.2 Panel Data Results 
Mixed-effects regression is used to run the regressions with restrict to values of 
GDP per capita and corruption bigger than zero, because there are some missing 
values that STATA, the program we use considers as zero even though they are not. 
Table (5-5) shows the results of the regressions analysis. As mentioned above, the 
main variables in this paper are corruption, English language and trade openness, 
for which the question of whether there is a direct relationship of these variables 
with the research productivity level is assessed. These variables show significance 
in all three models.  









-0.499*** 0.281*** 2.868*** 
(-7.377) (7.639) (7.225) 
Trade Openness 
-0.005*** -0.001*** -0.008*** 
(-8.005) (-3.991) (-3.116) 
Corruption 
-0.029*** -0.004*** -0.127*** 
(-13.318) (-5.454) (-10.739) 
R&D 
0.984*** 0.108*** 0.879*** 
(19.244) (2.862) (4.122) 
Country Size 
0.003*** -0.004*** -0.008*** 
(15.164) (-7.78) (-11.938) 
GDP (,000,000,000) 
0*** 0.001*** 0 
(7.541) (9.816) (1.288) 
GDP per Capita 
0.022*** -0.001 -0.044*** 
(7.868) (-1.434) (-4.906) 
1997 
-0.054 -0.003 0.364 
(-0.308) (-0.052) (0.35) 
1998 
0.256 -0.062 -0.192 
(1.265) (-0.59) (-0.176) 
1999 
0.099 -0.065 0.515 
(0.507) (-0.708) (0.456) 
2000 
0.288 -0.026 1.587 
(1.434) (-0.238) (1.322) 
2001 
0.132 -0.048 1.943 
(0.657) (-0.455) (1.529) 
2002 
0.114 -0.036 1.606 
(0.587) (-0.362) (1.281) 
2003 
-0.044 -0.038 1.49 
(-0.238) (-0.441) (1.295) 
2004 
-0.144 -0.042 1.448 
(-0.789) (-0.517) (1.342) 












-0.129 -0.047 -0.16 
(-0.708) (-0.619) (-0.158) 
2006 
-0.115 -0.085 -1.081 
(-0.638) (-1.233) (-0.965) 
2007 
-0.203 -0.106 -2.497*** 
(-1.118) (-1.648) (-2.275) 
2008 
-0.167 -0.118* -3.467*** 
(-0.907) (-1.868) (-3.552) 
2009 
-0.081 -0.115* -4.684*** 
(-0.443) (-1.822) (-4.596) 
2010 
0.091 -0.115* -3.761*** 
(0.508) (-1.794) (-3.713) 
2011 
0.098 -0.146*** -6.769*** 
(0.535) (-2.375) (-7.728) 
2012 
0.214 -0.176*** -6.838*** 
(1.168) (-2.805) (-6.384) 
2013 
0.271 -0.226*** -10.737*** 
(1.501) (-3.543) (-12.851) 
2014 
0.403*** -0.28*** -10.864*** 
(2.247) (-4.031) (-11.38) 
2015 
0.426*** -0.346*** -11.518*** 
(2.39) (-4.414) (-10.769) 
2016 
0.449*** -0.4*** -14.96*** 
(2.469) (-4.551) (-15.507) 
2017 
0.894*** -0.439*** -18.617*** 
(4.584) (-5.41) (-21.986) 
Constant 
7.975*** 0.416*** 30.581*** 
(32.389) (4.32) (23.16) 
Random Effects Constant 
0.471*** -0.411*** 2.119*** 
(40.721) (-5.115) (55.474) 
Number of Observations 3124 3124 3124 
Log Likelihood -5903.02 -3149.55 -1.11E+04 
Degrees of Freedom 28 28 28 
t-statistics is reported in the parentheses ( ). 
Robust standard errors have been used. legend: * p<0.1;** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
5.6.2.1 Number of documents 
Table (5-5) shows the results for the Model (5-2), where the number of documents 
is the dependent variable. Our main variable in this study is the English Language; 
we argue that research productivity is directly affected by the language meaning 
that countries with English as an official language are wealthier scientifically. The 
results show that English has nothing to do with the number of documents published 




per country, but the decreasing of the number of documents published because 
English is not necessarily the reason for countries to publish. For instance, even 
though China is growing outstandingly in terms of publications, English is not an 
official language. This increase is might be due to  China having its own journals 
in Chinese and the reason for the bias might be that the model disregards the 
strength of the journals: as we included all the publications irrespective of the place 
of the publications. Additionally, Bentley (2015) findings confirm that countries 
where people do not speak English prefer to publish in the domestic journals. In 
regard to, trade openness, which is about exchange of goods and services between 
countries, this has a negative impact on the research productivity of countries as 
shown in Table (5-5). When the country’s trade increases by 1%, the research 
productivity in terms of documents will go down by 0.0052 percentage points. 
Consequently, trade has no advantage in improving the research productivity, yet, 
it slows it down. Regarding corruption, the main variable in this thesis, the results 
reveal that corrupt countries are less likely to publish documents and be productive 
in research. The cleaner countries, —mainly developed countries, are more likely 
to be rich in science as they publish more— Furthermore, this result is consistent 
with the R&D expenditures where the result indicates that countries investing a fine 
proportion of their GDP in the R&D sector are more likely to publish as those 
resources are going into the research sector where publications are the main 
concern. Regarding the economy scale variable, GDP, where the result indicates 
that the countries with high GDP are more likely to publish, if the GDP increases 
by one percentage point, the publication would increase by 0.0247 percentage 
points. 
5.6.2.2 Number of citations 
The results where the number of citations is the dependent variable, are shown in 
table (5-5). In reference to the English language, it has a positive significant impact 
on the research productivity of nations as the countries with English as an official 
language are more likely to cite which eventually increases the research 
productivity and consequently improves the economic growth of countries. 
Regarding the trade openness variable, the results indicate that the number of 
citations is negatively associated with trade openness. Countries which are more 




open to trade are less likely to cite or have more citations, and less likely to do 
research. Furthermore, the main factor in this thesis —Corruption—reveals that 
more corrupt countries are less likely to do research, consequently they tend to cite 
less: because they produce fewer documents, they are less likely to cite compared 
to countries which focus on research and which are mainly clean countries. The 
R&D variable shows that the countries which tend to invest a fine portion of their 
GDP in the R&D sector are more likely to do research, which means they tend to 
cite more. The economy scale variable, GDP, shows a positive association with the 
number of citations; when the GDP increases by 1 billion US dollar, the number of 
citations increases by 754 citations. 
5.6.2.3 Citations per document 
We added this model as we want accurate and valid results. Therefore, to check 
consistency, we run the same regression using a different dependent variable, and, 
the results are shown in the Table (5-5). Our main variable, the English Language, 
shows a positively significant relationship with the dependent variable: countries 
with English as an official Language are more likely to have citations per document. 
On the other hand, the results regarding trade openness indicate that trade is not 
good for research. Trade has a negatively significant impact on the citations per 
document, meaning that the countries which are more open to trade are less likely 
to cite. Results regarding corruption are consistent with the Model (5-2) and (5-3), 
indicating that it has a negative impact on research productivity: countries which 
tend to be more corrupt, are less likely to do research and vice versa.  
5.6.3 Discussion 
In sum, the three models show the significance of the main variables in this study: 
corruption, English language and trade openness. The other variables such as R&D, 
GDP, country size and GDP per capita show significance in different levels with 
both positive and negative impacts. 




They start with our main variable, English, — where the results show a 
miscellaneous significant direct relationship in all three models. Countries which 
have the English language as an official language have an advantage over the 
countries which do not in terms of a number of citations, yet they are less likely to 
publish documents. Hence, those countries are more likely to be more innovative 
because English is the global language of research (DeMaria, 2009). Yet, Bentley 
(2015) has found that publishing in the English language is dominant but not 
exclusive as our results showed. On the other hand, trade openness shows 
significance in all the three models with adverse impact on the level of research 
productivity: countries which are more likely to open to the rest of the world via 
trade are less likely to do research (i.e. publish or cite). Therefore, as per our results, 
trade is bad for the research productivity of nations. Figure (5-6) shows the 
relationship between research productivity intensity (in terms of documents & 
citations). The figure shows that in countries open to trade such as Singapore, Hong 
Kong and Luxembourg the research productivity level is not quite parallel to their 
openness for trade. In contrast, countries like the USA and the UK which are less 
open to trade compared with the previous countries, have a better research 
productivity level. This can be explained by the suggestion that countries with better 
research are focusing on investing in research inside the country rather than 
investing in other countries, and this will result in more publications. Countries with 
less trade have a better research productivity level than the countries which are more 
open to a trade.   
Figure 5-6. The relationship between Research productivity intensity and trade openness. 
Source. Scimago Journal & Country Rank and World Bank 




The corruption variable which we added in the three models as a proxy for the 
relative performance of the governmental institutions (Mauro, 1995) shows a 
significant direct impact on the research productivity level of the nations in all the 
models. The results reveal that clean countries, less corrupt ones, are more likely to 
have better research productivity than highly corrupt countries because clean 
countries are focusing on public interest rather than on self-interest. Consequently, 
countries which are more likely to be corrupt are less likely to produce science. 
Figure (5-7) shows the relationship between research productivity and corruption. 
The results and Figure (5-7) are consistent, whereby the clean countries are 
publishing relatively more documents than the corrupt ones. In terms of citation 
intensity, the Gambia, is a good example with a high corruption level along with 
noticeable citations.  
 
R&D expenditure is used as a proxy for capital inputs which are devoted to 
innovative activities, and it is measured as a share of the GDP. By using overall 
R&D expenditure, we implicitly assume that the same proportion of such spending 
is devoted to economics in each country (Kocher et al., 2006). The outcomes of the 
regression show that there is a direct association between R&D and research 
production: countries which invest more in the R&D sector, are more likely to be 
more innovative in research (Varsakelis, 2006; Larsen et al., 2008; Meo et al., 
2013). Figure (5-8) shows the relationship between research productivity 
(documents and citation intensity) and R&D as a share of GDP. The illustration (5-
8) shows a quite interesting relationship between the two factors; for instance, South 
Figure 5-7. The relationship between Research productivity intensity and Corruption. 
Source. Scimago Journal & Country Rank and Transparency International 




Korea and Japan have been investing a considerable proportion of their GDP in the 
R&D sector and yet their number of documents and citations are not commensurate 
with this. The main reason for South Korea investing a considerable proportion of 
its GDP in the R&D sector is that it strives to transform itself into a knowledge-
based economy. It is one of the best examples of an economy that has become 
knowledge-based within less than 60 years. 
 
 Country Size is measured in terms of the total population. We argue that the 
countries with more population have the opportunity to have better research 
productivity, as DeMaria (2009) argued that greater population would yield a larger 
pool of individuals with an interest and talent in scientific investigation, meaning 
that the pool of the people who work in the research sector will increase. Our results 
are consistent with DeMaria (2009), as the countries with more population tend to 
publish more, and the reason for this might be that more people means more 
opportunities to work in research, which consequently can yield more publications. 
Citations show a contrary association, whereby countries with more population are 
less likely to have better research productivity in terms of citations, which might be 
because of pure time effects.  
The economy scale is represented in the GDP and is the main indicator used to 
gauge the strength of a country’s economy. The results show a direct positive 
association between GDP and research productivity: countries with a higher GDP 
are more likely to have better research productivity. We added GDP per capita in 
Figure 5-8. The relationship between Research productivity intensity and Research & Development. 
Source. Scimago Journal & Country Rank and World Bank 




three documents to check its impacts on the research productivity of nations and the 
results show an inverse relationship between research productivity that is citations 
per document. Countries with high GDP per capita have less research productivity. 
However, Meo et al. (2013) have found that GDP per capita has no association with 
research productivity.  
Furthermore, Figure (5-9) shows a comparison between economic intensity (GDP 
per capita) to the research productivity intensity. The figure shows that there is no 
logical relationship between wealth intensity and research productivity intensity. 
For instance, Qatar and Kuwait have the highest GDP per Capita in the world yet 
neither have not have remarkable research productivity. Contrarily, The Gambia 
and Grenada have the lowest GDP per capita in the world and yet their research 
productivity level is remarkably high. It can be concluded that there is no 
association between GDP per capita and research productivity (Meo et al., 2013). 
 
5.7 Conclusion 
This study has presented the impact of trade openness, English language and 
corruption factors on research productivity in terms of the number of documents 
and citations for 170 countries during the past 23 years by adopting the mixed 
methods of Hierarchical linear models. The empirical evidence reveals that both 
trade openness and corruption adversely affect research productivity. However, the 
Figure 5-9. The relationship between Research productivity intensity and Wealth Intensity (GDP per Capita). 
Source. Scimago Journal & Country Rank and World Bank 




results show that publications produced by countries with English as an official 
language are more cited than those where English is not an official language. This 
is firstly because English is an international language which makes research more 
visible to the world and secondly, most top-ranking journals are in English. 
Nevertheless, our findings reveal that this is not proportional to the number of 
publications produced by those countries, which means that countries with English 
as an official language do not necessarily tend to publish more documents. This 
might be due to the fact that these countries publish in domestic journals which are 
not necessarily in English. In conclusion, countries might be focusing on the 
quantity of published documents rather than their quality. 
In light of the empirical evidence, we suggest some policies in order to improve the 
research sector in nations as follows. First, the researchers or institutions could 
translate the local published documents into English in this way, because English 
is the global language (Northrup, 2013), the local piece of work can be globally 
exposed. Second, governments should stress the importance of the research sector 
in economic and social development (Meo et al., 2013) by establishing international 
universities, supporting international collaboration and increasing grants dedicated 
to research thus increasing R&D funds. Third, governments must highlight policies 
which can help to boost the research culture in countries.  
5.8 Limitations and Future Research Directions 
Some of the findings in this study shed additional light on the results of previous 
literature, while others are unique to the literature. While this work provides some 
interesting insights and ideas for future work in this strain, it has some limitations. 
One limitation is that this study might be more specific, as we can compare the 
research productivity using the same controlled variables using regions, or economy 
type or income levels. Furthermore, this study could be extended regionally or in 
terms of specialisation because those kinds of studies provide a comprehensive 
understanding of the distribution of research performance and productivity.  
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VI. Chapter Six: Common Conclusion and Policy 
Implications. 
This thesis has presented three empirical studies to explore the effects of certain 
factors on innovation. The first study examined the influence of corruption on 
innovation using the large panel dataset of 176 countries over a period of 18 years 
(2000-2017). Innovation has been represented using four proxies and they are 
categorized into: 1) innovation inputs (R&D expenditures and several researchers 
working in R&D sectors), and 2) innovation outputs (residential patents and the 
number of published journals and articles). Furthermore, a fixed effects model has 
been used for innovation inputs, while for innovation outputs, we used random 
effects. However, the empirical evidence has revealed a significant adverse impact 
of corruption on innovation activities represented in innovation inputs, yet, 
corruption has no impact on innovation outputs. Nevertheless, home corruption 
cannot be isolated from neighbouring corruption as many studies have attested to 
the fact that corruption is contagious. This has motivated us to extend our previous 
study and investigate the stimulus of contagious corruption on home innovation. 
This issue has been addressed in the second study using a dataset of 140 countries 
over a period of 15 years (2003-2017) with the Two Stages Least Squares model. 
In addition, the impact of neighbouring innovation or innovation spillover on home 
corruption has been considered using the random effects model. Our empirical 
findings disclose the fact that contagious corruption can definitely disturb home 
innovation and consequently can harm economic growth. Interestingly, our 
outcomes have demonstrated that the innovation of neighbouring countries could 
help the home country to be less corrupt (i.e. cleaner). From a different perspective, 
innovation can be represented as research productivity in terms of the number of 
documents and number of citations. In line with this, the third study has presented 
the effects of corruption, openness and the English language on research 
productivity and consequently, innovation. To address this issue, we have used 
mixed models, the hierarchal linear model and the data of 170 countries over the 
period of 1996-2018. Our results made it apparent that corruption and trade 
openness have a negative impact on research productivity. This means that 
countries which are less open to trade, because they tend to invest in the home 




country for research & development, have a higher rate of research productivity. 
English is a crucial factor in propagating documents through the citation process 
both because of being a global language and also because the top ranking journals 
are in English.  
In accordance with the empirical evidence, we suggest the following policy 
implications in order to diminish corruption and help the country innovate more, 
allowing potentially the global innovation to flourish.  
1. Governments/policymakers must focus on anti-corruption campaigns 
which have shown their effectiveness in reducing corruption.  
2. Governments shall consider putting some policies in order to trigger 
innovation activities such as eliminating unnecessary bureaucratic and 
red tape barriers.  
3. The policymakers are urged to undertake serious measures to spur 
innovative activities by eliminating the unnecessary bureaucratic 
matters that are the main cause of corruption and that lead to hindering 
economic growth and innovation. 
4. Governments should encourage more innovation-friendly procedures by 
enforcing e-government services mainly designed to reduce the time of 
governmental procedures, eliminate unnecessary intermediaries and 
induce a fair access to information and services. 
5. Governmental policymakers should set rules and regulations at the 
borders precisely because it is easier for corruption to travel as showed 
in Chapter 5. Fighting corruption locally and thus reduce home 
corruption can spill-over into neighbouring countries and help those to 
be cleaner and thus considered to be positive externalities. 
6. Researchers or institutions could translate locally published documents 
into English so that local pieces of work can be globally exposed.  




7. Governments should stress the importance of the research sector in 
economic and social development by establishing international 
universities, supporting international collaboration and increasing 
grants dedicated to research thus increasing R&D funds.  
8. Governments must highlight policies which can help boost the research 
culture in countries.  
 
In general, despite the sources of corruption, a nation’s ability to innovate can be 
harmed through the misallocation of resources and this might consequently affect 
innovation outputs —documents & citations—and eventually deter economic 
growth. Therefore, in order to enhance national innovation levels, governments 
shall focus on setting rules and regulations to control corruption in addition to 
setting English as an official academic language.  
 
